Woodard v. Allen County Circuit Court et al

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING case pursuant to 28:1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Signed by Judge William C Lee on 5/4/12. (jcp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DONALD L. WOODARD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALLEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, et al.,
Defendants.

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) CAUSE NO. 1:12-CV-135 WL
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OPINION AND ORDER
Donald L. Woodard, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
an in forma pauperis petition. In the complaint, Mr. Woodard names eight defendants. “A document
filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, “[n]otwithstanding
any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action . . . (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Here, though it is clear that Mr. Woodard sincerely believes
that he has been wronged, it is equally clear that there is no federal law basis for holding these
defendants financially (or otherwise) liable to him. Therefore this case must be dismissed.
First, Mr. Woodward attempts to sue the Allen County Circuit Court to overturn his guilty
plea. Such a claim cannot be brought in a civil rights lawsuit (such as this one) because habeas
corpus is the exclusive means of challenging a state court conviction in a federal district court. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Thus, he does not state a claim against the Allen
County Circuit Court.

Second, he attempts to sue the Fort Wayne Police Department for various events since 2006.
It must be noted that because “Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations . . . is applicable to all causes
of action brought in Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task
Force, 239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001), most of these claims are untimely. Nevertheless, the
dispositive reason why Mr. Woodard does not state a claim against the Fort Wayne Police
Department is because it is not a suable entity. Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t , 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Indiana statutory scheme does not grant municipal police departments the
capacity to sue or be sued.”)
Third, Mr. Woodard attempts to sue the Allen County Police Department based on two
different incidents. The first occurred in 2009 and is barred by the statute of limitations. The second
occurred in 2010 and is not. He alleges that while he was being held in the Allen County Jail,
officers “disguised themselves with odd clothing and women’s nylon hosiery covering their faces.”
ECF 1 at 4. He alleges that they entered his locked cell, punched and kicked him, and attempted to
sodomize him before shackling him in a courtroom holding cell. He does not allege, and it would
not be reasonable to infer, that the Allen County Police Department has a policy or custom of having
officers disguise themselves and attack inmates. “Monell [v. New York City Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)] held that respondeat superior is not a ground for municipal liability
under § 1983, [and that] a direct claim against a municipality [could only be] based on a policy or
custom of the municipality that violates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Schor v. City of
Chicago, 576 F.3d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 2009). Because these events did not occur as a result of a
policy or custom, Mr. Woodard does not state a claim against the Allen County Police Department.

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Fourth, Mr. Woodard attempts to sue the Allen County Jail, but the jail is a building and it
is not a suable entity. See Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011).
Therefore Mr. Woodard cannot state a claim against the Allen County Jail.
Fifth, Mr. Woodard attempts to sue Parkview Behavior Health because he disagreed with the
medications they administered to him while he was a patient there. In medical cases, the constitution
is violated only when a defendant was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs.
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). Even medical malpractice and
incompetence do not state a claim of deliberate indifference. Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th
Cir. 2000). “For a medical professional to be liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical
needs, he must make a decision that represents such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually
did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Disagreement with the medication decisions of a medical
professional does not state a claim of deliberate indifference. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331
(7th Cir. 2003). Therefore Mr. Woodard does not state a claim against Parkview Behavior Health.
Sixth, he attempts to sue Logansport State Hospital because one of its employees denied him
medication and another used excessive force against him. There is no general respondeat superior
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). Because the
complaint does not plausibly allege that either of these events occurred as a result of a policy or
custom, Mr. Woodard does not state a claim against the Logansport State Hospital.
Seventh, he attempts to sue Dr. John Marshall for sending him to Parkview Behavior Health
and Logansport State Hospital. Mr. Woodard asserts that he did not need to be hospitalized. That

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may well be true, but even incompetence does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Walker v.
Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2000). Only deliberate indifference states a claim. Gutierrez v. Peters,
111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, it is impossible to conclude that Dr. John Marshall was
deliberately indifferent based upon his decision to send Mr. Woodard to the hospital. Therefore Mr.
Woodard does not state a claim against Dr. John Marshall.
Eighth, he attempts to sue his public defender, John Nimmo. “In order to state a claim under
§ 1983 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendants deprived him of a federal constitutional right; and
(2) that the defendants acted under color of state law.” Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir.
2006). A criminal defense attorney, even an appointed public defender, does not act under color of
state law. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Therefore, Mr. Woodard does not state a
claim against John Nimmo.
Therefore, though it is clear that Mr. Woodard sincerely believes that he has been wronged
by these defendants, he nevertheless does not state a federal claim against them pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: May 4, 2012
s/William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court

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