Spencer v. US Probation Dept et al

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER re 1 PRO SE COMPLAINT filed by Addones Spencer. This case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 10/23/12. (cer)

United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
ADDONES SPENCER,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. PROBATION DEPT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 1:12-CV-363 JVB

OPINION AND ORDER
Addones Spender, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 1.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The court applies the same
standard as when deciding a motion to dismiss under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a
complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd.
of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must be liberally
construed “however inartfully pleaded.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Public court records show that in November 2010, Spencer pled guilty in federal court to
possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, and was sentenced to 57 months in prison.1 See

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In deciding whether to dismiss at the pleading stage, the court may look to the complaint itself,
documents attached to the complaint, documents that are central to the complaint or referred to within it,
and documents subject to judicial notice such as public records. See Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675
F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).

United States v. Spencer, No. 1:10-CR-55 (N.D. Ind. filed July 28, 2010). He did not pursue a
direct appeal. Id. In July 2012, he filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 claiming invalidity of his guilty plea, prosecutorial misconduct, and other grounds. Id.,
DE 176. To date, that motion remains pending. Id.
On October 15, 2012, Spencer filed the present lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
essence, he alleges that federal probation staff and state law enforcement personnel withheld
important information about his mental capacity from the court, including that he had suffered a
prior head injury which affected his mental functioning at the time of the offense.2 (DE 1 at 4.)
He asserts that had the defendants been forthcoming with his medical records in the criminal
case, it would have resulted in dismissal of the charges or a shorter sentence. (Id.) He seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as unspecified injunctive relief. (Id. at 5.)
Although the complaint is not a model of clarity, Spencer appears to be trying to assert a
claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady, a defendant’s due process
rights are violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to the accused that is
material either to guilt or punishment. Id. at 87. It is not clear that Spencer could assert a
Brady claim against the named defendants; however, even if he could name a proper defendant
in connection with this claim, relief is not warranted under Brady when the accused could have
obtained the information on his own with the exercise of reasonable diligence. United States v.
Earnest, 129 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, the information allegedly “suppressed” was
Spencer’s own medical history, a matter within his personal knowledge. If he felt his medical
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A claim against the federal defendants would arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but the legal
principles that apply are functionally equivalent. See, e.g., Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750-51 (7th
Cir. 2011) (applying cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Bivens action).

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records were relevant to the issues in the criminal case, he or his attorney could have obtained
them. See Earnest, 129 F.3d at 910 (no Brady violation based on alleged suppression of traffic
ticket where defendant knew he had received a traffic ticket and could have obtained it on his
own).
To the extent there is a plausible Brady claim in the complaint, it would be barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in any event. In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus.
Id. at 486-87. In other words, a Section 1983 claim is not cognizable when “a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at
487.
Here, there is no indication from the complaint that Spencer’s conviction has been
vacated or otherwise invalidated. To the contrary, it is clear that he is still incarcerated pursuant
to that conviction, and his motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 remains pending. Unless his
conviction is vacated or otherwise invalidated, he cannot seek damages for an alleged wrongful
conviction or improper sentence. If Spencer is trying to obtain release from custody based on an
alleged constitutional violation, his only remedy is 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973).

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Spencer also asserts that the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment,
because they did not ensure that information about his mental health problems was submitted to
the court prior to sentencing. (DE 1 at 4.) Most commonly the Eighth Amendment is employed
to protect convicted prisoners from inhumane conditions of confinement, see Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994), but Spencer may be attempting to invoke the narrow Eighth Amendment
principle prohibiting excessive sentences. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (“The
Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a narrow
proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences.”). To the extent he has alleged a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against a proper defendant, it would be barred by Heck. As
stated above, unless Spencer’s conviction is invalidated, he cannot seek damages for an
unconstitutional sentence. If he is seeking release from custody or a reduction of his sentence
based on an Eighth Amendment violation, he must pursue such relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99.
For the reasons set forth above, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
SO ORDERED on October 23, 2012.
s/Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
United States District Judge
Hammond Division

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