Townsend v. Wilson et al

Filing 47

OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING 45 MOTION Requesting Appointment of Counsel by Plaintiff Eddie Townsend. The pending motion for summary judgment 36 remains under advisement. Signed by Magistrate Judge Roger B Cosbey on 1/5/2015. (lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
EDDIE TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
M. WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO. 1:13-cv-315

OPINION AND ORDER
On December 12, 2014, pro se Plaintiff Eddie Townsend filed a motion in this 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 case advancing various constitutional and state law claims, asking that this Court request
an attorney to represent him. (Docket # 45.) On December 17, 2014, Defendants filed a response
opposing Plaintiff’s request (Docket # 46); Townsend has not filed a reply, and the time to do so
has now passed.
Because Townsend is competent to litigate this case himself, his motion will be
DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
“There is no right to court-appointed counsel in federal civil litigation.” Olson v.
Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir.
2007)). But under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court may request that an attorney represent an
indigent litigant; the decision whether to recruit pro bono counsel is left to the discretion of the
district court. Olson, 750 F.3d at 711; Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658.
“In deciding whether to request counsel, district courts must ask two questions: ‘(1) [H]as
the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded

from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent
to litigate it himself?’” Olson, 750 F.3d at 711 (alteration in original) (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at
654). The second portion of this inquiry, stated another way, is “whether the difficulty of the
case–factually and legally–exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to coherently
present it to the judge and jury himself.” Id. at 712 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). In
conducting this inquiry, the district court must ascertain “whether the plaintiff appears competent
to litigate his own claims, given their degree of difficulty, and this includes the tasks that
normally attend litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other
court filings, and trial.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655 (emphasis omitted).
Normally, determining a plaintiff’s competence will be assessed by considering “the
plaintiff’s literacy, communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience.” Id. And
if the record reveals the plaintiff’s intellectual capacity and psychological history, these too
would be relevant. Id. Overall, the decision to recruit counsel is a “practical one, made in light
of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question.” Id.
ANALYSIS
To begin, there is no evidence that Townsend has contacted any attorneys concerning his
case. Therefore, he fails to satisfy the threshold requirement concerning a request for
recruitment of counsel. See Jackson v. Cnty. of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1992) (“If
. . . the indigent has made no reasonable attempts to secure counsel (unless circumstances
prevented him from doing so), the court should deny any § 1915(d) motions outright.”); see also
Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851-52 (7th Cir. 2010).
But even if he had satisfied this threshold requirement, it is evident that Townsend is
competent to represent himself in this matter. This suit is a relatively straightforward § 1983
2

action: Townsend claims that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
false arrest and false imprisonment when it arrested him in August 2012 for operating a vehicle
while intoxicated after he was involved in a traffic accident. He also alleges federal and state
malicious prosecution claims and a state law negligence claim arising from the encounter.
Accordingly, the first factor–the difficulty of his claims–cuts against his request for counsel. See
Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying a motion to appoint counsel
where pro se plaintiff could adequately handle the discovery process and trial in a relatively
simple § 1983 case).
Furthermore, Townsend has already comprehensively articulated his claims in this suit
(Docket # 1, 18, 28); participated in a Rule 16 Preliminary Pretrial Conference (Docket # 31);
propounded discovery requests to Defendants (Docket # 34, 35); filed a response to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment (Docket # 39); and sought relief through two motions to amend
and the instant motion to appoint counsel (Docket # 14, 25, 45). Townsend’s submissions to the
district court are much better than the average pro se litigant’s. See Olson, 750 F.3d at 712.
Notably, he filed an extensive response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, incorporating
numerous legal citations and an exhibit (Docket # 39), indicating that he has already performed
considerable legal research and is fully capable of articulating his legal position.
And this is not the first suit that Townsend has filed on a pro se basis, see, e.g., Townsend
v. Smallwood, 1:98-cv-20; Townsend v. Moore, 1:97-cv-239, and thus he obviously has some
familiarity with the litigation process.
Moreover, it appears that Townsend has reasonably good communication skills, at least
at a sufficient level to proceed pro se. Cf. Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir.
July 25, 2014) (reversing a district court’s denial of request for counsel pertaining to “a blind and
3

indigent prisoner with a tenth-grade education and no legal experience” in a case involving
complicated medical matters); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing
a district court’s denial of request for counsel where the record reflected plaintiff’s low IQ,
functional illiteracy, and poor education). He is not presently incarcerated and thus has the
freedom to perform his own research. Finally, the facts of this case are within his particular
knowledge; therefore, the task of discovery is apt to be quite limited and certainly not
insurmountable.
Considering the foregoing, Townsend appears competent to adequately handle the
litigation of this § 1983 case. Consequently, his motion asking that the Court request counsel for
him will be denied. If his case survives the pending summary judgment motion and proceeds to
trial, the Court will reconsider recruiting counsel for him.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Appointment of Counsel
(Docket # 45) is DENIED. Plaintiff is, of course, free to attempt to secure counsel on his own.
The pending motion for summary judgment (Docket # 36) remains under advisement.
Enter for this 5th day of January 2015.
S/ Roger B. Cosbey
Roger B. Cosbey,
United States Magistrate Judge

4