Turney v. General Motors LLC

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 25 Amended Unopposed Motion for Protective Order filed by General Motors LLC. Dft may submit a revised protective order as outlined. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roger B Cosbey on 11/21/2013. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

MARY TURNEY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC,
Defendant.

CAUSE NO. 1:13-CV-3

OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is an Amended Unopposed Motion for Protective Order (Docket # 25)
filed by Defendant, seeking approval of a revised proposed protective order. The revised
proposed order, however, is still inadequate in several ways.
The order’s definition of “Confidential” continues to be impermissibly broad. It allows
parties to designate as “Confidential”:
(a)

certain non-party personnel information, including compensation information,
home addresses and telephone numbers, dates of birth, and social security
numbers;

(b)

non-public financial and business strategy information that would threaten
competitive injury if disclosed; and

(c)

information regarding internal complaints by non-parties.

(Proposed Protective Order ¶ 1.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) allows the Court to enter a protective order for
good cause shown. Under Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d
943, 946 (7th Cir. 1999), a protective order must only extend to “properly demarcated
categor[ies] of legitimately confidential information.”

Here, the use of the phrase “financial and business strategy information” in the definition
of “Confidential” is rather oblique, and the qualifier of “non-public” is too vague. See Cook, Inc.
v. Boston Scientific Corp., 206 F.R.D. 244, 248-49 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
If [non-public] means only that the information is not available to the general
public, then it is insufficient because the information must be kept secret from and
not be readily ascertainable by potential competitors. . . . If the parties seek nontrade secret protection for any . . . information, they must present reasons for
protection and criteria for designation other than simply that the information is
not otherwise publicly available. They must describe a category or categories of
information and show that substantial privacy interests outweigh the presumption
of public access to discovery material.
Id. That is, “merely asserting that a disclosure of the information ‘could’ harm a litigant’s
competitive position is insufficient; the motion must explain how.” Shepard v. Humke, IP 011103-C-H/K, 2003 WL 1702256, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2003) (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2002)). And Defendant also fails to explain what
“information regarding internal complaints by non-parties” pertains to and why such information
must be kept secret.
Moreover, as explained in the Court’s October 28, 2013, Order (Docket # 23), not all
information in an employee’s personnel file is considered private. See Little v. Mitsubishi Motor
Mfg. of Am., Inc., No. 04-1034, 2006 WL 1554317, at *4 (C.D. Ill. June 5, 2006); Smith v. City
of Chicago, No. 04 C 2710, 2005 WL 3215572, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2005). For example,
“there is nothing confidential about an employee’s job title, job description, hiring date, or work
assignment and location.” Little, 2006 WL 1554317, at *4. Here, Defendant’s use of the term
“certain” with respect to non-party personnel information is vague and could result in the
Defendant sealing more of a personnel file than is necessary. See, e.g., id.; Smith, 2005 WL
3215572, at *2.
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It is important to remember that “the public at large pays for the courts and therefore has
an interest in what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding.” Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d at
945. That is, “[w]hat happens in federal courts is presumptively open to public scrutiny.”
Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, a protective
order “may not issue absent an appropriate showing of good cause, as well as adherence to the
other limitations the Seventh Circuit has emphasized apply to such orders.” Shepard, 2003 WL
1702256, at *2.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES approval of the Amended Proposed Motion for
Protective Order. (Docket # 25.) Defendant may, however, submit a revised protective order that
cures the foregoing deficiencies and is consistent with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(7) and Seventh Circuit case law.
SO ORDERED.
Enter for this 21st day of November, 2013.
S/ Roger B. Cosbey
Roger B. Cosbey,
United States Magistrate Judge

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