Lynch v. ARAMARK Correctional Services LLC
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 6 MOTION to Amend Complaint re 1 State Court Complaint, filed in Allen Superior Court, by Plaintiff Jonathan P Lynch; Clerk DIRECTED to docket the proposed amended complaint. The federal claims contained in the amende d complaint are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28:1915A. Case is REMANDED to Allen Superior Court for further proceedings. The plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel (DE 7) and motion for class certification (DE 8) are DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Joseph S Van Bokkelen on 9/24/13. (lhc)
United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana
JONATHAN P. LYNCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARAMARK CORR. SERVICES, LLC,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 1:13-CV-271 JVB
OPINION AND ORDER
Jonathan P. Lynch, a pro se prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint which was removed
from Allen Superior Court by the defendants. (DE 1, 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court must review the complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To
survive dismissal, a complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur
v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 603. In other words, the
plaintiff “must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative
reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”
Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). The court
must bear in mind that “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
As an initial matter, the plaintiff seeks leave to file a proposed amended complaint. (DE
6.) Upon review, and in the interest of justice, the motion will be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P.
15(a). In the amended complaint (DE 6-1), the plaintiff alleges that while he was housed in the
general population at Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”), he received apple juice with
his breakfast. When he was transferred to the segregation unit, Westville Control Unit (“WCU”),
he stopped getting apple juice on his tray at breakfast. He claims that during the approximately
six months he was in WCU, the defendants “without cause stopped including with my meal
Apple Juice.” He claims that because inmates in general population were receiving apple juice,
this omission constitutes unlawful discrimination.
The plaintiff appears to be trying to raise a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. When an equal protection claim is not based on a protected class, such as race
or gender, a prison may treat similarly situated inmates differently as long as the unequal
treatment is rationally related to some legitimate state interest. See May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d
876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000). This is not a demanding standard, and a challenged action will be
upheld if there is some conceivable justification for it. Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798, 801
(7th Cir. 2009); Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 685 (7th
Cir. 2005). The court cannot find a challenged action irrational simply because it may seem
unwise, unfair, or improvident. Racine Charter One, Inc., 424 F.3d at 685. Furthermore, the
court must afford prison officials “wide-ranging deference” in the day-to-day operations of a
prison, particularly with regard to policies intended to preserve internal order and maintain
institutional security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
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Here, the plaintiff does not allege a discriminatory motive on the part of prison officials,
nor does he allege that he was discriminated against on the basis of race or some other improper
ground. Rather, his claim is simply that it was unfair for inmates in general population to get
apple juice with breakfast while he did not. However, while in segregation, the plaintiff was not
“similarly situated” to inmates in the general population. Racine Charter One, Inc., 424 F.3d at
680 (“To be considered ‘similarly situated,’ comparators must be prima facie identical in all
relevant respects”). Segregation units often house the most dangerous inmates, and are, by their
nature, considerably more restrictive.1 Walters v. Edgar, 163 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“Maximum security prisons are for the most dangerous prisoners. The segregation wards of
these prisons are therefore intended for the most dangerous of the most dangerous.”); see also
Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 610-12 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that inmates in segregation are
permissibly subjected to far more restrictive conditions than those in general population,
including inability to participate in prison programs, inability to attend church, drastic reduction
in exercise and commissary privileges, and drastic reduction in the number and nature of
personal items they are allowed to have in their possession).
It takes no great leap of the imagination to envision the many reasons that inmates in a
segregation unit might not get all the same food items, food containers, or utensils as inmates in
the general population, since these items could be used as weapons, tools of escape, or means of
self-injury. See Hammer, 570 F.3d at 801 (approving of different treatment among inmates with
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In other cases, this court has recognized WCU as a “supermax” facility. See Littler v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 3:11-CV-218, 2013 WL 587901 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 12, 2013); Smith v. Wilson, No. 3:07-CV-338, 2007 WL
2903197 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 1, 2007). “Supermax facilities are maximum-security prisons with highly restrictive
conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison population.” Wilkinson v.
Austin. 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005).
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different security classifications); see also Miles v. Konvalenka, 791 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (denial of coffee for inmates in segregation unit while providing it to inmates in general
population did not violate equal protection). The plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible equal
protection claim on this basis.
Prisoners do have a right to a nutritionally adequate diet under the Eighth Amendment,
Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996), and while a substantial deprivation of
food may amount to a constitutional violation, missing a few meals or a certain food item does
not. See Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1999), Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504,
507-08 (5th Cir. 1999). Instead, the Eighth Amendment is implicated only when a prisoner is
forced to endure deprivations of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). Plaintiff’s claim that he did not get apple juice with breakfast
falls short of satisfying this standard.
To the extent the plaintiff is trying to raise a Fourteen Amendment due process claim, the
Constitution does not create a liberty interest in avoiding transfer within a correctional facility or
remaining in the general prison population. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222 (2005);
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Instead, an inmate is entitled to due process protections
only when more restrictive conditions pose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. The court cannot,
under any stretch of the imagination, conclude that the lack of apple juice at breakfast constitutes
an “atypical and significant hardship” under this standard. The plaintiff also asserts that prison
officials violated internal prison policy in failing to provide him with apple juice, but even if this
is true, it could not form the basis for a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Sobitan v.
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Glud, 589 F.3d 379, 389 (7th Cir. 2009) (“By definition, federal law, not state law, provides the
source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.”) (internal
citation omitted); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that “42
U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws”).
The plaintiff also raises a number of state law claims, but because the federal claims must
be dismissed, the court will remand these claims to state court for further proceedings. See Doe-2
v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Ordinarily,
when a district court dismisses the federal claims conferring original jurisdiction prior to trial, it
relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).”).
Because the plaintiff has no plausible federal claim, his motions for class certification and
appointment of counsel (DE 7, 8) will be denied as moot. However, he is free to renew these
motions in state court if he feels such action is warranted.
For these reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint (DE 6) is
GRANTED, and the clerk is DIRECTED to docket the proposed amended complaint (DE 6-1).
The federal claims contained in the amended complaint (DE 6-1) are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The case is REMANDED to Allen Superior
Court for further proceedings. The plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (DE 7) and
motion for class certification (DE 8) are DENIED as moot.
SO ORDERED on September 24, 2013.
s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen
United States District Judge
Hammond Division
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