Dickerson v. Schultz et al

Filing 7

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 6/23/11. (jcp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
WILLIAM D. DICKERSON,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
BRAD SCHULTZ, et al.,
Defendants.

CAUSE NO. 1:11-CV-213

OPINION AND ORDER
William D. Dickerson, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(DE #1.)

For the reasons set forth below,

this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

BACKGROUND
Dickerson, a federal prisoner, filed this action in the U.S.
District for the Southern District of Indiana on May 23, 2011. (DE
#1.)

On June 17, 2011, the case was transferred to this Court.

(DE #4.)

DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review a prisoner
complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b).

The court applies the same standard as

when deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th
Cir. 2006).

To survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.

Bissessur v. Indiana

Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009).

“A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 603.

In

determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court must
bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, Dickerson alleges that officers from the Indiana State
Police violated his Fourth Amendment rights in connection with a
traffic stop and search that occurred in February of 2001 near Fort
Wayne, Indiana.

(DE #1 at 1-2.)

It is apparent from the face of

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the complaint that Dickerson’s claim is time-barred.1

Fourth

Amendment claims for false arrest or unlawful searches accrue at
the time of the violation. See Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585,
589 (7th Cir. 2008).

Under applicable law Dickerson was required

to bring his claim within two years of when it accrued.

See

Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406
F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (Indiana’s two-year limitations
period for personal injury suits applies to Section 1983 claims).
This case filed in 2011 is thus several years too late.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this action is DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

DATED: June 23, 2011

/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United State District Court

1

Although timeliness is an affirmative defense, dismissal at
the pleading stage is appropriate if the defense is
“unmistakable” and “apparent from the complaint itself.” Walker
v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Cancer
Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., LP , 559 F.3d 671, 674 (7th
Cir. 2009) (dismissal on the basis of an affirmative defense is
appropriate when the plaintiff includes information in his
complaint pleading himself out of court). That standard is
clearly met here.
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