Dickerson v. Schultz et al
Filing
12
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 10 MOTION for Reconsideration filed by William D Dickerson. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 7/6/11. (jcp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
WILLIAM D. DICKERSON,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
BRAD SCHULTZ, et al.,
Defendants.
CAUSE NO. 1:11-CV-213
OPINION AND ORDER
William D. Dickerson (“Dickerson”), a pro se prisoner, moves
for reconsideration of the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
(DE #10.)
For the reasons set forth below, the
motion (DE #10) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Dickerson, a federal prisoner, filed this action in the U.S.
District for the Northern District of Indiana on May 23, 2011. (DE
#1.)
On June 17, 2011, the case was transferred to this Court.
(DE #4.)
On June 23, 2011, this Court dismissed the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
(DE #7.)
Dickerson moved for reconsideration.
On June 30, 2011,
(DE #10.)
DISCUSSION
As is fully explained in the order of dismissal, Dickerson’s
complaint pertaining to a traffic stop and seizure occurring in
February 2001 was dismissed as time-barred.
(DE #7.)
The bulk of
Dickerson’s motion to reconsider addresses the underlying merits of
his claims (see DE #10 at 2-3), but the Court did not reach the
merits since the claims were untimely.
These arguments do not
provide any basis for reinstating the case.
As to the timeliness issue, Dickerson points out that one of
the defendants is a federal officer, and appears to argue that the
two-year statute of limitations period applicable to claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not apply to the claim against him.
(See DE #10 at 3.)
This argument is unavailing, however, because
Bivens actions brought against federal agents are subject to the
same two-year limitations period as actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
See Jackson v. Cotter, 541 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2008).
Dickerson further asserts that his claims against the state
troopers
“are
matters[.]”
not
personal
(DE #10 at 3.)
injury
claims
in
the
sense
that
Seventh Circuit case law is to the
contrary, however, and for purposes of the statute of limitations,
constitutional tort claims are treated like personal injury claims.
See Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council,
406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (Indiana’s two-year limitations
period applicable to personal injury suits applies to claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Dickerson also appears to argue that his federal claims are
based on a violation of INDIANA CODE § 35-33-5-5, a state law
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governing disposition of seized property, which he believes changes
the statute of limitations analysis.
#1 at 2-3.)
(See DE #10 at 2; see also DE
To the extent that is what Dickerson is claiming, his
allegations would not state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in any event.
See Campbell v. Chappelow, 95 F.3d 576, 579-80
(7th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff’s allegation that state trooper violated
INDIANA CODE § 35-33-5-5 could not create liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); see also Sobitan v. Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 389 (7th Cir.
2009) (“By definition, federal law, not state law, provides the
source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a
federal
constitutional
right.”)
(citation
omitted);
Scott
v.
Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“42 U.S.C. § 1983
protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations
of state laws . . . .”).
In short, none of Dickerson’s arguments
present a viable basis for reinstating the case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to reconsider (DE
#10) is DENIED.
DATED: July 6, 2011
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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