Brooks v. Verizon
Filing
14
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 11 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Linda Brooks. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roger B Cosbey on 10/11/11. (jcp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
LINDA BROOKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
VERIZON,
Defendant.
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CAUSE NO. 1:11-cv-203
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a request filed by pro se Plaintiff Linda Brooks in this Title VII racial
discrimination case against her former employer, Defendant Verizon, together with a completed
Questionnaire for Appointment of Counsel (Docket # 11, 13), asking that this Court recruit an
attorney to represent her. Because Brooks’s case is not a difficult one, and since she is
competent to litigate it, the motion will be DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Civil litigants do not have a right, either constitutional or statutory, to court-appointed
counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288
(7th Cir. 1995). Rather, district courts are empowered to appoint an attorney to represent a
plaintiff without charge when she is “unable to afford counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), or in
Title VII cases “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that several factors should be weighed by
the district court when determining whether appointment of counsel is warranted: (1) whether
the plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from
doing so; and (2) given the difficulty of the case, whether the plaintiff appears competent to
litigate it herself. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654-58; Sherrill v. Potter, 329 Fed. Appx. 672, 675 (7th Cir.
2009) (unpublished) (applying the Pruitt factors in a Title VII case); see also Darden v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 500-501 (7th Cir. 1986) (instructing the court to consider “the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff’s diligence in attempting to obtain a lawyer, and the plaintiff’s
financial ability to retain counsel” when considering a motion to appoint counsel under Title
VII).
ANALYSIS
Applying the foregoing analysis to the instant circumstances, it is difficult at present to
assess the merits of Brooks’s claims. We do know, however, that at least eleven attorneys
(several of which are quite experienced in employment discrimination) have chosen to pass up
the opportunity to represent her. (See Questionnaire for Appointment of Counsel ¶ 6.) This
circumstance speaks rather directly to the merits of her case and raises a fair inference that these
attorneys did not view her case as meritorious.
Perhaps equally important is the fact that Brooks seems fully capable of litigating these
claims herself. This suit is a relatively straightforward employment discrimination action:
Brooks claims that she was subjected to a “discriminatory/racially hostile work environment”
while employed by Verizon and was then retaliated against when she complained about it.
(Compl. 1-3); see, e.g., Jagla v. LaSalle Bank, No. 05 C 6460, 2006 WL 1005728, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 12, 2006) (denying plaintiff’s request for counsel in a straightforward national origin
discrimination case, observing that the issue did not involve any “nonintuitive procedural
requirements applied in a setting of complex legal doctrine” (quoting Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr.,
931 F.2d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1991))). Brooks has already adequately articulated her claims,
worked with opposing counsel to prepare a report of parties’ planning meeting, participated in a
preliminary pretrial conference, and prepared motions seeking specific relief. (See Docket # 1, 9,
10, 11.) Moreover, it appears that Brooks, at least for part of the time, successfully pursued on
her own her charge of discrimination at the Fort Wayne Metropolitan Human Relations
Commission. (See Docket # 1.) Consequently, it is clear Brooks is literate and has adequate
communication skills, at least for purposes of representing herself. Moreover, Brooks has the
freedom and ability to perform her own legal research. Finally, to a major degree the facts of the
case are within Brooks’s personal knowledge, so the task of discovery is apt to be quite limited
and certainly not insurmountable.
In short, Brooks appears to be competent and fully capable of representing herself in this
suit, and it does not appear that appointing counsel will make a difference in the outcome. See
Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 299. Consequently, her motion will be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion requesting the appointment of counsel
(Docket # 11) is DENIED. Plaintiff is, of course, free to attempt to secure counsel on her own.
Enter for this 11th day of October, 2011.
/S/ Roger B. Cosbey
Roger B. Cosbey,
United States Magistrate Judge
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