Slone v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 31

OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 9/1/2015. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TINA M. SLONE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:13-cv-111-JVB

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tina M. Slone seeks judicial review of the Defendant Commissioner of Social
Security’s decision to deny her disability insurance benefits, and asks this Court to reverse and
remand the case. On January 4, 2012, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Warnecke Miller denied
Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits and this decision became final when the Social
Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that the ALJ reached a patently wrong
adverse credibility determination. Additionally, Plaintiff contends the Appeals Council
improperly rejected her request for review.
For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

A.

Overview of the Case
Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled in July 2008, at the age of 46, due to her severe

depressive disorder and anxiety, which she claims has had a significant negative impact on her
ability to work and conduct daily activities. Prior to the alleged onset date, Plaintiff was

employed as a mold press operator, but was laid off on the basis of a reduced workload at the
company and her poor attendance record. Then, in June 2008, Plaintiff attempted suicide by
ingesting an excessive amount of her prescribed anti-depressant. Before and after this attempt to
harm herself, Plaintiff has been treated and evaluated by a myriad of mental health professionals.
She maintains that the diagnoses of these professionals, coupled with her own subjective
complaints regarding her depression and anxiety, prevent her from participating in gainful
employment and entitle her to Social Security disability insurance benefits.

B.

Standard of Review
This Court has the authority to review Social Security Act claim decisions under 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is reached under the correct legal
standard and supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345,
351 (7th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971). This Court will not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). This Court will, however, ensure that the ALJ built
an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion so that, as a reviewing court,
we may access the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful
judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002).

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C.

Disability Standard
To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must establish that she suffers from a

disability. A disability is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The SSA established a five-step inquiry to evaluate whether
a claimant qualifies for disability benefits. A successful claimant must show:
(1) [s]he is not presently employed; (2) [her] impairment is severe; (3) [her]
impairment is listed or equal to a listing in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1; (4) [s]he is not able to perform [her] past relevant work; and (5) [s]he is unable
to perform any other work within the national and local economy.
Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2004).
An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps three and five, to a finding
that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative
answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and leads to a finding that the claimant
is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the claimant at every step except the fifth,
where it shifts to the Commissioner. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).

D.

Analysis
Plaintiff alleges three separate instances of error that necessitate reversal and remand.

First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly weighed opinion evidence by failing to analyze
a treating source opinion and improperly evaluated a consulting examiner’s opinion. Second,
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ’s credibility determination was patently wrong because he
mischaracterized the extent of Plaintiff’s daily activities, overemphasized inconsistencies in
Plaintiff’s testimony, and misunderstood the impact mental illness has on an individual. Third,
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Plaintiff asserts that the Appeals Council erred in rejecting her request for review. Plaintiff avers
that the evidence provided after her hearing, but before the ALJ’s decision was published, was
new, material, and rendered the ALJ’s decision contrary to the weight of the evidence.

(1)

ALJ did not improperly weigh or fail to analyze treating source opinions
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to analyze a treating source opinion prepared by staff

at the Northeastern Medical Center in September 2009. Plaintiff contends that this report was not
utilized by the ALJ in his decision even though it should have been given controlling weight, or
at least deference. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ committed an error of law by failing to give
“good reasons” for discounting this opinion.
A treating physician’s opinion is generally given controlling weight if it is well-supported
by medically acceptable evidence and it is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The agency must always provide “good reasons” for the
weight afforded to a treating sources opinion. Id. If a treating source’s opinion is not given
controlling weight, “in determining the weight to give the opinion” the agency employs a multifactor assessment that includes: the examining relationship; the length, nature, and extent of the
treatment relationship; supportability; consistency; and specialization. Id. at (c)(1)–(5).
In this case, the ALJ gave significant weight to September 2009 Report of Psychiatric
Status. The ALJ summarized the key findings of the report within his decision and treated the
report in an even-handed manner that is consistent with the regulations concerning a treating
physician’s opinion. The ALJ outlines the report and the key conclusions of the treating
physician that included: (1) that Plaintiff’s prognosis was good; (2) her medications helped her
manage stress; (3) that she had good social skills, a sense of humor, and was kind to others; and

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(4) that she had “meltdowns” from time to time as a result of the stressors in her life. (DE 13, R.
20.) The findings of this report are expressly and impliedly present throughout the ALJ’s
decision. The ALJ assessed that Plaintiff would have some limitations that would affect her
ability to work. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff’s inability to handle stress, brought on by her depression and
anxiety, was also accounted for in the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) determination.
The ALJ, in his RFC determination, remarked that Plaintiff could perform a full range of work,
but that her work would necessarily be “limited to tasks that do not require more than superficial
interaction with the public, supervisors, or coworkers, meaning that successful performance of
the job duties involves working with things and not people.” (Id. at 18–19.) The ALJ went on to
note that Plaintiff could not work in an unpredictable environment that required her to make
decisions, or that was production-pace oriented. (Id. at 19.) Thus, the ALJ did not err as he
considered the September 2009 report, accounted for it in his RFC determination, and
incorporated its key elements throughout his decision.
Similarly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the opinion
of Dan Boen, PhD, who performed a consultative examination of Plaintiff in October 2010.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ credited reports from non-examining state agency consultants
more than Dr. Boen. Plaintiff insists that the ALJ failed to describe how he decided to give
greater weight to the state agency consultants and why he did not give significant weight to Dr.
Boen’s report. Plaintiff’s arguments are mistaken and do not reflect the ALJ’s decision.
In his decision, the ALJ explained precisely why he discounted the significance of Dr.
Boen’s report. The ALJ noted that Dr. Boen’s report and analysis was largely influenced by
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, which did not correspond to the testimony of other treating
sources and Plaintiff’s own family. (DE 13, R. 25.) Moreover, the state agency consultants also

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noted that Dr. Boen’s report was largely based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and did not
correspond to the other medical evidence in the record. (Id.) An ALJ need only “‘minimally
articulate’ his reasoning for the weight assigned to a physician’s opinion.” Gully v. Colvin, 593
Fed. Appx. 558, 563–564 (7th Cir. Ill. 2014) (citing Filus v. Astrue, 694 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2012). Here, the ALJ’s rationale easily cleared this low bar. Since the ALJ determined Plaintiff
exaggerated her limitations, and Dr. Boen’s report was based largely on her complaints, the ALJ
reasonably assigned little weight to this opinion. Moreover, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Boen’s
opinion conflicted with the opinions of treating physicians at the Northeastern Medical Center,
whose assessment reflected a higher ability to perform work-related activities. Accordingly, the
ALJ did not err by failing to properly weigh opinion evidence.

(2)

ALJ’s credibility determination was not “patently wrong”
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination is patently wrong. Plaintiff

asserts that the ALJ erred in examining: (1) the scope of her daily activities; (2) inconsistencies
between testimony and medical evidence; (3) her history of working while managing her
depression; and (4) her history of mental health treatment. ALJ credibility determinations are
entitled to deference because the ALJ is “in a special position to hear, see, and assess witnesses.”
Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). Courts only overturn such a credibility
determination if it is patently wrong, that is to say, if it lacks any explanation or support. Id. at
816. A credibility determination will be upheld as long as it is explained in a way that allows the
court to determine that the ALJ logically based it on specific findings and record evidence. Id.
In this case, the ALJ provided a logical explanation for the credibility determination. The
ALJ’s decision relied in part on Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities. The ALJ utilized

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testimony from family members and treatment providers regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities to
support his finding that her subjective complaints were not entirely credible. Plaintiff argues that
it is inappropriate for the ALJ to use the scope of her daily activities to infer that she is capable
of full-time employment. However, this is not what the ALJ did. The ALJ considered the
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her professed ability to perform daily activities and weighed it
against the record medical evidence and the testimony of Plaintiff’s family. (DE 13, R. 26–28.)
As a result of a perceived discrepancy, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were
less than credible and could have been motivated by other external factors. The ALJ even stated
that Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities would be somewhat limited, but not to the
nature and extent of her testimony. (Id. at 26.) This was not an improper consideration of
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and was grounded in the evidence.
Next, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in three more instances that make the credibility
determination patently wrong. However, each of these instances are supported by record
evidence, the ALJ adequately explained his rationale for considering them, and were simply
components of the ALJ’s credibility determination. The ALJ, as he is required to do, “adequately
explain[ed] his . . . credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 477
(7th Cir. 2009)). Regarding Plaintiff’s past work, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been able to
work despite her depression for the preceding fifteen years. (Id. at 27.) As a result, the ALJ
reasoned that Plaintiff could still work, with some restrictions, particularly since there was
nothing that occurred near the alleged disability onset date that would exacerbate her depression.
Next, concerning the receipt of unemployment benefits, the ALJ used this fact, in combination
with others, as another reason to doubt the veracity of her subjective complaints. In this instance,

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the ALJ coupled the receipt of unemployment benefits, Plaintiff’s husband encouraging her to
find work, and her assistance as her husband’s business as more support for an adverse
credibility determination. Lastly, the ALJ recounted all of Plaintiff’s treatment, but found that
two short hospitalizations and a prescribed outpatient mental health treatment program was not
as extensive as one would expect after hearing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. All of this,
combined with the inconsistencies discussed above, are all legitimate pillars of support for the
ALJ’s credibility determination. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility
determination was not patently wrong.

(3)

The Appeals Council did not err by rejecting Plaintiff’s request for review
Plaintiff contends that the Appeals Council erred by finding that evidence submitted after

the hearing, but before the ALJ’s decision, was not new and material. Had the Appeals Council
found the evidence was new and material they could have remanded the case, along with the new
evidence, to the ALJ for further consideration. The evidence in question is an admission record
from Northeastern Center that included a Psychosocial History Assessment and a Psychiatric
Evaluation. (DE 13, R. 525–535.) Plaintiff asserts that the document is new since it was created
after her hearing, but before the ALJ’s decision was published. (DE 21, Pl.’s Br. at 21.) To meet
the second prong of the test, Plaintiff contends that this evidence is material “because [it] was
generated after the hearing and immediately prior” to the ALJ’s decision. (Id.) Defendant
concedes that the evidence is new, but argues that is immaterial. Defendant is correct.
New evidence is only “material” if there is a “reasonable probability” that it would lead
the ALJ to a different conclusion had the evidence been considered. Johnson v. Apfel, 191 F.3d
770, 776 (7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s new evidence does not meet this standard. The most

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significant revelation in the new evidence is that Plaintiff had a suicide ideation in December
2011. However, before acting on it, she called for professional psychiatric assistance and had her
daughter drive her to the Northeastern Center. (DE 13, R. 528.) This episode is consistent with
Plaintiff’s previous mental health treatment and evidence of similar behavior was considered by
the ALJ in reaching his decision. The remainder of the evidence provided in Northeastern Center
report was simply a resuscitation of Plaintiff’s past medical history. Consequently, this evidence
would not have affected the ALJ’s decision and fails to meet the materiality requirement
necessary for Appeals Council review.

E. Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to show that the ALJ improperly weighed opinion evidence or made a
patently wrong credibility determination. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
Appeals Council erred by finding evidence presented after the hearing with the ALJ was
material. The ALJ decided Plaintiff’s claim using the correct legal standard and the decision was
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED on September 1, 2015.

s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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