Golden Ali v. Centralized Infractions Bureau et al
Filing
6
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 5 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; DISMISSING the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28:1915(e)(2)(B) as to Terrance El Jerome Golden Ali. Signed by Judge Theresa L Springmann on 4/16/12. (jcp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
TERRANCE EL JEROME GOLDEN ALI,
Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRALIZED INFRACTIONS BUREAU,
et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CAUSE NO.: 1:12-CV-53-TLS
OPINION AND ORDER
Terrance El Jerome Golden Ali, a plaintiff proceeding pro se, filed a document that he
titled Affidavit Tort Damages Deprivation of Constitutional Rights and Jury Demand [ECF No.
4]. He also filed an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (in forma
pauperis) [ECF No. 5]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY the Plaintiff’s
Application and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), will DISMISS what the Court has
construed as the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee of $350 to bring an action in federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite
their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must make two
determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court,
without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to
pay such costs or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff contends that
he earns approximately $250 per week, has no cash on hand and no dependents. Based on this
information, it appears that the Plaintiff is financially eligible for in forma pauperis status. See
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 77 FED. REG. 4035 (Jan. 26, 2012).
The inquiry does not end there, however. District courts have an obligation under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints before service on the defendants, and must dismiss
the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Dismissal under the in forma
pauperis statute is an exercise of the Court’s discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard
as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal under federal
pleading standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few
words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
2
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,
403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
In evaluating whether a complaint is frivolous for purposes of the in forma pauperis
statute, the Court need not “accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.”
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33. Instead, the statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss
a claim based on an undisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the
veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. This includes allegations that are “fantastic” or
“delusional.” Id. at 328.
Here, the Plaintiff’s original complaint was essentially incomprehensible. (See ECF No.
1.) The Court struck the complaint and granted the Plaintiff an opportunity to submit an amended
complaint, sent him the proper form, and gave him specific instructions on what information he
needed to provide. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Rather than completing the form that was sent to him, he
filed a type-written document labeled, “Affidavit Tort Damages For Deprivation of
Constitutional Rights and Jury Demand.” This document is as incomprehensible as the original
complaint. Given the nature and content of his filings, however, it does not appear that granting
the Plaintiff another opportunity to replead his claims will result in a more viable complaint. The
Court therefore proceeds to screening.
In his Amended Complaint, Golden Ali purports to sue an entity called the “Centralized
Infractions Bureau,” which he identifies as “a private corporation . . .foreign to the United States
Republic,” and four individuals, each of whom are identified as “STATE OF INDIANA/ALLEN
SUPERIOR COURT officer of the, private corporation, foreign to the United States Republic;
3
and foreign to the organic Northwest Indiana Territory.” (Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 4.) The bulk
of the Amended Complaint consists of nonsensical statements pertaining to Golden Ali’s alleged
status as an “Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish-American” who is subject to the “Treaty of Peace
and Friendship of 1836 A.D.” between the United States and Morocco rather than the laws of
Indiana or the United States. At one point, he complains that he was pulled over by Allen County
police officers for committing various traffic violations, which he believes was improper because
“Plaintiff never entered into any contract/agreement nor was there a corpus delecti established
into the record as subject matter.” (Id. at 3–4.) He also asserts that a state case pending against
him (perhaps arising from the traffic stop) is invalid because his name was put in all capital
letters in the caption; he views this as a “deliberate grammatical error, intended for injury to me;
and is clearly not of consanguine relationship to me or my nationality, in any form, truth, or
manner.” (Id. at 4.) Among other relief, he seeks enforcement of the “Divine Constitution and
By-Laws of the Moorish Science Temple of America,” dismissal of various state charges, and
monetary damages against the defendants. (Id. at 16–17.)
The Court cannot discern within these allegations any plausible federal claim against any
defendant. See United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.
2003) (“Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward.”); Jennings v. Emry,
910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990) (complaint “must be presented with sufficient clarity to
avoid requiring a district court or opposing party to forever sift through its pages” to determine
whether it states a valid claim). To the extent Golden Ali is claiming to be a “sovereign citizen”
not subject to the laws of Indiana or the United States, such a claim is “shop worn” and
“frivolous.” See United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Blake-
4
Bey v. Cook County, Ill., 438 Fed. Appx. 522, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011) (suit properly
dismissed as frivolous where plaintiffs, adherents of Moorish Science Temple of America,
alleged that they were citizens of Moroccan Empire not subject to the laws of Illinois); United
States v. Toader, 409 Fed. Appx. 9, at *13 (7th Cir. Nov. 24, 2010) (rejecting argument that
court lacked jurisdiction over defendant claiming to be “Native Asiatic Moorish National
Citizen” since laws of the United States “apply to all persons within its borders”). Furthermore,
this Court has no authority to dismiss or otherwise interfere with the state court case.1 See In re
Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that as a general matter, federal courts
lack authority to “control or interfere with state court litigation”); Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d
768, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2002) (“lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to conduct direct
review of state court decisions.”). Accordingly, the Court declines to authorize the Plaintiff to
proceed with this lawsuit under the in forma pauperis statute.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without
Prepayment of Fees [ECF No. 5], and DISMISSES the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 4]
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
SO ORDERED on April 16, 2012.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1
Although federal habeas corpus provides a vehicle for challenging a state conviction on
constitutional grounds, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Golden Ali does not provide sufficient information
about the nature and status of the state case for the Court to ascertain whether this presents a
viable option.
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?