Mast et al v. Parrish et al

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 23 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (AMENDED COMPLAINT) filed by John M Parrish, GRANTING 25 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by J Scott Vanderbeck. This action is DISMISSED as to al l John Doe defendants. Terminating as moot: 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Insufficient Process or Service of Process filed by J Scott Vanderbeck, 21 Motion to Withdraw 11 Application for Clerk's Entry of Default filed by Levi D Mast, Monte Edwin Mueller, 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by John M Parrish. All dismissals are without prejudice. Clerk to enter final judgment. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 4/30/2013. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
:LEVI-D: MAST. and
:MONTE-EDWIN: MUELLER.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOHN M. PARRISH
[INVESTIGATOR, PROSECUTORS
OFFICE COUNTY OF LAGRANGE],
J. SCOTT VANDERBECK, [JUDGE,
LAGRANGE COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT], and
JOHN DOE 1-100,
Defendants.1

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No. 1:12 CV 403

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on motions to dismiss the amended complaint
(DE # 20) filed by defendants J. Scott Vanderbeck and John M. Parrish. (DE # 23;
DE # 25.) Plaintiffs have not responded to the motions.
This action was initiated when plaintiffs Levi D. Mast and Monte Edwin Mueller
(using the ordinary spelling of their names, not the stylized method in the complaint,
which the court has attempted to reproduce in the caption above) filed a complaint
(DE # 1) which, inclusive of attachments, comprises nearly two dozen pages of
unintelligible gibberish.2 Both defendants filed motions to dimiss that complaint, but

The bracketed text after defendants’ names is as in the complaint, not parenthetical
information inserted by the court.
1

The attachments, which began on CM/ECF page 12 of DE #1, appear to be from a state
criminal action against plaintiff Mast and are not themselves unintelligible. They are covered
with incomprehensible numerical annotations, however, the meaning of which is known only to
plaintiffs.
2

because of plaintiffs’ pro se status, Magistrate Judge Cosbey ordered them to file an
amended complaint that complied with RULE 8(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, and gave them explicit notice that this action would be dismissed
otherwise. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (DE # 20) a day after Judge Cosbey’s
deadline, which shortcoming is unimportant; leave to file instanter is sua sponte granted.
As an initial matter, the amended complaint no longer mentions defendant
Parrish in its caption or, so far as the court can tell, in its body. “It is axiomatic that an
amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original
complaint void.” Flannery v. Recording Industry Ass’n of America, 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1
(7th Cir. 2004). As defendant Parrish points out in his motion to dismiss, this means that
plaintiffs have elected to drop him from the action. See Carver v. Condie,169 F.3d 469, 472
(7th Cir. 1999). Defendant Parrish’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
The amended complaint again names Judge Vanderbeck as a defendant. The
amended complaint, however, is just as unintelligible as before, and again completely
fails to comply with RULE 8(a). Not surprisingly, Judge Vanderbeck argues that it
should be dismissed pursuant to RULE 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim because of its
unintelligibility; that it should be dimissed pursuant to RULE 12(b)(4) and (5) for
insufficient process and insufficent service of process; and, last, that whatever claim(s)
plaintiffs might be pleading, he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.3

The documents plaintiffs have attached to the amended complaint indicate that Judge
Vanderbeck is presiding over plaintiff Mast’s state criminal proceeding. (DE # 20 at 10.)
3

2

RULE 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) permits
dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). RULE 8 establishes the pleading requirements for a complaint filed in federal
court. RULE 8(a) states:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “A plaintiff . . . must provide only enough detail to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and,
through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he
is entitled to relief.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The amended complaint that has been filed is completely incoherent and
unintelligible. As such, it fails to provide, in a short and plain statement of the claim,
fair notice of the claim or the grounds upon which it rests, or to present any facts from
which it can be inferred that either plaintiff is plausibly entitled to some form of relief
due to actions taken by the defendant. The indecipherable allegations lack any
cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable theory. A “plaintiff
must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that
3

holds together,” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010), but the court
is unable even to determine what story plaintiffs are attempting to tell through their
assertions.
[W]here the lack of organization and basic coherence renders a complaint too
confusing to determine the facts that constitute the alleged wrongful conduct, dismissal
is an appropriate remedy.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
Hoskins v. Polestra, 320 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample
authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus
save everyone time and legal expense . . . even when the plaintiff has paid all fees for
filing and service.”). Thus, in addition to granting defendant Judge Vanderbeck’s Rule
12b)(6) motion, this action will also be dismised as to defendants John Doe 1-100. See
Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The dismissal of a complaint
on the ground that it is unintelligible is unexceptionable.”).
Fot the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by defendant Parrish
(DE # 23) and defendant Vanderbeck (DE # 25) are GRANTED; the action is dismissed
as to all John Doe defendants; and all remaining motions (DE # 4; DE # 13; DE # 21) are
terminated as moot. All dismissals are without prejudice. Clerk to enter final judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Date: April 30, 2013

s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT