Miller v. Hoffman et al

Filing 70

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 65 MOTION to Seal Exhibit by Plaintiff Linda Miller; GRANTING 51 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Defendants Darrell Caudill, Fort Wayne City of, Heather Hoffman. The federal claims against against Officers Hoffman and C audill DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the state law claims against the City of Fort Wayne and Officers Hoffman and Caudill are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court. The Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 12/18/2013. (lhc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
LINDA MILLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FORT WAYNE CITY
POLICE OFFICERS HEATHER
HOFFMAN and DARRELL
CAUDILL, et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO. 1:12-CV-128

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the: (1) Fort Wayne
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants, Fort
Wayne City Police Officers Heather Hoffman and Darrell Caudill, on
May 24, 2013 (DE #51); and (2) Motion to File Under Seal, filed by
Plaintiff, Linda Miller, on August 9, 2013 (DE #65).

For the

reasons set forth below, the Motion to Seal (DE #65) is GRANTED and
Exhibit 6 to Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (DE #63-6) shall be maintained UNDER
SEAL due to this narrow and specific request and based on the
articulated concerns for confidentiality.

The Motion for Summary

Judgment (DE #51) is also GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED to DISMISS
the federal claims against Officers Hoffman and Caudill WITH
PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s state law claims against the City of Fort

Wayne and Officers Hoffman and Caudill are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to refiling in state court.

Additionally, the Clerk is

ORDERED to CLOSE this case.

BACKGROUND
This case arises from the mistaken arrest of Plaintiff, Linda
Miller,

by

Defendants,

Officers

Caudill, on December 7, 2010.

Heather

Hoffman

and

Darrell

Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to

a writ of attachment issued by a judge of the Allen County Superior
Court, Small Claims Division, for a “Linda Taylor.”

Consequently,

Plaintiff spent approximately 17 hours in the Allen County Jail
until the matter was resolved.
Plaintiff alleges that Officers Caudill and Hoffman subjected
her to false arrest in violation of her federally protected right
to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the
arrest violated Indiana state laws.

The complaint also alleges

that Defendant, City of Fort Wayne, is sued in its representative
capacity as employer of Officers Caudill and Hoffman, and that it
is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the false
arrest of Plaintiff.

Defendants, Fort Wayne City Police Officers

Heather Hoffman and Darrell Caudill, moved for summary judgment on

2

May 24, 2013 (DE #51)1, arguing because the officers were acting
pursuant to a valid outstanding body attachment warrant, they are
entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity. (DE #52.) They also
argue even if questions of fact exist as to whether Miller should
have been arrested, Officers Hoffman and Caudill remain entitled to
summary

judgment

under

the

doctrine

of

qualified

immunity.

Finally, they contend both officers are entitled to the protection
of law enforcement immunity on all of Plaintiff’s state law tort
claims.
Plaintiff filed a response arguing her claims should be sent
to trial because there are genuine issues of material fact from
which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the officers
subjected Miller to false arrest and unreasonable seizure.
#64.)

(DE

Defendants Hoffman and Caudill then filed a reply in

support.

(DE #69.)

As such, this motion is fully briefed and

ready for adjudication.

Undisputed Factual Background
On January 27, 2010, the Allen Superior Court, Small Claims
Division, issued a Writ of Attachment for a person by the name of

1

The motion for summary judgment and memorandum are only
made on behalf of Officers Caudill and Hoffman. (DE #51; DE #52,
pp. 1, 14.) Neither party presented any argument about the state
law claims against Defendant City of Fort Wayne; therefore, this
Court cannot rule upon the merits of those claims. Pourghoraishi
v. Flying J., Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 795 (7th Cir. 2006).
3

“Linda Taylor” in the case of Anthony Wayne Credit Adjusters v.
Linda

Taylor,

Cause

No.

02D01-0008-SC-17672

(DE

#35,

p.

3.)

Plaintiff, Linda Miller’s maiden name is Taylor. (Miller Dep., pp.
6, 27.)

Plaintiff, Linda Renee Miller, was married several times.

After her first and second divorces, she used her maiden name of
Linda Taylor.

(Miller Dep., pp. 6, 28, 29.)

Plaintiff has had the

last name of Miller since about 1999, when she married her third
husband Larry Miller. (Miller Aff. ¶ 1.) She divorced Miller, but
kept his last name. Id.
1956.

Plaintiff’s date of birth is November 17,

(Miller Dep., p. 6.)

Plaintiff’s address is 337 West

Paulding Road, Fort Wayne, Indiana, where she has lived for
approximately 14 years.

(Id., p. 3; Miller Aff. ¶ 2.)

In

contrast, the Writ of Attachment lists “Linda Taylor’s” address as
4506 SW Anthony Wayne Dr., Fort Wayne IN 46806.

(DE #63-3.)

Plaintiff is 5'2" tall, 200 pounds, Caucasian, with gray hair and
blue eyes.

(DE #63-6.) Typically, there are “warrant information

cards that are attached to the actual Body Attachments” which “have
identifiers of the person wanted for contempt” but although the
Clerk’s office tried to locate the card attached to Plaintiff’s
body attachment, they “were unable to locate it.”

(Internal

Memorandum produced by Defendants in discovery, DE #63-7.)
According to Lieutenant Troy Hershberger of the Allen County
Sheriff’s Department, “the file of the Plaintiff, file number
380477, was merged with the file of a Linda Taylor, file number

4

27518, by a John W. Drinnon on October 3, 2002.” (Hershberger Aff.
¶ 4, DE #36-1, and attached Ex. A, document showing the merger of
the two files.)

The document showing the merger of the two files

(DE #36-1 Ex. A), lists Linda Miller’s address as 337 Paulding Road
(Plaintiff’s true address) and contains her correct date of birth,
November 17, 1956, as well as her correct social security number.
The document also lists Miller’s employer as Deluxe Taxi.

Id.

Plaintiff has no criminal history and the incident at issue was the
only time she has been arrested.
On the day of the arrest, Plaintiff went to her job at Deluxe
Taxi.

During her shift, she received threatening phone calls from

two men.

Consequently, Plaintiff contacted the Fort Wayne Police

Department (“FWPD”).
Fort Wayne Police Officers Darrell Caudill and Heather Hoffman
responded to a threat report at 6:01 p.m.
Caudill Aff. ¶ 3.)

(Hoffman Aff. ¶ 3;

En route to Deluxe Taxi, Fort Wayne Police

dispatch told the officers that “Linda R. Miller, date of birth
November 17, 1956,”

had an outstanding body attachment warrant.

(Hoffman Aff. ¶ 4; Caudill Aff. ¶ 4.)

Neither Officer Hoffman nor

Caudill were involved in the issuance of the body attachment for
Plaintiff.

(Hoffman Aff. ¶ 10; Caudill Aff. ¶ 9.)

Officers Hoffman and Caudill attested in their affidavits that
they confirmed in the Spillman computer system in their police
vehicle the existence of an active body attachment for a “Linda

5

Miller” with a date of birth of November 17, 1956.
¶ 5; Caudill Aff. ¶ 5.)

(Hoffman Aff.

However, a copy of the Spillman printout

is attached to both of the officers’ affidavits, and a close read
shows that the name listed was “Linda Taylor” and the date of birth
was July 9, 1957.

(DE #51-3 Ex. A.)2

Additionally, the Spillman

screen provided a social security number different from Plaintiff’s
social security number. (DE #51-3; Pl.’s Ex. 6; Miller Aff. ¶ 10.)
After

Plaintiff

gave

the

officers

information

about

the

threatening phone calls, they told her there was an outstanding
body attachment warrant and that she would be taken to the Allen
County Jail.

(Hoffman Aff. ¶ 7; Caudill Aff. ¶ 7.)

The officers

asked for her identification, and Plaintiff gave them her driver’s
licence which contains an accurate physical description of what she
looked like.

(Miller Aff. ¶ 4.)

Officer Caudill also asked

Plaintiff if she had used other names before, and she said her
maiden name was Taylor and her two prior married names were
Hildebrand and Wind.

(Id. ¶ 5.)

Officer Caudill also asked

Plaintiff whether she had ever lived on South Anthony Wayne, or on
South Wayne (the address in the Writ of Attachment), and Plaintiff

2

Plaintiff alleges that the “Linda” for whom the body
attachment was issued sometimes went by the name “Linda K.
Martin” and “Linda Kay Richardson,” and attaches as exhibits
Spillman reports for a “Linda Martin” with listed address of 5001
Holton Ave., and “Linda Richardson” with listed address as 5001
Holton Ave., and identified as African American. (DE #63-5, pp.
2-3.) However, there is no evidence that Officers Caudill or
Hoffman ever saw these Spillman screens or relied upon them.
6

told him no.

(Id. ¶ 5.)

When told she was under arrest,

Plaintiff’s initial reaction was “are you kidding me?” and she told
them she didn’t think they had the right person, she was unaware of
any collection issue pending against her or outstanding warrant.
(Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)

Plaintiff did not see or hear the officers review

any paperwork to confirm they had the right person, or try to
verify whether the person they were supposed to arrest fit her
physical description.

(Id. ¶ 9.)

Miller was the only employee working at Deluxe Taxi at that
time, so the officers let her contact a replacement employee and
waited for the replacement to arrive.

When the replacement

employee arrived, the officers took Plaintiff into custody and
transported her to the Allen County Jail.
Caudill Aff. ¶ 7.)

She was never handcuffed.

(Hoffman Aff. ¶ 7;
(Hoffman Aff. ¶ 8;

Caudill Aff. ¶ 8; Miller Dep., p. 15.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff
attested in her affidavit that “[b]eing arrested was still very
upsetting.”

(Miller Aff. ¶ 8.)

DISCUSSION
Pursuant

to

Rule

56(a)

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp. v.

7

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

In other words, the record

must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
Karazanos v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th
Cir. 1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court

must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas de
Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of
“the

pleadings,

depositions,

answers

to

interrogatories,

and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits,” if any, that the
movant believes “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Once the movant has met

this burden, the nonmovant must support its assertion that a fact
is genuinely disputed by citing to particular parts of materials in
the record.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill

Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989).
“Whether

a

fact

is

material

depends

on

the

substantive

law

underlying a particular claim and ‘only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Walter v.

Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
8

“A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue
may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate,
by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of
material fact which requires trial.”

Beard v. Whitley Country

REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original); see
also Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 955 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir.
1993).

Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of

an essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof
at trial, summary judgment will be appropriate. In this situation,
there can be “’no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving

party’s

immaterial.”

case

necessarily

renders

all

other

facts

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Quasi-Judicial Absolute Immunity
Because it is a complete defense to liability, “[a]bsolute
immunity

from

civil

liability

for

damages

is

of

a

rare

and

exceptional character,” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273, 275
(7th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted), and there is a presumption
against granting it to government officials.
978 F.2d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1992).

Houston v. Partee,

The burden of establishing

absolute immunity rests on its proponent, who must show that
overriding

considerations

of

public

policy

require

that

the

defendant be exempt from personal liability for unlawful conduct.

9

Auriemma, 860 F.2d at 275; Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277,
281 (7th Cir. 1994).
“Non-judicial officials whose official duties have an integral
relationship with the judicial process are entitled to absolute
immunity for their quasi-judicial conduct.”

Henry v. Farmer City

State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Ashbrook v.
Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1980)).
typically

extended

ministerial

acts,

to

those

“those

performing

performing

Although immunity is

discretionary

ministerial

acts

and

not

under

a

judge’s supervision and intimately related to judicial proceedings
have quasi-judicial immunity.”

Id.

For example, in Henry, the

Court found that a Sheriff who enforced a money foreclosure
judgment entered by a court was entitled to quasi-judicial absolute
immunity from suit for damages arising from the acts.

There, the

Seventh Circuit held that “police officers, sheriffs, and other
court officers who act in reliance on a facially valid court order
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from suit under § 1983 for
damages.”

Henry, 808 F.2d at 1239.

However, as the Court aptly stated in Roy v. The Town of
Newburgh, No. 3:03-CV-00099 RLY WG, 2005 WL 941681 (S.D. Ind. Feb.
28, 2005):
The key to determining if a police officer is
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity is to examine
the nature of the plaintiff’s complaint in relation
to the officer’s conduct. If a suit was brought
against the officers simply for carrying out the
orders of a judge in an arrest warrant, then their
10

actions fall under the protection of quasi-judicial
immunity. Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 436-38
(7th Cir. 2001). “By contrast, when the conduct
directly challenged is not the judge’s decision
making, but the manner in which the decision is
enforced, ... the law enforcement officer’s
fidelity to the specific orders of the judge marks
the boundary for labeling the act ‘quasijudicial.’”
Id. at 436.
Thus, if the wrong
complained of is not the judge’s order, but is,
instead, the manner in which that order is carried
out, then quasi-judicial immunity is no protection
for the officers. Id. This is true because the
manner in which an officer enforces a judicial
order implicates an executive function, not a
judicial one. Id. at 438.
Roy, 2005 WL 941681, at *7.
In this case, Plaintiff does not challenge the issuance of the
Writ of Attachment to “Linda Taylor.”

Her complaint is with

Officers Hoffman and Caudill for the manner in which they executed
the warrant.

Plaintiff states so much in her memorandum: “[t]he

lawfulness of the manner in which the Defendants’ executed the
order of body attachment is at issue in this case, not of the
lawfulness of the order itself...”

(DE #64, p. 8.)

The Writ of

Attachment states that the person in contempt is “Linda Taylor” and
her address is 4506 SW Anthony Wayne Dr., Fort Wayne.

Here,

Plaintiff’s name is Linda Miller, and her address is 337 West
Paulding Road, Fort Wayne.

Thus, the Court concludes that because

the conduct complained of is the manner in which the Officers
executed the Writ of Attachment (on, admittedly, the wrong person),
quasi-judicial immunity is not applicable.

11

Qualified Immunity
Even when they are not protected by absolute immunity, law
enforcement officers typically receive qualified immunity for
conduct performed within the scope of their official duties.
Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2001).

See

Under the

doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established

statutory

or

constitutional

reasonable person would have known.”

rights

of

which

a

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The contours of a clearly established right
must

be

sufficiently

clear

that

a

reasonable

official

understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Pulaski

Cnty.,

omitted).

17

F.3d

185,

189

(7th

Cir.

1994)

would

Sivard v.
(quotation

This standard provides ample protection “to all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Millspaugh v. Cnty. Dep’t of Public Welfare of Wabash Cnty., 937
F.2d at 1176 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Although the privilege of qualified immunity is a defense, the
plaintiff carries the burden of defeating it.

Molina ex rel.

Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2003).

Whether a

government official is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal
question for resolution by the court, not a jury.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).
12

Hunter v.

In resolving whether qualified immunity applies, the Court
must ask two questions.

The first inquiry is whether the facts

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right;
and the second inquiry is whether the right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

The Supreme Court has

held that the Court need not resolve the two inquiries in a
sequential fashion, and may address the second inquiry before the
first.
of

the

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges
district

courts

and

the

courts

of

appeals

should

be

permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
case at hand.”).
The Seventh Circuit has held that “[t]he arrest of a person
named in a valid warrant, . . . even if it turns out to be the
wrong individual, will not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the
arresting officer acted unreasonably.” White v. Olig, 56 F.3d 817,
820 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding it not unreasonable for police to
arrest plaintiff pursuant to a body attachment order that contained
the

same

name,

race,

county

of

approximate weight of plaintiff).

residence,

birth

date,

and

In this case, no one disputes

that there was a real Writ of Attachment for a “Linda Taylor”
living at 4506 SW Anthony Wayne Dr., Fort Wayne, IN.

13

(DE #63-3.)

Moreover,

Defendants

have

not

contested

the

explanation

of

Hershberger of the Allen County Sheriff’s Department, who explained
that Plaintiff’s name came up as having an outstanding body
attachment on December 7, 2010, due to an improper merger of
Plaintiff’s file with the file of “Linda Taylor.”

(DE #36-1.)

Indeed, the document showing the merger of the two women’s files is
in the record, and again, is not controverted.

(DE #36-1 Ex. A.)

See Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) (“when a
responding party’s statement fails to controvert the facts as set
forth in the moving party’s statement in the manner dictated by the
rule, those facts shall be deemed admitted for purposes of the
motion”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The two officers attested that
they were not involved in issuing the Attachment Warrant, and their
only involvement was to arrest Miller after being advised of the
outstanding body attachment by dispatch and verifying the existence
of the active body attachment in the Spillman system.

(Hoffman

Aff., pp. 2-3; Caudill Aff., pp. 2-3.)3
3

Plaintiff argues the Officers’ claim that they were
verbally told a warrant was pending against “Linda Miler” creates
a material issue of fact, because a jury could disbelieve the
Defendants’ story that the dispatcher said the last name “Miller”
instead of “Taylor.” (DE #64, p. 10 ft. 3.) First, both
Officers signed affidavits under oath that dispatch told them
there was a pending warrant against “Linda R. Miller, date of
birth November 17, 1956.” (Hoffman Aff. 4; Caudill Aff. 4.)
Defendants have not cited to any materials in the record
(depositions, affidavits, etc.), to show this is a disputed fact.
At this stage of summary judgment, once the moving party puts
forth evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
14

Plaintiff argues that based upon the details in the Spillman
computer screen in the squad car, the officers could not have
reasonably believed Plaintiff was the person they sought to arrest.
The Spillman screen plainly indicates the arrestee was “Linda
Taylor” date of birth 7/9/1957, who lived at 337 Paulding Rd. in
Fort Wayne.

(DE #51-3 Ex. A.)

In contrast, Plaintiff was “Linda

Miller” (but her maiden name was Taylor, and she admitted to the
officers to using Taylor at times when she was not married), and
her date of birth was less than one year different at November 17,
1956; however, her address was indeed 337 Paulding in Fort Wayne.
Does the different last name (but her maiden name), different date
of birth (but less than a year difference), and different social
security number on the Spillman screen make the officers’ belief
unreasonable?

This Court thinks not.

“[S]ufficient probability,

not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment.”

Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).

In

Hill, the police arrested a man who had a completely different name
(Miller) than the real suspect (Hill) and produced identification.
Id.

at

799.

The

Court

noted

that

“aliases

and

false

identifications are not uncommon” and held there was no Fourth

provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute.
Hudson Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago Heights, 48 F.3d 234, 237 (7th
Cir. 1995); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Mere “metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts” is not enough. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

15

Amendment violation because “the officers in good faith believed
Miller was Hill.”

Id. at 803-04.

The Seventh Circuit is replete with cases that have recognized
discrepancies

between

a

warrant

and

the

arrestee’s

physical

appearance, address, and birth date are often insufficient to
create a genuine factual dispute about whether arresting officers
had probable cause.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 40-

41 (7th Cir. 1982) (no Fourth Amendment claim where white plaintiff
was arrested pursuant to a warrant bearing her name and address but
describing suspect as African American); Patton v. Przybylski, 822
F.2d 697, 698-700 (7th Cir. 1987) (no claim where police arrested
plaintiff with a warrant bearing his name but had a different
address and birth date); Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 168-69
(7th Cir. 1987) (no claim where plaintiff’s name was same as alias
associated with warrant that matched his race and gender, even
though birth date and address were different). As the Court stated
in White, “the peril of liability under section 1983 should not be
placed upon arresting officers every time they are faced with the
practical dilemma of arresting or releasing an individual who,
despite some discrepancies in description, they reasonably believe
to be the intended subject of an arrest warrant.”
at 820.

White, 56 F.3d

Here, there is uncontroverted evidence that the Officers

were verbally told by dispatch that there was an outstanding body
attachment for “Linda Miller” (Plaintiff’s name) and given her

16

accurate date of birth.

The Spillman screen in the squad car

verified a body attachment for a person with the same first name as
Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s maiden last name, her true and correct
address, and a birth date less than one year away from Plaintiff’s
true birth date.

There is no evidence in the record that the

Officers intentionally or wrongfully set out to deprive Plaintiff
of her liberty, and the mere discrepancies in the Spillman screen
upon which they relied do not create a genuine issue of material
fact that the Officers are liable for wrongful conduct under
Section 1983.
As Defendants point out, several cases upon which Plaintiff
relies

in

arguing

qualified

immunity

is

not

available

warrantless arrests or warrantless search cases.

are

See, e.g.,

Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007) (warrantless
arrest); United States v. Ellis, 499 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2007)
(warrantless search of residence); United States v. Mancillas, 183
F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 1999) (investigatory warrantless vehicle stop).
These cases are inapposite.
a

warrant

(which

gave

Here, the arrest was made pursuant to

the

officers

a

basis

for

arresting

Plaintiff), with the standard that the arresting officer must
reasonably believe the person arrested is the person sought. Olig,
56 F.3d at 820; United States v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68, 69 (7th Cir.
1996).

In Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 2009),

a case cited by Plaintiff, but where the Court affirmed summary

17

judgment in favor of the defendants and affirmed the finding of
qualified immunity where officers mistakenly arrested the wrong
suspect, the Court emphasized that:
[T]he defendants are required to show only the
reasonableness of their belief that the person they
arrested was the person they were seeking; they are
not required to show that they knew with certainty
that the person they arrested was the person they
were seeking.
Often, there will have been more
than an officer could have done to confirm a
suspect’s identity. This will not render an arrest
unconstitutional so long as the officer’s actions
were reasonable under the circumstances.
Catlin, 574 F.3d at 366 (italics in original).

As stated earlier,

the Officers in this case acted reasonably when they relied upon
the verbal notification from dispatch and the Spillman screen which
provided that the suspect was “Linda Taylor” (and Taylor is
Plaintiff’s maiden name), and Plaintiff’s accurate address.
Plaintiff also relies upon Phelan v. Village of Lyons, 531
F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2008), which is also distinguishable.

In

Phelan, police officers stopped and arrested the plaintiff after
they typed into the LEADS system the license number of the car she
was driving and got a report of a stolen vehicle.

However, they

overlooked the third line of the LEADS report containing the
description for the stolen vehicle as being a black 2002 Honda
motorcycle (not the white automobile plaintiff was driving).

The

Seventh Circuit found no qualified immunity because the officers
could not ignore information in front of them that undermined
probable case.

Id. at 488-90.
18

In this case, there was no

information the officers received that definitely established
Plaintiff was not the intended arrestee - rather, they relied upon
a facially valid bench warrant, dispatch’s statement about the
warrant for “Linda Miller,”

and the information on the Spillman

screen (including Plaintiff’s correct maiden name and address).
This information provided the officers with a reasonable basis to
believe

Plaintiff

was

the

intended

arrestee,

despite

some

discrepancies.
To the extent Plaintiff urges that the Officers should have
investigated further due to Plaintiff’s protestations of innocence
(DE #64, p. 10-11), this argument also fails.

Plaintiff argues

that, after her protestation, the Officers should have obtained
additional
information

information.
the

officers

It

is

should

unclear
have

exactly

obtained

or

what

other

read,

but

presumably, Plaintiff is arguing they should have tried to find out
the information contained in the information card that is usually
attached

to

the

actual

personal identifiers.

Body

Attachments

which

typically

has

However, all parties concede in this case

that the card that was supposedly attached to Plaintiff’s body
attachment was never located or produced, so it is pure conjecture
to speculate what information the card might have contained, or if
it was ever actually attached to the Body Attachment.
Memorandum

produced

by

Defendants

19

in

discovery,

(Internal
DE

#63-7.)

Regardless of the exact extra information Plaintiffs believe the
Officers should have sought out or attempt to receive and read,
The Constitution does not require an arresting
officer
to
conduct
an
incredibly
detailed
investigation at the probable cause stage. . . .
Once an officer has trustworthy information that
leads him to reasonably believe that probable cause
exists, he is entitled to rely on that information
and is under no further duty to investigate.
Olig v. City of Hobart Police Dep’t, No. 2:08 cv 301, 2010 WL
3894108, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010) (quotations and citations
omitted).

As the Seventh Circuit set forth in Johnson:
If an officer executing an arrest warrant must do
so at peril of damage liability under section 1983
if there is any discrepancy between the description
in the warrant and the appearance of the person to
be arrested, many a criminal will slip away while
the officer anxiously compares the description in
the warrant with the appearance of the person named
in it and radios back any discrepancies to his
headquarters for instructions.

Johnson, 680 F.2d at 41.
While this Court certainly sympathizes with the plight of
Plaintiff, whom everyone agrees was wrongfully arrested, based upon
the information in front of Officers Caudill and Hoffman at the
time of Plaintiff’s arrest, including the undisputed evidence that
dispatch verbally told them there was a body attachment for “Linda
R. Miller,” birth date November 17, 1956, and the Spillman screen
showed the name “Linda Taylor” (Plaintiff’s maiden name) and
indicated her true address, and a birth date less than one year
off, the Court believes the Officers were reasonable in their
20

belief that Plaintiff was the suspect indicated in the Body
Attachment.

As such, qualified immunity applies.

State Law Claims
The Court has granted summary judgment in favor of Officers
Hoffman and Caudill on Plaintiff’s federal claims, which were the
sole basis for federal jurisdiction in this action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.

The parties are not diverse.

Because Plaintiff’s claims

under § 1983 against Officers Hoffman and Caudill were the only
federal claims in this case, the Court must decide whether to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state
law claims against the Officers and against the City of Fort Wayne
in its representative capacity.4 Upon due consideration, the state
law claims against Officers Hoffman and Caudill and the City of
Fort Wayne are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the federal
claims have been dismissed prior to trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t
is the well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice
is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever
all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”); see also
Williams v. Fort Wayne Police Dep’t Officers John/Jane Does, No.
4

The complaint specifies that Defendant, City of Fort Wayne,
is being sued in its representative capacity as employer of
Officers Hoffman and Caudill under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for the alleged false arrest of Plaintiff. (DE #1, ¶
2.)
21

1:12-CV-202, 2012 WL 6727534, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012)
(dismissing without prejudice to refiling in state court state
claims against the City of Fort Wayne in its representative
capacity after ruling that section 1983 claims against individual
officers should be dismissed).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Seal (DE #65)
is GRANTED and Exhibit 6 to Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to
Defendants’

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(DE

#63-6)

shall

be

maintained UNDER SEAL due to this narrow and specific request and
based on the articulated concerns for confidentiality.
for Summary Judgment (DE #51) is also GRANTED.

The Motion

The Clerk is

ORDERED to DISMISS the federal claims against Officers Hoffman and
Caudill WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s state law claims against the

City of Fort Wayne and Officers Hoffman and Caudill are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in state court.

Additionally, the

Clerk is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.

DATED: December 18, 2013

/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court

22