Tuttle v. Sallie Mae Inc

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 9 MOTION to Compel Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation filed by Sallie Mae Inc. This case is STAYED pending the conclusion of the arbitration. Pla to participate in arbitration. Parties to file with the Court a report on the status of arbitration no later than 9/2/2014. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 2/11/2014. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
MELISSA TUTTLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALLIE MAE, INC.,
Defendant.

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OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises from actions taken by the Defendant Sallie Mae, Inc. (“Sallie Mae”), to
collect on a student loan incurred by the Plaintiff Melissa Tuttle. Ms. Tuttle alleges that Sallie
Mae’s collection calls to her cellular telephone violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(“TCPA”). In lieu of answering the complaint, Sallie Mae moved to stay the litigation and
compel arbitration based on an alleged arbitration agreement between the parties. [DE 9.] Ms.
Tuttle filed a response in opposition [DE 12] and Sallie Mae filed a reply in support [DE 13].
For reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Sallie Mae’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Stay Litigation.
I. Factual Background
On September 12, 2007, Ms. Tuttle signed a College Advantage Loan Program
Application and Promissory Note (“Note”) in order to obtain a loan to help pay for her
education. [DE 10-1 at 5–17.] The Note contains many terms and conditions. Some of the
terms are intended to apply to Ms. Tuttle; others were form terms applying to borrowers from
other states. [See DE 10-1 at 14–15.] One of the terms relevant to this case is an arbitration
clause, which provides, in part:

S. ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
To the extent permitted under federal law, you and I agree that
either party may elect to arbitrate – and require the other party to
arbitrate – any Claim under the following terms and conditions.
This Arbitration Agreement is part of the College Advantage Loan
Promissory Note (“Note”).
1. RIGHT TO REJECT: I may reject this Arbitration
Agreement by mailing a rejection notice to P.O. Box
147027 Gainesville FL, 32608 within 60 days after the
date of my first disbursement. Any Rejection Notice
must include my name, address, telephone number and
loan or account number.
2. IMPORTANT WAIVERS: If you or I elect to arbitrate
a Claim, you and I both waive the right to: (1) have a
court or a jury decide the Claim . . . . Other rights are
more limited in arbitration than in court or are not
available in arbitration.
...
4. “CLAIM” means any legal claim, dispute or controversy
between you and me that arises from or relates in any way
to the Note, including any dispute arising before the date of
this Arbitration Agreement and any dispute relating to: (1)
fees, charges or other provisions of the Note; (2) any
application, disclosure or other document relating in any
way to the Note or the transactions evidenced by the Note;
(3) any insurance or other service or product offered or
made available by or through you in connection with the
Note, and any associated fees or charges; and (4) any
documents, instruments, advertising or promotional
materials that contain information about the Note or any
associated insurance or other service or product. This
includes, without limitation, disputes concerning the
validity, enforceability, arbitrability or scope of this
Arbitration Agreement or the Note; disputes involving
alleged fraud or misrepresentation, breach of contract,
negligence or violation of statute, regulation or common
law; and disputes involving requests for injunctions or
other equitable relief. . . .

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[DE 10-1 at 16–17 (emphasis in original).]1 After the Note was signed, Sallie Mae disbursed
funds to Ms. Tuttle in accordance with the Note. [DE 10-1 at 3.] Sallie Mae’s records do not
show that Ms. Tuttle ever exercised her right to reject the arbitration agreement. [DE 10-1 at 3.]
On June 10, 2013, Ms. Tuttle filed a complaint in this Court against Sallie Mae [DE 1].
Ms. Tuttle asserts that Sallie Mae made numerous collection calls to her cellular telephone in an
attempt to collect on the loan and that such calls violate the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. [DE
1 at 2–3.] In lieu of answering the complaint, Sallie Mae filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Stay Litigation, which is now ripe for decision.
II. Analysis
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that an arbitration agreement in a contract
involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. If a suit is
brought upon an issue that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, the Court “shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. Further, the Court shall order arbitration “upon
being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA creates “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements” and “requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according to their terms.”
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). “That is the case even when the
claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a
contrary congressional command.’” Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).

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Ms. Tuttle’s response purports to quote from the arbitration clause [DE 12 at 9], but the language included by Ms.
Tuttle is different than the arbitration clause actually included in the Note. The Court looks to the actual language of
the Note to interpret the arbitration clause.

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In determining whether Ms. Tuttle’s claim is arbitrable, this Court is prohibited from
reviewing the merits of the dispute and must instead constrain its inquiry to “(1) whether a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists and (2) whether the scope of the parties’ dispute falls within that
agreement.” Tickanen v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 461 F. Supp. 2d 863, 866 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Sallie Mae argues that both conditions exist. Ms. Tuttle denies both and raises the additional
argument that even if a valid arbitration agreement exists, it should not be enforced because
Congress intended that violations of the TCPA should be heard solely in a judicial forum. The
Court will consider each of the issues in turn.
A.

The Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists is a question of state contract law. Gore v.

Alltel Commc’ns, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). Neither party addresses the question of
what substantive law should apply to the determination of the validity of the agreement, nor does
either party cite any state cases in arguing whether the arbitration agreement is valid. In this
case, the Note contains a choice of law provision which states “I understand that the Lender is
located in the State listed in the introductory paragraph of this Note and this Note will be entered
into in the same State. Consequently, the provisions of this Note will be governed by federal
laws and the laws of that State to the extent not preempted, without regard to conflict of law
rules.” [DE 10-1 at 15.] Indiana courts will generally apply a valid choice of law provision
contained within a contract to determine the substantive law governing the contract. Smither v.
Asset Acceptance, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). However, the introductory
paragraph referenced in the choice of law provision (which was to identify the substantive law
applicable to the Note) appears to be blank in Ms. Tuttle’s Note. [DE 10-1 at 12.] Accordingly,

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the Note contains no valid choice of law provision and the Court will apply Indiana’s other
choice of law rules.
Indiana applies the “most intimate contacts” test when determining choice of law in
contract actions. Schaffert by Schaffert v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 687 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1997). That rule requires the Court to “consider all acts of the parties touching the
transaction in relation to the several states involved and will apply as the law governing the
transaction the law of that state with which the facts are in more intimate contact.” Id. (quoting
W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945)). Factors to be considered include
“(1) the place of contracting, (2) the place of negotiation, (3) the place of performance, (4) the
location of the subject matter of the contract, and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Id.
Here, the parties have provided little information regarding the contacts between the
parties and any state. Ms. Tuttle acknowledges that she is a resident of Indiana. [DE 12 at 3.] In
addition, it appears that Ms. Tuttle was located in Indiana when she signed the Note and that the
loan amounts were disbursed to an educational institution in Indiana.2 In light of these likely
contacts to Indiana and the lack of any argument that another state’s substantive law should
apply, the Court will apply the substantive law of Indiana in determining the validity of the
arbitration agreement.
In support of its argument that the Note contains a valid arbitration agreement, Sallie Mae
attached the Note signed by Ms. Tuttle, which does contain a section entitled “Arbitration
Agreement.” [DE 10-1 at 16.] Ms. Tuttle argues, in opposition, that Sallie Mae “does not
present any evidence or documentation showing that Plaintiff signed or executed any document

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The Note indicates that Ms. Tuttle was enrolled full-time at ITT Technical Institute, but does not indicate the
location of the campus. [DE 10-1 at 5.] Ms. Tuttle currently lives in Auburn, Indiana [DE 1 at 1], which is in
reasonably close proximity to an ITT Technical Institute campus in Fort Wayne, Indiana.

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consenting to arbitration nor does Defendant present any evidence or documentation that the
arbitration clause was ever brought to Plaintiff’s attention upon receipt of the multi-page College
Advantage Loan Program.” [DE 12 at 3.] However, Sallie Mae’s attachment of the signed Note
is sufficient evidence that it was signed or executed by Ms. Tuttle. Further, it is well established
in Indiana that an individual “is presumed to understand the documents which he or she signs
and cannot be released from the terms of a contract due to his or her failure to read the
documents.” Robert’s Hair Designers, Inc. v. Pearson, 780 N.E.2d 858, 869 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (finding a covenant not to compete valid and reversing district court’s failure to grant a
preliminary injunction enforcing the covenant). Therefore, Ms. Tuttle is presumed to have read
and understood the arbitration agreement at the time she signed the Note.
Ms. Tuttle further takes issue with the fact that the Note contains terms and conditions
not relevant to Ms. Tuttle and alleges that Sallie Mae “appears to engage in the practice of
specifically providing Plaintiff and other consumers with the Note documentation without
informing its customers of the arbitration clause buried in the multipage document.” [DE 12 at
3–4.] Ms. Tuttle’s argument is that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.3
To be unconscionable under Indiana law, a contract “must be such as no sensible man not
under delusion, duress or in distress would make, and such as no honest and fair man would
accept.” Roddie v. N. Am. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006) (finding arbitration agreement not unconscionable). There are two types of
unconscionability: substantive and procedural. See DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1023

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The Supreme Court has distinguished between two different types of challenges to the validity of an arbitration
agreement: challenges to the contract as a whole and challenges to just the agreement to arbitrate. Rent-A-Center,
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010). This Court may only decide a challenge to the arbitration
agreement itself. If a challenge pertains to the contract as a whole, then it is for an arbitrator to decide. Id. Ms.
Tuttle does not make clear whether she is challenging the arbitration agreement alone or the contract as a whole.
However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court treats the challenge as one to just the arbitration provision and
analyzes that challenge accordingly.

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(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)).
“Substantive unconscionability refers to oppressively one-sided and harsh terms of a contract,
while procedural unconscionability involves the manner and process by which the terms become
part of the contract.” Id.
Ms. Tuttle cites no law in support of an argument of unconscionability and has not
established that the arbitration agreement is either procedurally or substantively unconscionable.
The Court notes that Ms. Tuttle specifically had the option to opt-out of the arbitration agreement
but she did not to do so. See, e.g., Jones v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-837, 2013 WL
6283483, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2013) (finding ability to opt-out of arbitration agreement
“vitiates any conceivable claim that the circumstances under which [the borrower] initially
signed the Agreement were procedurally unfair.”). Additionally, the arbitration agreement is not
hidden in the Note. Instead, several sections of the arbitration agreement are bolded and
capitalized so as to call attention to the provision. Finally, Ms. Tuttle has provided no argument
as to any unfair terms contained within the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable and is valid against Ms. Tuttle.
B.

The Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
After determining that the arbitration agreement is valid, the Court would normally turn

to the question of whether the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
However, in this case the Court need not do so. That is because the parties contracted in their
arbitration agreement that the arbitrators would decide any “disputes concerning the validity,
enforceability, arbitrability or scope of this Arbitration Agreement or the Note.” [DE 10-1 at
17.] The Supreme Court has recognized that parties can agree to arbitrate such “gateway” issues,
such as whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement. Jackson, 130 S. Ct.

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at 2777–78 (“An agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional, antecedent
agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates
on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any other.”). Accordingly, based on the
plain language of the parties’ agreement in the Note, whether a TCPA claim falls within the
scope of the arbitration agreement is for the arbitrator, not this Court, to decide.
Even if the parties had not agreed to arbitrate any issues regarding the scope of the
arbitration agreement, the Court would still find Ms. Tuttle’s claim to fall within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. Once it is clear, as it is in this case, that the parties have a contract that
provides for arbitration of some issues between them, any doubts concerning the scope of the
arbitration clause is resolved in favor of arbitration as a matter of federal law. Gore, 666 F.3d at
1032. “To this end, a court may not deny a party’s request to arbitrate an issue unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute.” Id. at 1032–33 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the arbitration agreement is very broad, covering “any legal claim, dispute or
controversy between [Sallie Mae] and [Ms. Tuttle] that arises from or relates in any way to the
Note.” [DE 10-1 at 17.] It also includes “disputes involving . . . breach of statute.” Id. The
Seventh Circuit has repeatedly construed the phrases “arising out of” and “relating to” in
arbitration agreements very broadly. See Gore, 666 F.3d at 1033 (“we read both ‘arising out of’
and ‘relating to’ broadly.”) (citing Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, Inc., 174 F.3d 907,
909 (7th Cir. 1999)). It has also emphasized that the use of such broad language raises a
presumption of arbitrability, requiring that any doubts regarding whether the dispute is arbitrable
be resolved in favor of arbitration. Id. at 1033–34.

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Based on this broad construction of the arbitration agreement and the presumption that
disputes are to be arbitrated, if it reached the issue the Court would find that the dispute is within
the scope of the arbitration agreement. It is a plausible interpretation of the arbitration agreement
that disputes regarding a breach of statute are to be submitted to arbitration. Further, Ms.
Tuttle’s TCPA claims relate in some way to the Note in that the alleged violations arose from an
attempt to collect on the debt incurred under the Note. Accordingly, the Court cannot say “with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute,” Gore, 666 F.3d at 1032–33, and thus would presume that the issues raised by
Ms. Tuttle’s complaint are subject to arbitration.
The Court rejects Ms. Tuttle’s argument that the TCPA claim is either collateral to the
Note or arises independently from the Note. In support of this argument, Ms. Tuttle cites several
cases from outside this circuit, including cases from the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.
Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding certain
claims not subject to arbitration); Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 924 (9th
Cir. 2011) (finding claims peripheral to agreement not subject to arbitration); Coors Brewing Co.
v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding antitrust claims exceeded the
scope of the contract and were not subject to arbitration). The Court notes that none of these
cases is binding on this Court. In addition, each of those cited cases is distinguishable from this
one.4

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In Collins, there were two contracts at issue—one with an arbitration clause and one without—and the claims not
subject to arbitration were based on the contract without an arbitration clause. Collins, 58 F.3d at 20–21 (“The
question is not whether the second and third claims arise under the 1998 Agreement, which has no arbitration clause;
the question is whether these claims plead conduct that ‘aris[es] out of or [is] related to’ the 1977 Contracts, which
does have such a clause.”). In Cape Flattery, the arbitration clause at issue covered any claims “arising under” the
contract, which is less broad than the “arises from or relates in any way to the Note” language included in the
arbitration clause in this case. Cape Flattery, 647 F.3d at 921 (“we held that the phrase ‘arising under’ in an
arbitration agreement should be interpreted narrowly”). Finally, in Coors, the claims at issue were antitrust claims

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Ms. Tuttle does cite one case from the Seventh Circuit in support of her argument that the
TCPA claim does not relate to the Note. Smith v. Steinkamp, 318 F.3d 775, 776–77 (7th Cir.
2003). The Court does not view Smith as factually analogous to this case. Unlike this case, the
plaintiffs in Smith had signed multiple contracts with the defendants, some of which contained
arbitration agreements and some of which did not. The Seventh Circuit looked to whether or not
the arbitration agreement actually signed by the plaintiffs extended to actions arising from the
later contract that did not include an arbitration provision. Id. at 778 (“All that is certain is that
the waiver agreement, read sensibly as a whole, with careful attention to the relation among the
clauses, does not apply to future disputes, including disputes over future loan agreements.”).5
Instead of relying on Smith, the Court looks to other Seventh Circuit cases in which the court has
repeatedly held that an arbitration agreement may reach disputes “having their origin or genesis
in the contract, whether or not they implicate interpretation or performance of the contract per
se.” Gore, 666 F.3d at 1033 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial–A–
Mattress Int’l, Ltd., 1 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, if it
needed to reach this issue, the Court would find that Ms. Tuttle’s TCPA claims have their origin
or genesis in the contract because Sallie Mae’s efforts to collect on the Note gave rise to the
TCPA claims.
C.

The TCPA’s Text Does Not Reflect Congressional Intent to Preclude Arbitration
Finally, the Court addresses Ms. Tuttle’s argument that the normal federal presumption of

arbitrability should not apply in this case because the text of the TCPA shows that Congress

against two companies, with only one of whom the plaintiff had a contract containing an arbitration agreement. The
claims were thus far more removed from the contract than the TCPA claim in this case. Coors, 51 F.3d at 1516.
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If anything, Smith may hurt Ms. Tuttle’s case, since it notes that the district court compelled arbitration of a RICO
claim arising out of a payday loan agreement containing a valid arbitration agreement. Id. at 777 (“But the other
two plaintiffs signed the waiver agreement every time they borrowed from Instant Cash, and the district judge held
that they were bound by the agreement and so had to arbitrate their RICO and other claims.”).

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intended for violations of the TCPA to be heard in a judicial forum. Ms. Tuttle’s argument is
basically that Congress used the word “court” throughout the TCPA and, therefore, an arbitrator
should not hear a TCPA claim. In making this argument, she relies on a district court ruling
from another circuit, in which the court found that Congress intended to preclude arbitration in a
different federal statute that uses the phrase “right to sue.” Alexander v. U.S. Credit Mgmt., 384
F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (voiding arbitration clause for claims brought under Credit
Repair Organizations Act).
Ms. Tuttle has not succeeded in establishing that Congress intended to preclude parties
from agreeing to arbitrate TCPA claims. As an initial matter, the district court’s reasoning in
Alexander was recently rejected by the Supreme Court. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132
S. Ct. 665 (2012). In CompuCredit, the Court considered the same issue as in Alexander
regarding whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act showed a Congressional intent to
preclude arbitration. Though it did not cite Alexander specifically, the Supreme Court squarely
rejected the rationale employed in Alexander. The Court held that the use of the terms “action,”
“class action,” and “court” were not sufficient to infer an intent to preclude arbitration but rather
were “utterly commonplace” phrases used to describe civil actions. Id. at 670. The Court stated
that if such words were enough to preclude arbitration “valid arbitration agreements covering
federal causes of action would be rare indeed.” Id.
This Court finds no basis to distinguish the arguments made by Ms. Tuttle from the
arguments rejected by the Supreme Court in CompuCredit. Accordingly, Ms. Tuttle has not
shown a Congressional intent to preclude arbitration of TCPA claims. The Court notes that this
decision is consistent with at least one other decision that recently rejected a similar challenge to

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arbitration of TCPA claims. See, e.g., Cyganiewicz v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 13-40067, 2013 WL
5797615, at *5–6 (D. Mass. Oct. 24, 2013).
III. Conclusion
As explained above, the Court finds that the parties have a valid arbitration agreement, in
which the parties have delegated to the arbitrator any disputes regarding the scope of the
arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Sallie Mae’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Stay Litigation. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, this case is STAYED pending the
conclusion of the arbitration. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, Ms. Tuttle is ORDERED to participate
in arbitration, consistent with the terms of the signed arbitration agreement. The parties are
ORDERED to file with this Court a report on the status of the arbitration no later than
September 2, 2014.
SO ORDERED.
Entered: February 11, 2014

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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