Valley Forge Insurance Company v. Hartford Iron & Metal Inc et al
Filing
298
OPINION AND ORDER: Court DENIES 93 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; DENIES AS MOOT 95 Motion for Clarification; DENIES 274 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Exhibits; and GRANTS 276 Motion to Seal. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 12/7/2015. (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
HARTFORD IRON & METAL, INC.
AND ALAN B. GOLDBERG (DBA
HARTFORD METAL & IRON),
DEFENDANTS.
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CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-006-RLM-SLC
OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Valley Forge Insurance Company
sued Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc. and Alan B. Goldberg, seeking damages for
breach of contract and declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ rights and
obligations under a series of insurance policies and settlement agreements. This
matter is before the court on Valley Forge’s motion for partial summary
judgment. (Doc. No. 93). The motion concerns only the claims for declaratory
relief: Valley Forge seeks a declaration that it has the right to control both the
defense and the remediation of the Hartford Iron site free from interference by
Hartford Iron.1 Also before the court are Valley Forge’s motion for clarification of
the court’s ruling denying a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 95), Hartford Iron’s
motion for leave to file supplemental exhibits to its summary judgment response
The court refers to both Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc. and Alan B. Goldberg as
“Hartford Iron” for purposes of this order.
1
(Doc. No. 274), and Hartford Iron’s motion to seal one of its proposed
supplemental exhibits (Doc. No. 276).
For the reasons that follow, Valley Forge is not entitled to summary
judgment on its declaratory relief claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Because Valley Forge’s motion seeks only partial summary judgment, it
isn’t necessary to recite in detail the evidence regarding storm water discharges
at the Hartford Iron site and the remediation efforts thus far.
This litigation arises from environmental contamination at a Hartford City,
Indiana metal scrap yard. Hartford Iron operates the scrap yard, and Valley
Forge provided several general liability insurance policies covering it. These
insurance policies2 provide that Valley Forge has the right and duty to
Valley Forge offered one written policy as evidence, and provided the court with
an affidavit from a Valley Forge attorney stating that this policy’s terms are
representative of all policies issued to Hartford Iron. (Doc. No. 94-1, Thompson Affidavit,
¶ 3). Hartford Iron disputes Valley Forge’s allegation that all the other policies contain
the same or functionally equivalent terms, but doesn’t cite to any record evidence of
conflicting terms in other policies or provide a sworn affidavit challenging the assertions
made by Valley Forge’s affiant. Instead, Hartford Iron simply states that it “has not yet
undertaken a comparison of each year’s policy terms” and so the court can’t assume
the truth of Valley Forge’s claim that the policies are all comparable. (Doc. No. 173-1,
Response Appx at p.29). At the summary judgment stage, Hartford Iron can’t simply say
it disagrees with evidence offered by Valley Forge – it must point to specific evidence in
the record contrary to Valley Forge’s factual allegations. Since Hartford Iron hasn’t done
so, Valley Forge’s sworn statement that all the policies bear functionally equivalent
terms is deemed admitted. Hartford Iron also insists that Valley Forge’s “Exhibit 2” cited
in the affidavit isn’t an insurance policy but “an unrelated drainage study map.” This is
incorrect. Exhibit 2 to the affidavit attached to Valley Forge’s motion for summary
judgment is a document entitled “Commercial General Liability Coverage Form,” which
appears to be the insurance policy in question.
2
investigate, defend, and settle covered liability claims against Hartford Iron, and
that:
(c) [Hartford Iron] and any other involved insured must:
…
(3) Cooperate with [Valley Forge] in the investigation, settlement or defense
of the claim or “suit”; and
…
(d) No insureds will, except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment,
assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid,
without [Valley Forge’s] consent.
(Doc. No. 94-3, Section IV(2)).
In August 2006, the Indiana Department of Environmental Management
(“IDEM”) found that the scrap yard wasn’t in compliance with environmental
regulations and issued a Notice of Violation to Hartford Iron. Valley Forge initially
agreed to defend Hartford Iron, but disputes soon arose between the parties. In
2009, IDEM and Hartford Iron entered into an Agreed Order concerning
investigation and remediation at the site, and Valley Forge and Hartford Iron
entered into their first settlement agreement allocating responsibility for
complying with the IDEM order.
Within two years the parties were again at odds about how to remediate
the scrap yard, and Hartford Iron filed suit in state court against Valley Forge
and the attorney Valley Forge had hired as Hartford Iron’s defense counsel in the
IDEM action. Environmental violations at the site continued, and the EPA issued
Hartford Iron a Notice of Intent to File Civil Administrative Complaint. IDEM also
issued a Remediation Request in April 2012 requiring Hartford Iron to submit a
plan to reduce the discharge of PCBs from the site. Hartford Iron submitted a
plan in July 2012.
The parties reached a second settlement agreement in December 2012.
Both sides agreed to release all coverage, malpractice, and bad faith claims they
might have had against each other to that point, and Valley Forge agreed to make
an immediate payment to resolve all past damages and defense costs. As relevant
to the summary judgment motion, the 2012 agreement establishes that: (1)
Valley Forge may immediately appoint new defense counsel subject to Hartford
Iron’s approval, which can’t be unreasonably withheld. The new defense counsel
will defend against the EPA and IDEM claims, supervise the environmental
consultant, and represent Valley Forge’s interests in prompt and cost effective
remediation; (2) Valley Forge may immediately replace the former environmental
consultant with August Mack. August Mack will immediately begin work to
control storm water discharges, and will implement (at Valley Forge’s expense)
any future remediation plans ultimately required and approved by IDEM or the
EPA; (3) Valley Forge must defend and indemnify Hartford Iron as to the EPA
penalty already imposed; (4) Valley Forge must defend and indemnify Hartford
Iron with respect to the EPA and IDEM claims, and will “control the defense of
these matters”; (5) Hartford Iron must “cooperate with Valley Forge, defense
counsel, and August Mack” in implementing the remediation plan; and (6)
August
Mack
and
defense
counsel
must
correspondence relating to work at the site.
copy
Hartford
Iron
on
all
Since the 2012 settlement, both the storm water discharge violations and
the parties’ disputes over control of the defense have continued, and each side
blames the other for the failure to achieve adequate remediation at the site.
Hartford Iron takes the position that August Mack’s remediation efforts have
been insufficient, and actually increased rather than abated the discharge of
harmful chemicals into the groundwater. Valley Forge argues that August Mack’s
remediation plans could have worked well, but were frustrated by Hartford Iron’s
failure to cooperate in denying August Mack employees unfettered access to the
scrap yard.
Valley Forge filed this suit against Hartford Iron in January of 2014,
seeking damages for breach of the 2012 agreement as well as a declaratory relief
regarding Hartford Iron’s obligations under the agreement. The breach of
contract claim alleges that Hartford Iron has failed to cooperate with Valley Forge
and August Mack as required by the 2012 agreement, and that this failure to
cooperate caused the ongoing storm water discharges and increased the costs of
remediating the site. Valley Forge also sought a preliminary injunction that
would prevent Hartford Iron from withholding its consent to the appointment of
new defense counsel at Valley Forge’s expense. The court denied the preliminary
injunction motion on March 9, 2015. (Doc. No. 58).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court must grant summary judgment if “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine
issue of material fact exists whenever “there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine dispute
exists as to any material fact, a court must view all the evidence and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Weber v. Univ.
Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). The existence of an
alleged factual dispute, by itself, won’t defeat a summary judgment motion;
“instead, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal,”
Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012), and “must
affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine
issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc.,
476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007). It isn’t appropriate for the court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses or evaluate the weight of the evidence; the only
question on summary judgment is “whether there is a genuine issue of fact.”
Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment
is “not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment in
a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a
trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory,
407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
There are unquestionably disputes of material fact regarding the
remediation efforts so far, the storm water discharges from the scrapyard, and
who is responsible for the site’s ongoing noncompliance with environmental
regulations. None of these disputes is material to the declaratory relief claims.
Actual overruns of storm water don’t affect the legal issue presented in the
summary judgment motion: whether, as a matter of law, Valley Forge retains the
right to control the defense of the IDEM proceeding under the insurance policies
and settlement agreements after filing this complaint.
A. Hartford Iron’s motions to supplement and to seal
Before reaching the merits of Valley Forge’s motion for summary judgment,
the court must address the pending motions to supplement and to seal. On
November 23, 2015, Hartford Iron filed its second motion3 for leave to file
supplemental exhibits regarding summary judgment. (Doc. No. 274). The motion
seeks to submit fifteen additional exhibits that didn’t exist or hadn’t been
produced at the time Hartford Iron filed its summary judgment response,
including further noncompliance reports from IDEM and communications
regarding the remediation plan proposed by Hartford Iron’s preferred
environmental contractor. Hartford Iron also filed a motion to seal one of the
The court granted Hartford Iron’s first motion to supplement its summary
judgment response brief on September 8, 2015. (Doc. No. 193).
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fifteen supplemental exhibits on the grounds that it might contain Valley Forge’s
privileged attorney-client communications. (Doc. No. 276).
The court has reviewed the proposed exhibits, and none of them materially
affect the court’s analysis of the summary judgment issues – they are largely
cumulative of other evidence in the record, demonstrating only newly arisen
examples of the same underlying disputes. Moreover, Hartford Iron’s motion to
supplement doesn’t identify with particularity how any of these additional
exhibits relate to the issues in the motion for partial summary judgment; all the
motion says is that the exhibits “concern material facts for purposes of the
motion.” While the reply to the motion provides more detail about the contents
of the exhibits and what Hartford Iron believes them to show, it too doesn’t
clearly connect them to the legal arguments presented in the summary judgment
briefing.4 It isn’t the court’s responsibility to sift through the evidence to try and
discern possible arguments that Hartford Iron hasn’t made. Because Hartford
Iron hasn’t clearly identified the relevance of the proposed exhibits to the narrow
legal issues currently before the court, the motion to supplement is denied and
the court declines to consider these documents.
With regard to proposed supplemental exhibits 5-8, for example, Hartford Iron’s
reply only states that the exhibits show IDEM approved the new Keramida system
Hartford Iron wants to build to control storm water discharges. (Reply Mot. Supplement,
Doc. No. 296 at 2-3). Hartford Iron recites that IDEM’s requirements as to the Keramida
system “go to the heart of the conflict of interest” but does not elaborate as to how these
documents show that a conflict exists. Other exhibits are similarly irrelevant to the
partial summary judgment motion, as they simply show that the parties continue to
send each other communications disputing who is responsible for the remediation
failures.
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Because one of the proposed supplemental exhibits is an email from Valley
Forge’s claims managers that might be seeking legal advice from attorneys, the
court grants Hartford Iron’s motion to seal that document. While the court won’t
consider the document in ruling on the summary judgment motion, the motion
to seal is granted solely to ensure that potentially privileged communications
aren’t publicly disclosed on the case docket.
B. Summary Judgment Merits
Valley Forge argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its
declaratory relief claims for three general reasons: (1) no conflict exists that
would prevent Valley Forge from controlling the defense to the environmental
claims; (2) even if a conflict exists with regard to the defense, the conflict doesn’t
undermine Valley Forge’s right to control the remediation itself; and (3) the 2012
settlement agreement should be enforced in any case because it is an armslength contract between counseled parties, and it would be unfair to abrogate
Valley Forge’s bargained-for rights under that agreement.5 None of these
arguments is persuasive. By filing a breach of contract action against Hartford
Hartford Iron raises several other issues in its response, arguing that: (1) Valley
Forge can’t enforce the settlement agreements at issue because Valley Forge materially
breached them first; (2) Valley Forge can’t “control” the defense because that would
entail overriding the independent judgment of defense counsel, in violation of ethical
rules; (3) there is no “control” left to exercise because the current remediation plan has
been approved by IDEM and is legally required; and (4) Valley Forge fails to specify what
it means by “control.” Because a conflict of interest prevents Valley Forge from exercising
its contractual rights, summary judgment must be denied on that basis and it isn’t
necessary to reach these issues.
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Iron that seeks recovery of the same remediation costs Hartford Iron says the
insurance policies cover, Valley Forge created a conflict of interest that prevents
it from controlling the defense and remediation as a matter of Indiana law.
1. Right to Control the Defense
Valley Forge’s chief argument is that there is no conflict of interest here
that would prevent it from controlling the defense to the underlying IDEM and
EPA claims and choosing defense counsel. In Valley Forge’s view, there is no
reason to preclude it from exercising its contractual rights because it has already
agreed to pay the costs of defending against the environmental claims in full.
Because there is no dispute as to coverage, there is no conflict; defense counsel
chosen by and answering to Valley Forge would have no incentive to defend the
environmental claims in any way other than the most meritorious and costeffective. This position views both the dispute between these parties and the
relevant law on conflicts too narrowly. There is sufficient risk of misaligned
incentives to prevent an attorney from representing both Hartford Iron’s and
Valley Forge’s interests consistent with his or her ethical obligations.
Indiana’s ethical rule on attorney conflicts of interest is embodied in Rule
of Profession Conduct 1.7, which provides that a lawyer may not represent a
client if the representation involves a “concurrent conflict of interest” and defines
a concurrent conflict as existing where:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client;
or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client,
a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(In. RPC Rule 1.7(a)).
Such a conflict often exists between the respective interests of an insurer
and insured when the defense to an underlying lawsuit or enforcement action
may influence whether the claims is covered or not covered. In such a situation
of misaligned incentive – where the attorney defending the underlying claim
might have to select a defense that furthers the financial interest of the insured
or the insurer, rather than both – the accepted practice has long been for the
insurer to pay for independent defense counsel and exercise no control. See
Snodgrass v. Baize, 405 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. App. 1980) (holding that in such a
case the insurer should pay for counsel selected by the insured); All–Star Ins.
Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160, 165 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (noting that in
such a situation the insurer “must either provide an independent attorney to
represent the insured, or pay for the cost of defense incurred by the insured
hiring an attorney of his choice”).
As the court noted at the preliminary injunction hearing, Armstrong
Cleaners, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 364 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ind. 2005) is highly
instructive in determining whether such a conflict exists in the general liability
insurance context. In Armstrong Cleaners, IDEM notified the owner of a building
that the building violated environmental regulations, and the owner sought
contribution from the tenants who were renting the building for a dry cleaning
business. When the tenants turned over defense of the lawsuit to their insurer,
the insurer responded with a reservation of rights including an insistence that
“pollution” was excepted from the insurance policy. The tenants asked the court
to declare that the insurer had to pay the bills of independent defense counsel
of the tenants’ choosing. The Armstrong Cleaners court noted that “not every
reservation of rights poses a conflict for defense counsel” but rejected the
insurer’s argument that a conflict exists only in particular easily identifiable
categories of cases, concluding that the Rule 1.7 standard “cannot be confined
to only its easiest and clearest applications” but rather “sweeps more broadly
and looks more generally at the risk that an attorney’s representation of one
client will be impaired by her relationship with another client or another entity
paying the bill.” Armstrong Cleaners, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 808. The court went on
to emphasize that evaluating the risk of conflict requires “close attention to the
details of the underlying litigation” rather than any bright-line rule, and
concluded that because counsel hired by the insurer would be conducting
discovery on issues relevant to the underlying suit that would also be relevant to
the coverage dispute (such as the tenants’ state of mind and the degree of care
they exercised), a significant risk of conflict existed under Rule 1.7.
Valley Forge argues that unlike Armstrong Cleaners – in which the
underlying defense was to a lawsuit – this case involves only a notice of
violations. IDEM won’t make explicit findings based on who was at fault; it will
only demand that the problem be fixed and issue fines to Hartford Iron. Yet
relative fault for the discharges is the basis for the breach of contract claims in
the instant case. According to Valley Forge, no conflict therefore exists because
the defense counsel it appoints for Hartford Iron has no way to manipulate the
record in the environmental actions in a way that would support Valley Forge’s
breach of contract claim before this court. It characterizes the dispute between
the parties regarding the defense as a strategic disagreement rather than a
serious conflict of interest.6
The court sees this situation as closely analogous to the one in Armstrong
Cleaners. In the underlying environmental claims, IDEM and the EPA are
alleging – and threatening penalties for – further discharge of contaminated
storm water that occurred after August Mack began remediation work. Under
Indiana law, a defendant in an environmental action “may assert defenses
provided by law or equity, including a defense that damages … were caused in
whole or in part by a nonparty.” Ind. Code § 13-30-9-5. Not only is this a potential
defense available to Hartford Iron, there is evidence in the record that it has
actually been pursued; Ms. Dameron (Hartford Iron’s defense counsel during the
initial stages of this case) has sent letters to IDEM encouraging the agency to go
after August Mack and Valley Forge for the contamination rather than Hartford
Iron, and has testified before this court that the blame-shifting strategy is the
The case Valley Forge points to for the premise that strategic or tactical disputes
between an insurer and insured don’t give rise to a conflict of interest is a Texas state
court case, N. Cnty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2004). Because the
question of whether or not a conflict exists is governed by Indiana’s rules of professional
conduct, Davalos isn’t instructive. It is also easily distinguishable; the insured in that
case wanted control of the defense only because he wished to bring suit for his car
accident injuries in a different venue than that favored by his insurer, and the court
held this tactical squabble insufficient to create a conflict. There is little question here
that the parties’ disagreements about the defense of the environmental claims extend
beyond a single purely tactical issue, as Hartford Iron wants to make use of a defense –
blaming August Mack – that is wholly contrary to Valley Forge’s interests.
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only one she believes she can ethically pursue. (PI hearing transcript, at 137138). Hartford Iron’s defense with regard to at least the most recent storm water
discharges is essentially that the fault lies not with it but with August Mack’s
shoddy remediation work. This is in direct conflict with Valley Forge’s breach
claim in this suit, which alleges that Hartford Iron’s bad faith failure to cooperate
with August Mack is the cause of the ongoing storm water discharge problem.
While IDEM may not make any written findings as to who is to blame, any
defense counsel appointed for Hartford Iron but controlled by Valley Forge will
need to decide which of the two masters to serve when gathering evidence and
preparing reports about the storm water discharges. This conflict is sufficient to
materially limit the attorney’s representation of Hartford Iron.
Hartford Iron points to specific facts in the record that aptly demonstrate
the conflict. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Ms. Dameron testified to an
incident in which IDEM gave Hartford Iron notice that waste hadn’t been properly
disposed of. She responded by sending a self-disclosure letter to IDEM which
blamed the waste violation event on August Mack’s conduct. (PI hearing
transcript, at 144-145). August Mack and Valley Forge then sent a letter to the
agencies contradicting Ms. Dameron’s description of the incident. (Id. at 147).
Ms. Dameron in her independent judgement as Hartford Iron’s counsel felt that
the best way to avoid formal action on the waste violation was to lay the blame
on August Mack, and the representations she made to the regulatory agencies
directly contradicted the allegations in Valley Forge’s complaint identifying
Hartford Iron as responsible for the delay in waste disposal. The conflict is only
compounded by Valley Forge making inconsistent representations to the
agencies; by contradicting Ms. Dameron’s explanation for the discharges, Valley
Forge’s letter undermined the only defense to the violations Hartford Iron could
offer. A similar incident involved a sworn witness statement prepared for a
regulatory report by Scott Goldberg, a Hartford Iron employee, attesting to his
personal observation of a storm water discharge event. (Doc. No. 45-8). Valley
Forge’s attorney responded by insisting that Mr. Goldberg make changes to his
statement, in a way that Ms. Dameron believed shifted blame for the discharge
from August Mack to Hartford Iron. (PI hearing transcript, at 138-139). These
examples illustrate the difficulty any attorney charged with representing both
Hartford Iron’s and Valley Forge’s interests would encounter, and show that it is
not only likely but virtually certain that the conflict will materially limit the
attorney’s representation of Hartford Iron.
Accordingly, the conflict of interest created by Valley Forge’s breach of
contract claim against Hartford Iron prevents Valley Forge from controlling the
defense to the environmental actions as a matter of law.
2. Right to Control the Remediation
Valley Forge also argues that even if a conflict exists with regard to the
defense of the IDEM and EPA claims, it doesn’t impact its absolute right to
control the remediation itself. This argument is based on characterizing the costs
of the remediation as a “settlement” or “damages” rather than defense costs.
As an initial matter, Valley Forge provides no authority for the proposition
that a conflict that influences the defense to an environmental claim doesn’t also
infect the remediation costs. Instead, it relies chiefly on two cases from Indiana
in which courts upheld the right of insurers to refuse to pay settlements in
conflict situations. In Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. C.M.A. Mortg., Inc., 682 F.
Supp. 2d 879 (S.D. Ind. 2010), an insurer agreed to fund a mortgage company’s
defense in a Fair Credit Reporting Act class action suit. Because the insurer
decided to contest coverage, it agreed to pay for independent defense counsel
and didn’t exercise control over the defense. When the independent defense
counsel entered into a settlement with the class and demanded that the insurer
pay it, the insurer refused, relying on a portion of the insurance contract that
prohibited voluntary payments without the insurer’s consent. The court held
that the insurer was within its rights to refuse to pay the settlement, given the
clear language in the policy prohibiting voluntary payments. Similarly, in
Klepper v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 999 N.E.2d 86 (Ind. App. 2013), an insurer provided
independent counsel for a class action suit but reserved its right to deny
coverage, then refused to pay a settlement the insured entered into without its
consent. The court held that the insurer didn’t breach its policy contract in
refusing to pay the settlement, because language in the policy forbade the
insured from making voluntary payments without the insurer’s consent.
The situations in C.M.A. and Klepper differ from the circumstances here.
In both those cases, the insurer was disputing coverage – and both courts
highlighted this as an important factor in their holdings. The C.M.A. court
emphasized that the insurer had reserved its rights to pay any part of the claim
at all. See Am. Family v. C.M.A. Mortg., 682 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (noting that
because the insurer reserved its rights “without being bound by any adverse
‘determination’ resulting from a trial of the class action, then clearly it would
also not be bound by any adverse ‘determination’ resulting from an agreement
voluntarily entered into by CMA.”). Similarly, the Klepper court explained that
what freed the insurer to repudiate the settlement was the dispute over coverage,
as “for a settlement agreement to be binding on an insurer, coverage must be
shown.” Klepper v. ACE, 999 N.E.2d at 95-96.
By contrast, Valley Forge has stated repeatedly that it doesn’t dispute
coverage and will pay all reasonably necessary remediation costs up to the policy
limits. The insurers in C.M.A. and Klepper paid for defense counsel but sought
to escape indemnifying the insured on the underlying FCRA claim at all; forcing
them to be bound by the settlement before the coverage dispute was resolved
would have nullified the right to contest coverage. They prevailed in court based
on the insurance policy’s prohibition on voluntary payments. While that same
provision exists in the policies here, it only prohibits voluntary payments without
Valley Forge’s consent. Valley Forge has, in effect, already consented to the
settlement at issue here – the Agreed Order with IDEM – but seeks to exercise
control over how precisely the obligations under that settlement are met.
While C.M.A. and Klepper involved settlements to traditional lawsuits, this
case involves a defense to environmental regulatory enforcement. As other courts
have noted, the distinction between “defense” and “indemnity” costs blur in
environmental actions, in which investigations are open-ended and remediation
is intended both to address past violations and to convince regulators not to
proceed further against the violator. See Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am. v. State, Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., 143 N.J. 462, 476, 672 A.2d 1154, 1162 (1996) (counting as both
“defense” and “indemnity” the costs of investigative activities that “kills two birds
with one stone in the sense of fulfilling a defense obligation while also relieving
the policyholder of a potential claim for damages.”). Valley Forge’s motion doesn’t
draw a clear distinction between what activities in the ongoing environmental
cleanup efforts it considers “remediation” as opposed to “defense,” and is silent
as to who will make this (most likely hotly contested) determination. That defense
and remediation activities are inextricably intertwined is also reflected in the
2012 agreement itself, which specifies that defense counsel’s duties include
overseeing the environmental contractors doing the remediation work.
Accordingly, many of the same conflicts concerns presented by Valley
Forge’s control over the defense are also implicated by control of the remediation.
Valley Forge’s lawsuit attempts to avoid some of the costs of remediation on the
grounds that Hartford Iron’s actions have prevented August Mack from fixing the
problem. Were Valley Forge to exercise control over the remediation despite its
lawsuit, it would have an incentive to prioritize fixing things for which it is
unquestionably responsible while neglecting necessary work for which it believes
Hartford Iron will ultimately foot the bill – even if doing so exposes Hartford Iron
to a high risk of future enforcement action. For these reasons, Valley Forge is
not entitled to summary judgment on its claim for declaratory judgment
regarding control over the remediation.
3. Enforcement of the Settlement Agreements
Valley Forge’s third argument is that the 2012 settlement agreement
should be enforced as written, because it was an arms-length contract negotiated
between counseled parties and so not subject to the same presumptions against
the insurer that govern insurance policies under Indiana law. It would be unfair,
Valley Forge argues, to strip it of its rights to control the defense and remediation,
because those rights were the only thing it got out of the settlement agreement
in the first place.
In light of the finding that a conflict of interest exists as a matter of law,
this argument doesn’t require extended discussion. Even an otherwise valid,
arms-length contract can’t require (or even permit) Hartford Iron’s appointed
defense attorney to violate state ethical rules by providing a conflicted defense.
While Valley Forge argues that this renders its rights to control the defense under
the settlement agreement illusory, this is a conflict of Valley Forge’s own making.
Had Valley Forge filed suit only for declaratory relief to clarify the parties’
obligations, no conflict would exist and Valley Forge would be free to enjoy its
bargained-for right to control the underlying defense to the environmental
actions. By seeking a damage remedy for breach of contract, however, Valley
Forge effectively forfeited its control rights. Valley Forge’s claim for breach of
contract seeks damages from Hartford Iron for the same incurred costs that
Hartford Iron contends are covered under the insurance policies; by filing its
complaint, Valley Forge in effect disputed its duty to pay for costs associated
with the remediation of the Hartford Iron site. This created a conflict of interest
for defense counsel hired by Valley Forge to represent Hartford Iron’s interests
in the context of the IDEM and EPA enforcement actions, and as a matter of
Indiana law, such a conflict of interest prevents Valley Forge from exercising its
contractual rights to control no matter what the contract says.
C. Valley Forge’s motion for clarification of the preliminary injunction ruling
At the same time Valley Forge filed its motion for partial summary
judgment, it also filed a motion asking for clarification of the implications of the
court’s ruling denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. Valley Forge
argues that clarification is necessary because Hartford Iron stopped cooperating
with Valley Forge entirely and conducted the defense on its own after the
preliminary injunction hearing, having seemingly interpreted the denial of the
preliminary injunction to mean that it had the right to control the defense
unilaterally from then on. Valley Forge’s motion asks the court to answer four
questions about what the preliminary injunction ruling does or doesn’t entitle
the parties to do going forward.
No clarification of the preliminary injunction order is appropriate. The
court denied Valley Forge’s request for a preliminary injunction because Valley
Forge hadn’t shown likelihood of success on the merits of its declaratory
judgment counts, and so wasn’t entitled to appoint new defense counsel for
Hartford Iron without Hartford Iron’s consent at that time. After denying the
motion, the court stated:
I recognize that Hartford Iron might be back with a request for its own
counsel, not subject to Valley Forge’s control, but funded by Valley Forge.
And in light of today’s finding that a conflict exists for an attorney
attempting to represent Hartford Iron while Valley Forge maintains control
over the litigation, I don’t anticipate need for additional evidence, though I
think it remains to determine what remedy or relief would be appropriate…
(Doc. No. 60, p. 243).
When the court said it didn’t think additional evidence would be needed,
the statement was in the context of a potential competing motion for a
preliminary injunction concerning Hartford Iron’s right of refusal on the selection
of counsel. The court made no findings that control, or even influence, the rest
of the litigation. Any such findings would have been inappropriate at that stage,
because the only question before the court was whether Valley Forge had met
the stringent standards for a preliminary injunction – standards that differ
greatly from those that apply in other stages of this litigation. The court tried to
make that point clear at the hearing:
I have before me only one properly presented claim for preliminary
injunction relief and that single claim is for the appointment of Mr.
Hatchett as an additional attorney under the 2012 settlement agreement,
and I can only rule on that claim, and I do so by denying Valley Forge's
motion for a preliminary injunction.
(Id.)
In any case, Valley Forge’s motion for clarification is now moot. While the
court didn’t make a finding at the preliminary injunction hearing that a conflict
of interest exists and prevents Valley Forge from controlling the defense as a
matter of law, it makes such a finding in this order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court DENIES Valley Forge’s motion for partial
summary judgment (Doc. No. 93), DENIES AS MOOT Valley Forge’s motion for
clarification (Doc. No. 95), DENIES Hartford Iron’s motion for leave to file
supplemental exhibits (Doc. No. 274), and GRANTS Hartford Iron’s motion to
seal (Doc. No. 276).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: December 7, 2015
/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court
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