Bolden v. Caravan Facilities Management LLC

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER granting defendant's 22 Motion for Summary Judgment, VACATES the July 1, 2015 final pretrial conference and the jury trial set for July 20, 2015 and DENIES as moot 25 joint motion to continue trial and all pretrial filing requirements. Signed by Judge Robert L Miller, Jr on 6/8/2015. (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
STANFORD BOLDEN,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.

CARAVAN FACILITIES
MANAGEMENT, LLC,
DEFENDANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO. 1:14-CV-26-RLM

OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant Caravan Facilities
Management, LLC’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Stanford Bolden
opposes the motion. The court heard argument on April 29, 2015.

I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Bolden is an ordained minister in the Missionary Baptist Church and
is the senior pastor of his church. Mr. Bolden keeps the Sabbath on Sunday;
he understands the Sabbath to begin at 12:01 a.m. on Sunday morning and to
end at midnight that night.
From August to October 2011 and February to July 2012, Mr. Bolden
was employed by Aramark Facilities Services, Inc. through Pro Resources
Staffing Agency to perform janitorial work at the Marion, Indiana General
Motors Stamping Facility on an as needed basis. The full-time Aramark janitors
were members of the Local 977 of the United Automobile, Aerospace and

Agriculture Implement Workers of America; as a temporary employee of Pro
Resources, Mr. Bolden wasn’t a member of the union. During his employment
with Pro Resources, Mr. Bolden spoke with Facility Manager Karen Schwartz,
employed by Aramark, to request Sundays off so he could observe the Sabbath.
Ms. Schwartz conferred with the union officials, who decided the union didn’t
object to a temporary, non-union janitor not being scheduled on Sundays. Ms.
Schwartz

told

Mr.

Bolden

that

Aramark

and

Pro

Resources

would

accommodate his request, and he wasn’t scheduled to work on Sundays.
Aramark turned over the facility management contract at the GM plant
to Caravan Facilities Management, LLC in August 2012. During the transition
period that took place the month before, Caravan offered full-time employment
to the Aramark full-time, union janitors and the Pro Resources temporary
janitors. Every janitor had to fill out an employment application, but Caravan
honored the union members’ seniority dates, positions, and shifts. Formerly
temporary janitors were given a ninety-day probationary period, at the end of
which they would become members of the union. Mr. Bolden submitted an
employment application to Caravan and began his probationary period. Two
other employees were hired under the same conditions.
Caravan and the union agreed that Caravan would adopt the janitors’
existing neutral, rotating work schedule. The schedule included three janitorial
shifts: First (6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.); Second (2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.); and
Third (10:30 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.). The janitors worked five consecutive days and
-2-

then had two consecutive days off. The neutral, rotating schedule distributed
the weekend work evenly among the janitors on each shift. Thus, the days
on/days off schedule rotated. The collective bargaining agreement required
shift assignments to be made according to seniority. Caravan didn’t alter the
union janitors’ assigned shifts; Mr. Bolden and the two other probationary
employees had no seniority and were placed on second shift.1
Mr. Bolden again asked for Sundays off in order to observe the Sabbath.
A factual dispute exists about the substance of his conversation with Ms.
Schwartz, now the Site Manager for Caravan, about his request. At his
deposition, Mr. Bolden testified that Ms. Schwartz told him Caravan didn’t
want to accommodate him and to call-off if he couldn’t get anyone to work in
his place. Bolden Dep. 96:14–97:22, 145:20–146:4, Aug. 27, 2014. He said he
didn’t ask for further explanation. Bolden Dep. 104:4–10. Mr. Bolden
acknowledged the janitors were allowed to trade days off, and he could have
traded with a coworker who had a Sunday off. Bolden Dep. 99:1–100:23.
According to Mr. Bolden, he wasn’t able to find anyone to replace him because
his coworkers wanted their Sundays off. Bolden Dep. 97:21–22, 101:4–10,
103:1–7. Mr. Bolden remembered that his coworker Tracy traded with him
once, but otherwise he didn’t remember the names of the coworkers that he
had asked to trade or when he had asked them. Bolden Dep. 102:1–12,

The second shift also had union members who had bid on-to or elected not to bid offof the shift and two of the three lowest seniority union members. An empty spot on second shift
was filled by bumping the remaining lowest seniority union member to the shift from his
preferred first or third shift.
1

-3-

101:11–25. Mr. Bolden testified that he didn’t remember whether he had any
further discussions with Ms. Schwartz about his request, didn’t recall
discussing

Caravan

not

accommodating

his

request

with

a

union

representative, and didn’t discuss the issue with any other Caravan employees.
Bolden Dep. 114:15–25, 104:11–23, 115:1–9. According to Ms. Schwartz’s
declaration, she again conferred with union officials about the request, but now
that Mr. Bolden was a full-time employee and was going to be a part of the
union at the end of his probationary period, the union was unwilling to make
an exception to the neutral, rotating work schedule to give Mr. Bolden every
Sunday off. Schwartz Aff. 4. Ms. Schwartz says she explained to Mr. Bolden
that because he was no longer a temporary employee and was going to be a
regular member of the union, he was subject to the rotating work schedule. Id.
Mr. Bolden called-off three Sundays in a row without getting a
replacement. As a result, Caravan terminated his employment on October 10,
2012. There were ten Sundays between the time Caravan took over the facility
management contract at the GM plant, making Mr. Bolden a probationary, fulltime employee of Caravan, and Mr. Bolden’s termination:
SUNDAY
Aug. 5
Aug. 12

MR. BOLDEN
SCHEDULED TO WORK
yes
yes

Aug. 19

yes

Aug. 26
Sept. 2
Sept. 9

no
no
no
-4-

OUTCOME
didn’t work
traded with William
(Tracy) Hampton
traded with William
(Tracy) Hampton

Sept. 16
Sept. 23
Sept. 30
Oct. 7

no
yes
yes
yes

called-off
called-off
called-off

Four of the Sundays fell on Mr. Bolden’s scheduled days off. The time records
show that Mr. Bolden didn’t work on August 5, although he was scheduled to
do so. Caravan’s records don’t reflect whether another employee worked for Mr.
Bolden on that Sunday or whether he called-off. Mr. Bolden testified that Mr.
Hampton traded with him on at least one occasion; Caravan’s records show
that Mr. Hampton likely traded with Mr. Bolden on two Sundays, August 12
and 19. Mr. Bolden called-off on September 23, and he received an attendance
warning on the 24th. Mr. Bolden signed a copy of that warning, as did his
supervisor Jeff Price and his union representative. Mr. Bolden acknowledged
that he received and signed the notice. Bolden Dep. 118:21–121:2. Mr. Bolden
then called-off on September 30 and October 7. After the third Sunday that he
called-off without a replacement, Caravan identified Mr. Bolden as an
unsatisfactory probationary employee and terminated his employment.
Mr. Bolden filed suit against Caravan; he alleges Caravan violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., when it
didn’t accommodate his religious belief and terminated his employment as a
result. Caravan moves for summary judgment; it argues no genuine issue of
material fact exists because it reasonably accommodated Mr. Bolden’s religious
belief through a neutral, rotating work schedule and the opportunity to trade
-5-

scheduled days on/days off with other employees and any alternative
accommodation would have placed more than a de minimis burden on the
company.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute as to any
material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The court must construe all facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986); Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). Factual disputes
that preclude summary judgment are both material and genuine. Carroll v.
Lynch, 698 F.3d at 564. “The underlying substantive law governs whether a
factual dispute is material” and “a factual dispute is genuine when ‘the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at
248).

III. DISCUSSION
Caravan argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr.
Bolden’s

discrimination

claim

because

-6-

Caravan

offered

Mr.

Bolden

a

reasonable

accommodation

for

his

religious

belief

and

his

suggested

accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on Caravan.
“Title VII prohibits employers from ‘discriminating against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.’” Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). Under Title VII, religion “includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–(j). To
establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination “based on an employer’s
failure to provide reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff ‘must show [1] that the
observance or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is religious
in nature, [2] that [he] called the religious observance or practice to [his]
employer’s attention, and [3] that the religious observance or practice was the
basis for [his] discharge or other discriminatory treatment.’” Porter v. City of
Chicago, 700 F.3d at 951. “Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to make a reasonable
accommodation of the religious practice or to show that any reasonable
accommodation would result in undue hardship.” Id. Mr. Bolden claims his
observance of the Sabbath is religious in nature, he asked his employer for an
accommodation, and his absence at work on Sundays was the reason for his
termination. So, he claims to have established a prima facie case of religious
discrimination. Caravan argues that regardless, it offered him a reasonable
-7-

accommodation and to accommodate his belief would cause it an undue
hardship.

A. Reasonable Accommodation
Caravan contends that its neutral, rotating shift schedule combined with
the opportunity to switch scheduled days on/days off with other employees
was a reasonable accommodation. Mr. Bolden acknowledges Caravan’s
proposed accommodation but contends that whether the accommodation was
reasonable is a question of fact for the jury.

Reasonableness
“[A] ‘reasonable accommodation’ of an employee’s religious practices is
‘one that eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and
religious practices.’” Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir.
2012). The employer’s duty to accommodate doesn’t require the employer to
violate a collective bargaining agreement or seniority system when the union
was unwilling make an exception to the agreement or system in order to
accommodate the religious belief of an employee. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79, 81 (1977). At least two circuits have found a
neutral, rotating work allocation schedule combined with employer authorized
voluntary shift-swapping to be a reasonable accommodation for employees
whose religious beliefs prevent them from working on a certain day each week.
-8-

Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994)
(neutral rotating shift system with authorization to swap shifts sufficiently
accommodated an employee who observed the Sabbath sundown Friday to
sundown Saturday); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145 (5th
Cir. 1982) (rotating shift scheduling system and opportunity to trade schedules
sufficiently accommodated an employee who observed the Sabbath from
sundown Friday to sundown Saturday). The court of appeals found that “it is a
reasonable accommodation to permit an employee to exercise the right to seek
job transfers or shift changes, particularly when such changes do not reduce
pay or cause loss of benefits,” with the caveat that “whether an accommodation
is reasonable in a particular case must be made in the context of the unique
facts and circumstances of that case.” Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d
771, 776 n.7 (7th Cir. 1998). For example, employer authorized shift-swapping
isn’t a reasonable accommodation for an employee who also has a religious
objection to asking another employee to work for them on what they believe to
be the Sabbath. Id. Mr. Bolden doesn’t claim to have a religious objection to
asking his coworkers to swap scheduled days on/days off with him but argues
that whether the accommodation was reasonable is a question for the jury. He
emphasizes that the reasonableness of the accommodation depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The court doesn’t disagree, but rotating
shift schedules that spread weekend work as evenly as possible among
employees are nearly universally recognized as a neutral way for employers to
-9-

distribute work and the opportunity for employees to swap shifts has been
recognized as a way for employers to cure any conflict the neutral schedule
creates with an employee’s request for days off for religious reasons. Without a
distinguishing circumstance, it isn’t likely that a reasonable jury could find the
same accommodation unreasonable in this case. See Williams v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 40 F. Supp. 3d 1055, 1066 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (“[I]t seems likely, given the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ approval of shift-swapping and its approving
citation of out-of-circuit cases such as Brener, 671 F.2d at 146, that U.S.
Steel’s

shift-swapping

arrangement

is

a

reasonable

accommodation.”).

Nevertheless, the court needn’t decide whether the accommodation is
reasonable as a matter of law because all other potential accommodations
would place an undue hardship on Caravan.

Interactive Process
Mr. Bolden argues that a dispute exists about whether Caravan caused a
breakdown in the interactive process. The federal regulations that implemented
the Americans with Disabilities Act require an interactive process involving
both the employer and the employee with a disability to determine the
appropriate reasonable accommodation. Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d
1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000). Mr. Bolden doesn’t cite a similar regulation to

-10-

support the interactive process requirement in Title VII cases.2 Regardless, Mr.
Bolden doesn’t allege a failure to engage in the interactive process claim that
would survive the ADA standard. An employer is liable for failing to engage in
the interactive process only if the lack of an interactive process resulted in a
failure to identify an appropriate accommodation that otherwise would have
been found. Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1059 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2014). The parties dispute the substance of the conversation that took
place when Ms. Schwartz told Mr. Bolden that Caravan wouldn’t accommodate
his request for every Sunday off. Mr. Bolden says that Ms. Schwartz told him
Caravan didn’t want to accommodate him and to call-off if he couldn’t get
anyone to work in his place. Bolden Dep. 96:14–97:22, 145:20–146:4. Ms.
Schwartz says she explained to Mr. Bolden that because he was no longer a
temporary employee and was going to be a regular member of the union after
his probationary period, he was subject to the neutral, rotating work schedule
and the union was unwilling to make an exception to that schedule. Schwartz
Aff. 4. During argument on the summary judgment motion, counsel for
Caravan said it doesn’t dispute that Ms. Schwartz told Mr. Bolden to call-off if
he couldn’t find a replacement, but it contends the reason Ms. Schwartz told
Mr. Bolden to call-off was because the consequences were more severe if he
didn’t show up for work and also didn’t call-off. The question of fact, therefore,

Mr. Bolden cites Filinovich v. Claar, No. 04 C 7189, 2005 WL 2709284, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 19, 2005), a Title VII case in which the court cited Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d
1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000), an ADA case, for failure to engage in the interactive process
standard.
2

-11-

isn’t what Ms. Schwartz said to Mr. Bolden during that conversation – it is
what Ms. Schwartz meant and what Mr. Bolden understood her to mean. The
September 24th attendance warning that followed the first Sunday absence for
which he called-off without a replacement undermines any contention that Ms.
Schwartz gave Mr. Bolden permission to call-off for a scheduled shift. Further,
Mr. Bolden’s interpretation of Ms. Schwartz’s comment doesn’t align with the
other statements Ms. Schwartz made during the conversation. Mr. Bolden
understood Ms. Schwartz to say that Caravan didn’t want to accommodate
him. If Ms. Schwartz had given Mr. Bolden permission to call-off for a
scheduled

shift

without

consequences,

Caravan

would

have

been

accommodating Mr. Bolden by making an exception to the facility’s attendance
policy and the attendant consequences for violating that policy. Nevertheless,
the dispute about the meaning of the conversation isn’t material because Mr.
Bolden doesn’t allege or explain how further clarification or discussion would
have identified a reasonable accommodation. The court can’t say the interactive
process resulted in a failure to identify an appropriate accommodation for Mr.
Bolden.

B. Undue Hardship
Even if the neutral, rotating schedule along with the ability to swap days
on/days off wasn’t a reasonable accommodation, Caravan argues Mr. Bolden’s
requested accommodation – a schedule with every Sunday off – would have
-12-

placed an undue hardship on Caravan. Mr. Bolden claims a factual dispute
exists about the hardship that his absence would cause Caravan.
An employer isn’t required to incur more than a de minimis cost – either
in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages – to accommodate an
employee’s religious practice. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 84 (1977). “[E]very religious accommodation will inevitably cause some
differences in treatment among employees, and differential treatment alone is
not enough to create an undue hardship. But if accommodating an employee’s
religious beliefs also causes a ‘real’ and ‘actual’ imposition on co-workers, Title
VII does not require an employer to make such an accommodation.” Harrell v.
Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 980-981 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977)) (citations omitted). The employer
bears the burden of proof and must show that any and all accommodations
would have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct of its business.
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(j)).
Mr. Bolden doesn’t suggest alternative accommodations. Caravan points
to Mr. Bolden’s deposition and says the only accommodation Mr. Bolden found
adequate was to have every Sunday off. Bolden Dep. 141:22-142:18. One
option, Caravan says, was to make an exception to the neutral, rotating days
on/days off schedule for Mr. Bolden and never schedule him on Sunday. This
could be done two ways. Since the system always schedules the employees with
-13-

two consecutive days off, when Mr. Bolden came up in the rotation with a
schedule that didn’t include a day off on Sunday, Caravan could swap his
schedule with one of his coworkers whose schedule that week included a day
off on Sunday. Alternatively, when the system assigned Mr. Bolden a schedule
that didn’t include a day off on Sunday, Caravan could leave Mr. Bolden’s other
days off intact and permit him to also have Sunday off. Caravan could then
work an employee down, pay overtime to other workers to cover the shift, or
hire an outside person to cover the shift.
A second option, which Caravan says Mr. Bolden suggested at his
deposition, was to move Mr. Bolden to the third shift. Caravan claims this
option doesn’t align with Mr. Bolden’s observation of the Sabbath from 12:01
a.m. to midnight on Sunday and ignores the seniority of Mr. Bolden’s
coworkers. The three lowest seniority union members were assigned to the
second shift. Two were assigned to the shift by default after higher seniority
union members claimed their shifts, and the third lost his preferred shift when
a position needed to be filled on the second shift. To move Mr. Bolden to the
third shift would disrupt the seniority system’s distribution of shifts among the
janitors and directly negatively impact the three union members with more
seniority than Mr. Bolden and the two probationary employees who had the
same seniority as Mr. Bolden. Caravan says this option would cause it to
violate the CBA and deny Mr. Bolden’s coworkers their contractual rights.

-14-

In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), an
employee requested a specific day off each week to observe the Sabbath, a
seniority system set out in the collective bargaining agreement determined job
assignments, and the employee didn’t have the seniority to bid on the shift that
would accommodate his religious belief. Id. at 67-68. To give the employee that
specific day off every week, the employer could have violated the CBA and
overridden the seniority system or allowed the employee to work a four day
week instead of the standard five day week and either required another
employee to cover the job duties or scheduled another employee for the day and
paid them overtime. Id. at 76-77. The union was unwilling to depart from the
CBA’s provisions, and if the employer had unilaterally overridden the union’s
decision, the employer would have breached the CBA. Id. at 78-79. The court
observed that to violate the CBA’s neutral system that allocated days off would
deprive the employee’s coworkers of their contractual rights, id. at 81, and to
have either another scheduled employee cover the job duties or pay a
replacement employee would cost the employer in the form of either lost
efficiency in another job or higher wages. Id. at 84. The court concluded the
proposed accommodations imposed an undue hardship on the employer. Id. at
84-85.
First, Caravan argues that it needn’t violate the CBA in order to
accommodate Mr. Bolden’s religious belief. The court agrees. Caravan wasn’t
required to make an exception to the neutral, rotating schedule that
-15-

distributed weekend work as evenly as possible among Mr. Bolden and his
coworkers or to override the seniority system that dictated how the janitors bid
on positions on shifts – both of which were designed and implemented by the
CBA. EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir.
2008) (“It is well established that Title VII does not require an employer to
violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, especially provisions
pertaining to seniority-based scheduling.”). On a related note, the exceptions to
the neutral schedule and the seniority system also adversely impact the
contractual rights of Mr. Bolden’s coworkers. If the schedule is altered, they
must either work more Sundays than Mr. Bolden or have fewer days off than
Mr. Bolden. If the seniority system is disregarded, they lose the benefit of their
tenure. See EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d at 317 (“[A]n
employer is not required to adversely impact or infringe on the rights of other
employees when accommodating religious observances.”).
Next, Caravan contends that if it doesn’t change the schedule and deals
with Mr. Bolden’s absence on the Sundays that he is scheduled, Caravan’s
options are to place the burden on one of Mr. Bolden’s coworkers, lose
productivity with one less worker, or incur the additional expense of
compensating a replacement worker. These are the types of lost efficiency in
another job or higher wages the Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison Court
found to be more than a de minimis cost to impose on the employer. 432 U.S.
at 84; see also Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 146-147 (5th
-16-

Cir. 1982) (hiring a substitute, having the employee’s supervisor work for him,
or operating without the employee were accommodations that would impose an
undue hardship on the employer).
The court of appeals cautions that the undue hardship in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison must be understood in the context of a seniority
system or collective bargaining agreement. Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners,
LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 456 (7th Cir. 2013). Both a seniority system and a
collective bargaining agreement were in place for the janitors at the GM plant,
and the union wasn’t willing to make exceptions to them. The “existence of a
neutral seniority system does not relieve the employer of its duty to reasonably
accommodate

the

religious

beliefs

of

its

employees,

so

long

as

the

accommodation can be accomplished without disruption of the seniority
system and without more than a de minimis cost to the employer.” Balint v.
Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). Neither Caravan nor
this court can think of an accommodation that allows Mr. Bolden to have every
Sunday off but doesn’t violate the CBA or impose more than a de minimis cost
on Caravan.
Mr. Bolden simply responds that he has set forth enough facts to create
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his absence would cause
Caravan an undue hardship. Caravan contends Mr. Bolden hasn’t set forth any
facts on the topic at all, and the court agrees. Mr. Bolden can’t rest on mere
allegations at the summary judgment stage and must point to some evidence
-17-

that sets forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Scherer v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Argument is not
evidence upon which to base a denial of summary judgment.”). Mr. Bolden
doesn’t

explain

how

any

of

Caravan’s

proposed

options

that

would

accommodate his request for every Sunday off wouldn’t cause an undue
hardship on Caravan, and he doesn’t propose any other options.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 22), VACATES the July 1, 2015 final pretrial
conference and the jury trial set for July 20, 2015, and DENIES as moot the
joint motion to continue trial and all pretrial filing requirements (Doc. No. 25).
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: June 8, 2015

/s/ Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Judge
United States District Court

-18-