Godt v. United States of America et al
Filing
11
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 6 Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant United States of America. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 3/29/2012. (kjm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JASON EDWARD GODT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Defendant.
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NO. 1:11-CV-374
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the United States of
America’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on December 23, 2011.
For the
reasons set forth below, this motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, this
case is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
According to the allegations contained in the complaint, the
Internal
Revenue
Service
(“IRS”)
began
questioning
regarding possible delinquent federal income taxes.
Plaintiff
Then the IRS
placed liens on Plaintiff’s property due to collect on delinquent
taxes.
Plaintiff asserts that on October 27, 2011, the IRS began
collecting back taxes by garnishing his paycheck.
Plaintiff filed
a “Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,”
alleging that the IRS has sought to collect from him a direct
unapportioned income tax.
Plaintiff argues that the IRS does not
have constitutional power to impose a direct unapportioned income
tax.
Moreover, Plaintiff demands a declaratory judgment and
asserts that the IRS agreed not to take collection action against
him until “they have provided answers” to plaintiff’s contentions
concerning the constitutionality of the federal income tax system.
As such, he seeks to have all liens and levies removed and seizures
returned.
Further, he seeks $100,000 for emotional and financial
distress.
In response, the IRS has filed the instant motion to dismiss,
arguing that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure respectively.
DISCUSSION
For the purpose of analyzing Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) claims,
the following standards apply.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss claims over
which
the
federal
court
lacks
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the "power to decide" and must be conferred upon a
federal court.
In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 794
F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986).
When jurisdictional allegations
are questioned, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
jurisdiction requirements have been met.
Kontos v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 1987).
In reviewing a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court may look beyond the
complaint and review any extraneous evidence submitted by the
parties to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.
United Transp. Union v. Gateway Western R.R. Co., 78 F.3d 1208,
1210 (7th Cir. 1996).
To the extent Defendant’s claims are under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court will apply the following guidelines. The purpose of a motion
to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not
to decide the merits.
Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989). In determining the propriety of
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court
must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2001).
A complaint
is not required to contain detailed factual allegations, but it is
not enough merely that there might be some conceivable set of facts
that entitles the plaintiff to relief.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007), abrogating in part Conley
v.
Gibson,
355
U.S.
41,
45-46
(1957).
A
plaintiff
has
an
obligation under Rule 8(a)(2) to provide grounds of his entitlement
to relief, which requires more than labels and conclusions. Id. at
1965.
Factual allegations, taken as true, must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.
Id.
Moreover, a
plaintiff may plead himself out of court if the complaint includes
allegations that show he cannot possibly be entitled to the relief
sought.
Jefferson v. Ambroz, 90 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (7th Cir.
1996).
This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over
Plaintiff’s Claims Under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.
The IRS is correct that, to the extent Plaintiff makes claims
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act and
the Anti-Injunction Act, this Court is without subject matter
jurisdiction those claims.
A liberal reading of the complaint demonstrates that the
Plaintiff is asking this Court to enter a declaratory judgment that
a statement in an IRS letter constitutes an agreement on the part
of the IRS to stay collection of assessed federal income tax
liabilities. While the Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes courts
to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party,” it specifically exempts controversies “with respect to
Federal taxes.”
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see also Seibert v. Baptist,
594 F.2d 423, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1979)(recognizing that district
courts have no jurisdiction over the use of declaratory judgments
with respect to federal taxes).
Thus, this Court is without
jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment here.
It also appears that Plaintiff is bringing tort claims against
the IRS for emotional and financial distress.
Title 28 U.S.C.
section 1346(b), subject to the conditions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2671 et seq., does generally confer
jurisdiction to district courts over “civil actions or claims
against the United States, for money damages.”
However, “claim[s]
arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax” are
specifically excluded.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).1
F.Supp. 141, 147 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
Young v. I.R.S., 596
Because Plaintiff seeks money
damages for distress allegedly arising in respect of the assessment
and collection of his federal income tax, this Court is without
jurisdiction to entertain such claims.
In addition, Plaintiff asks this Court to apply the AntiInjunction Act and restrain the collection of federal income tax by
having “all liens and levies removed and seizures returned.”
However, the Anti-Injunction Act provides that “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.”
U.S.C. § 7421.
26
Accordingly, the Court is without power to fulfill
this request.
Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Title 42, Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.
Plaintiff styles his action “Complaint Under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Section 1983 provides a private action
against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another
1
In addition, to bring any claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
Plaintiff would be first required to exhaust his administrative remedies, 28
U.S.C. section 2675(a), which he did not do. (Decl. Spickelmier).
person of their rights.
However, section 1983 does not apply to
the acts taken under color of federal law.
Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); Young v. I.R.S., 596 F.Supp. 141, 145 (N.D. Ind.
1984).
“[A]ctions of the IRS officials, even if beyond the scope
of their official duties, are acts done under color of federal law
and not state law, thus making section 1983 inapplicable.”
596 F.Supp. at 145.
Young,
Because the alleged actions of the IRS would
have necessarily been undertaken pursuant to federal law, they
cannot form the basis of a section 1983 claim.
It should be pointed out that Plaintiff does not provide any
argument or legal authority in conflict with the issues discussed
above.
Instead, Plaintiff’s response brief is focused on one
discrete issue. He states that, “[w]ith the desire that truth will
be revealed, I ask one simple request of this Court before ruling
on the defence’s motion to dismiss, I ask this Court to reconstruct
the Supreme Court case that all the other lower Court cases
acknowledge
as
the
one
that
determined
the
existence
Constitutional power for a direct unapportioned income tax.
of
That
Supreme Court case is Brushaber 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, (1916).”
(DE# 9, p, 2). Simply stated, Plaintiff complains that the federal
income
tax
unapportioned
is
tax
unconstitutional
and
that
lower
because
it
courts
have
is
a
direct,
misinterpreted
Brushaber to allow such a tax.
This Court declines Plaintiff’s request to reconstruct the
Supreme Court case of Brushaber.
As illustrated by the discussion
above, that issue is immaterial for purposes of resolving the
instant motion.
Nevertheless, many litigants in the past have
argued against the Brushaber decision and further argued that the
federal income tax is unconstitutional because it is a direct,
unapportioned tax. “This argument has been raised and rejected for
decades.”
United States v. Maggi, No. 98-5570, 1999 WL 96651, *2
(6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1999).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is
GRANTED.
DATED:
March 29, 2012
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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