Martin v. Indiana State of et al

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER re 1 PRO SE COMPLAINT filed by Anthony C Martin. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 USC § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Plaintiff CAUTIONED that if he files another frivolous lawsuit he may be sanctioned by being restricted from any further civil litigation in this court. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 5/30/12. (cer)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
ANTHONY C. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:12 CV 146

OPINION AND ORDER
Anthony C. Martin, a pro se plaintiff, filed an implausible complaint and an in
forma pauperis petition. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless,
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In evaluating whether a complaint is frivolous for purposes of the
in forma pauperis statute, the Court need not “accept without question the truth of the
plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33-33 (1992). Instead, the statute
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an undisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s

factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Legal conclusions can
provide a complaint’s framework, but unless well-pleaded factual allegations move the
claims from conceivable to plausible, they are insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 680.
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[C]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Id. (quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[I]n considering the
plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations
of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578
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F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it
has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quotation
marks and brackets omitted). Thus, “a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words
on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d
400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original).
This complaint, the twenty-ninth civil action Martin has had before this court,
does not met these standards. Here, Martin alleges that these seventeen defendants are
liable to him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 as well as several state law claims.
He alleges that they are co-conspirators. He alleges that he has a substantive due
process claim, an equal protection claim, a 1st, 4th, and 14th Amendment claim. He
alleges that he has been retaliated against as well as unlawfully searched and seized
without explaining how, when, or by whom. He alleges that unidentified policies are
unconstitutional for unspecified reasons. He alleges a failure to intervene, train, or
correct illegal actions of subordinate employees without identifying either the actions or
the employees. He alleges harassment, neglect, racial discrimination, irrational and
malicious applications of the law, defamation, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and
battery. He says that he has been injured as a result of an excessive use of force and
subjected to unconstitutional conditions in the jail. He alleges he has been subjected to
double jeopardy and that he is a class of one. What he does not do is provide a factual
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basis for these claims from which the court can plausibly conclude that these
defendants are liable to him. Though reciting the elements of these various causes of
action would have been insufficient to state a claim, he does not even do that.
What he has done is explain that he has been involved in 32 or more traffic stops
since the first of this year, but he does not say when, by whom, or why. These stops
appear to have been effectuated by three different law enforcement agencies. He
explains that he has attempted to obtain legal assistance and that he has complained to
various governmental agencies. He explains that he has been held in jail, appeared
before state court judges, and been released on bond. He has also attached 146 pages of
exhibits. These include various filings and court orders in Martin v. New Haven Police,
1:00-CV-197 (N.D. Ind. filed May 4, 2000); Martin v. Ross, 1:08-CV-199 (N.D. Ind. filed
August 26 2008); Martin v. York, 1:08 CV 246 (N.D. Ind. filed October 21, 2008); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:09 CV 048 (N.D. Ind. filed February 20, 2009); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 346 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 347 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 348 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 349 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 350 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 351 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 352 (N.D. Ind. filed October 6, 2011); Martin v.
Fort Wayne Police Department, 1:11 CV 403 (N.D. Ind. filed November 23, 2011); and
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Martin v. State of Indiana, 1:12 CV 069 (N.D. Ind. filed February 29, 2012). He has
included traffic tickets from 2010, various state court filings, and several Fort Wayne
Police Department documents. He has also attached a number of complaint letters he
has written and various responses he has received.
In sum, the complaint is little more than a grand conspiracy theory about how
the State of Indiana, the Allen Superior Courts, four state court judges, the Allen County
Prosecuting Attorney, the Allen County Sheriff and members of the Sheriff’s
Department, the Indiana State Police, the City of Fort Wayne, its Mayor and Police
Department are out to get him. However, based on this complaint and its attachments,
none of the alleged actions by these defendants plausibly give rise to a cause of action.
Vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy state no claim upon which relief can
be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Amundsen v. Chicago Park District, 218 F.3d 712, 718
(7th Cir. 2000). Neither do vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy state a
claim under any other legal theory. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Therefore this case will be dismissed. See Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 F.3d 773,
774 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[N]o evidentiary hearing is required in a prisoner’s case (or anyone
else’s, for that matter) when the factual allegations are incredible.”)
Moreover, filing this frivolous complaint alleging a conspiracy based on more
than a dozen different legal theories, without a factual basis, was malicious. Filing this
case appears to be little more than a thinly veiled attempt to harass these defendants
and abuse the judicial process. Abusive behavior may be sanctioned. Chambers v.
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NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has stated
approvingly that, “Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional
obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry
out Article III functions.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 185 n. 8 (1989) quoting In re
Martin-Trigona, 737 F. 2d 1254, 1261 (2nd Cir. 1984). “Abusers of the judicial process are
not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the normal filing fees -- indeed, are not
entitled to sue and appeal, period. Abuses of process are not merely not to be
subsidized; they are to be sanctioned.” Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir.
1989).
In light of his previous history before this court, Martin’s behavior in this case
supports the imposition of a severe sanction. In 2009, he was restricted from proceeding
in forma pauperis for two years. That sanction was imposed because he had lied to the
court about his financial status. However, before selecting a sanction in this case, it is
important for the court to consider alternatives. See Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541, 544
(7th Cir. 2011). The court could direct the clerk to refuse to file any papers submitted by
Martin in any civil case. See Support Sys. Int’l v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995).
Such a sanction would thereby bar him from litigating any of the fourteen other civil
cases that he currently has pending. Such a prohibition would be justified because this
is not the first time that Martin has been sanctioned. Nevertheless, the court believes
that a full restriction precluding any civil litigation in this court would be too severe a
sanction at this time. Though commonly a fine would be a reasonable lesser sanction,
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“[m]onetary sanctions are generally not as effective against a pro se plaintiff proceeding
as a pauper . . ..” Id. Therefore the court will not impose a fine at this time. Thus, even
though it is a lenient sanction under the circumstances, the court will merely dismiss
this case and caution Martin that if he files another frivolous or malicious lawsuit, he
may then be sanctioned by being restricted from any further civil litigation in this court.
For the forgoing reasons, the court DISMISSES this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and CAUTIONS Anthony C. Martin that if he files another frivolous
or malicious lawsuit, he may be sanctioned by being restricted from any further civil
litigation in this court.
SO ORDERED.
Date: May 30, 2012

s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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