Miller et al v. Peoples Federal Savings Bank

Filing 11

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 5 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM by Defendant Peoples Federal Savings Bank and DENYING 6 MOTION for Sanctions by Defendant Peoples Federal Savings Bank. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiffs Lavern Joseph Miller and Kenny Lavern Miller and is DISMISSED with prejudice as to plaintiff Monte Edwin Mueller. Clerk to enter final judgment. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 5/3/13. (lhc) (lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
:LAVERN-JOSEPH: MILLER.,
: KENNY-LAVERN: MILLER., and
:MONTE-EDWIN: MUELLER.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PEOPLES FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANK,
Defendant.

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No. 1:12 CV 434

OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on motions filed by defendant Peoples Federal
Savings Bank (“PFSB”) seeking dismissal of the complaint pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) and sanctions pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
11 and LOCAL RULE 1.3. (DE # 5; DE # 6.) Plaintiffs Lavern Joseph Miller, Kenny Lavern
Miller and Monte Edwin Mueller (spelling their names in the ordinary way, not the
stylized method used in the complaint, as shown in the caption above) have not
responded to either motion, despite Magistrate Judge Cosbey’s written notice (DE # 9)
giving them a deadline to do so and warning them of likely consequences should they
not.
Just like at least three other cases filed by Mueller jointly with other plaintiffs in
this district,1 the document initiating this case, inclusive of attachments, is comprised of

The case is also like approximately nine other cases filed by Mueller in other
judicial districts, which the court found using the national PACER system.
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over two dozen pages of incomprehensible gibberish.2 Not surprisingly, this prompted
PFSB’s motions. In addition, Magistrate Judge Cosbey ordered plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint that complied with RULE 8(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE by February 12, 2013, giving them explicit notice that this action would
otherwise be dismissed without prejudice. (DE # 10.) That deadline came and went, and
plaintiffs filed nothing.
Considering PFSB’s motion for dismissal first, RULE 12(b)(6) of the FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). RULE 8 establishes the pleading
requirements for a complaint filed in federal court. RULE 8(a) states:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the
claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “A plaintiff . . . must provide only enough detail to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and,

The last attachment, beginning at CM/ECF page 14, appears to be all or part of
a real property mortgage to which plaintiff Lavern J. Miller and defendant PFSB are
parties. This document itself is not unintelligible, but it is covered with unintelligible
annotations.
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through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he
is entitled to relief.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The court agrees with PFSB that the complaint plaintiffs filed is completely
incoherent and unintelligible. As such, it fails to provide, in a short and plain statement
of the claim, fair notice of the claim or the grounds upon which it rests, or to present
any facts from which it can be inferred that any plaintiff is plausibly entitled to some
form of relief due to actions taken by the defendant. The indecipherable allegations lack
any cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable theory. A
“plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a
story that holds together,” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010),
but the court is unable even to determine what story plaintiffs are attempting to tell
through their assertions. “[W]here the lack of organization and basic coherence renders
a complaint too confusing to determine the facts that constitute the alleged wrongful
conduct, dismissal is an appropriate remedy.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 798 (7th
Cir. 2011); see also Hoskins v. Polestra, 320 F.3d 761, 762 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges
have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or transparently defective suits
spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal expense . . . even when the
plaintiff has paid all fees for filing and service”); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818,
820 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is unintelligible”
is completely acceptable.”).
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For these reasons, PFSB’s motion to dismiss the complaint will be granted.
However, it is a rare case in which a court should dismiss a confusing complaint with
prejudice. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co. of New York v. Intercounty Nat. Title Ins. Co., 412 F.3d
745, 749 (7th Cir. 2005). This would seem especially true given the leniency afforded pro
se plaintiffs like the two Miller plaintiffs here. It is not clear to which claims prejudice
might attach, since it is impossible to determine what claims the Millers are attempting
to assert in the complaint. Moreover, it may be that they have some viable claim against
PFSB, but have somehow been convinced that Mr. Mueller’s nonsense-pleading style
has merit. Should the Millers choose to begin communicating in standard American
English, and file a complaint asserting a viable claim, either pro se or by an attorney, the
court does not believe the present misguided action should be a bar.
Therefore, dismissal of the complaint as to the Millers will be without prejudice.
This is not true for plaintiff Mueller, however. This case is like the several others he has
filed and he has, as yet, failed to heed the court’s orders directing him to file an
amended complaint in any of them. As to him, the dismissal will be with prejudice.
PFSB’s motion for sanctions will be denied. There is no indication that it
complied with the safe harbor provision found in RULE 11(c)(2). Moreover, it does not
appear that the Miller plaintiffs have been involved in other actions of this nature, and
the dismissal of this case can serve as a lesson, along with this warning: should they file
a similar complaint again, the court will consider sanctions, including awarding
attorneys’ fees and costs to the defendant. As to Mueller, a sanction might be warranted
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if RULE 11(c)(2) had been followed. Nevertheless, the court has already sanctioned
Mueller in another case by enjoining him from filing new cases without leave of court.
See Hochstetler v. Lake City Bank, 1:12 CV 458, DE # 16. The court thinks that serves the
purpose sought by defendant here, making additional sanctions unnecessary.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss (DE # 5) is GRANTED,
and motion for sanctions (DE # 6) is DENIED. As to plaintiffs Lavern Joseph Miller and
Kenny Lavern Miller, this action is DISMISSED without prejudice; as to plaintiff
Monte Edwin Mueller it is DISMISSED with prejudice. Clerk to enter final judgment.

SO ORDERED.
Date: May 3, 2013

s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT