Saul v. Prince Manufacturing Corporation

Filing 34

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 30 MOTION for Leave to File filed by Richard C Saul, Jr. Clerk directed to show Pla's Response in Opposition to Dft's Motion for Summary Judgment filed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roger B Cosbey on 1/22/2013. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
RICHARD C. SAUL, JR.,

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Plaintiff,
v.
PRINCE MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

CAUSE NO.: 1:12-CV-270

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File, seeking leave to
file a late response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket # 30.) Defendant
objected to the motion (Docket # 31), and Plaintiff subsequently replied (Docket # 32). For the
following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion will be GRANTED.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On August 7, 2012, Plaintiff Richard C. Saul, Jr., brought this action against his
employer, Defendant Prince Manufacturing Corporation, alleging that Prince wrongfully
determined that he was ineligible for health benefits. (Docket # 1.) In an Opinion and Order
issued on October 12, 2012, this Court afforded the parties up to and including December 11,
2012, to file cross-motions for summary judgment and up to and including January 2, 2013, to
file cross-responses. (Docket # 21 at 5.)
As such, on December 11, 2012, the parties filed their cross-motions for summary
judgment. (Docket # 25, 27.) Prince then submitted its response to Saul’s summary judgment
motion on January 2, 2013. (Docket # 29.) Saul, however, did not file his response to Prince’s
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motion for summary judgment before the deadline. Rather, on January 3, 2013, the day after the
deadline, Saul moved for leave to file a late response. (Docket # 30.) Prince objects to Saul’s
motion (Docket # 31), arguing that he has failed to establish either good cause or excusable
neglect for missing the deadline (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File 1).
B. Applicable Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), “[a] motion filed before the deadline may be
granted ‘for good cause,’ [while] a motion made after the time has expired may be granted only
if ‘the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.’” Murphy v. Eddie Murphy Prods., Inc.,
611 F.3d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)). Here, Saul’s motion for
leave to file his response was untimely—filed one day after the deadline. As such, Saul must
make a showing of both “good cause” and “excusable neglect” under Rule 6(b). Id.
The good cause standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking the extension.
Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2011); Smith v. Howe Military Sch., No.
3:96-CV-790RM, 1997 WL 662506, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 20, 1997). To demonstrate good
cause, a party must show that despite its diligence, the time table could not reasonably have been
met. Smith, 1997 WL 662506, at *1.
On the other hand, excusable neglect is “a somewhat elastic concept,” Pioneer Inv. Servs.
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 391 (1993), demanding an equitable
determination that can “encompass situations in which the failure to comply with a filing
deadline is attributable to negligence,” Robb v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 122 F.3d 354, 355-56 (7th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 394). In doing so, the Court takes “account of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission . . . includ[ing] . . . the danger of

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prejudice to the [nonmoving party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of
the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd., 646 F.3d 401, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S.
at 395); see also Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006).
C. Analysis
In the instant case, Saul explains that the response deadline was missed because it was
never placed on the calendars of the two attorneys of record in the case at the time and the
associate assigned to the motion at the firm had been absent for several days both before and
after the response was due because of sickness and a back injury. (Pl’s Reply to Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File (“Pl.’s Reply”) 2, Ex. A.) According to Saul’s counsel, they were
alerted to the January 2nd deadline by the filing of Prince’s response to Saul’s motion for
summary judgment, which they represent they did not read or analyze in preparing Saul’s
response. (Pl.’s Mot. for Leave ¶¶ 3-4.) Counsel maintain that, once they were aware of the
deadline, they attempted to correct the mistake as soon as possible. (Pl.’s Reply 2.)
Errors in calendaring deadlines can, but do not necessarily, constitute good cause or
excusable neglect for missing deadlines. Compare Ruiz v. Carmeuse Lime, Inc., No. 2:10-CV21-PRC, 2011 WL 3290376, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 14, 2011) (finding excusable neglect for
missing a response deadline due to an inadvertent calendaring error), and Boctking v. United
States, No. 3:10-cv-10-RLY-WGH, 2010 WL 2265310, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 2, 2010) (setting
aside a default because good cause was shown when a calendaring error led defendant to believe
it had one more month to file an answer), with Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 426 (7th Cir.

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2012) (holding that a simple miscalculation of time did not constitute excusable neglect for
missing a deadline), and Stevens v. Cont’l Mobile Tel. Co., No. 95 C 3841, 1996 WL 328021, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1996) (“Failure to docket a date correctly is a careless or negligent mistake
that fails to demonstrate good cause.” (citations omitted)).
Here, counsel’s mistake appears to be a honest and inadvertent one that cannot be traced
to Saul directly, see Boctking, 2010 WL 2265310, at *2 (finding good cause for missing deadline
to file an answer when the failure to respond was inadvertent and the fault of counsel rather than
the client directly), rather than “a situation where Plaintiff’s counsel ignored the information he
received in open court . . . and then ignored or overlooked a deadline that he had virtually set for
himself,” Tschantz v. McCann, 160 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (finding a lack of good
cause). Furthermore, as soon as counsel was alerted to the deadline, they filed a response the
next day, further suggesting that counsel acted in good faith. See Ruiz, 2011 WL 3290376, at *1
(finding excusable neglect and that counsel acted in good faith when, within one day of
discovering the missed deadline, counsel filed the late response).
The danger of prejudice to Prince is minimal as Saul’s counsel swore in an affidavit that
they had not read or analyzed Prince’s response to Saul’s summary judgment motion in
preparation for their response. (Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Ex. A at ¶ 4.) And the length of the
delay is also minimal, given that Saul filed his motion for leave one day after the response
deadline and on the day after the inadvertent error was realized. See Ruiz, 2011 WL 3290376, at
*2 (stating that the danger of prejudice was minimal when the response was filed 17 days after it
was originally due and on the same date that the inadvertent error was realized).
Moreover, the calendaring omission was compounded by the fact that the associate

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assigned to the motion was out of the office due to apparent sickness and injury. Although to a
significant extent the reason for this delay was within the control of counsel, at least under these
circumstances, when any prejudice to Prince is minimal, the combination of the calendaring
omission and the associate’s absence establish both good cause and excusable neglect for
missing the response deadline by one day. Id. (finding excusable neglect when two of the
attorneys on the case were unaware of the response deadline and the attorney primarily assigned
to the case had left the firm).
D. Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File (Docket # 30) is GRANTED. The
Clerk is directed to show the Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment filed.
SO ORDERED.
Enter for this 22nd day of January, 2013.
S/Roger B. Cosbey
Roger B. Cosbey,
United States Magistrate Judge

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