Godsey v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER: The decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 12/16/2015. (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MIKE GODSEY
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROYLN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Cause No. 1:14-cv-297

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on petition for judicial review of the decision of the
Commissioner filed by the plaintiff, Mike Godsey, on September 24, 2014. For the following
reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED.
Background
The plaintiff, Mike Godsey, filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income on February 6, 2013, alleging a disability onset date of October
31, 2007. (Tr. 16). The Disability Determination Bureau denied Godsey’s application on March
27, 2013, and again upon reconsideration on June 14, 2013. (Tr. 16). Godsey subsequently filed
a timely request for a hearing on July 22, 2013. (Tr. 16). A hearing was held on November 14,
2013, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Terry Miller, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on December 19, 2013. (Tr. 16–26). Vocational Expert (VE) Marie N. Kieffer testified
at the hearing. (Tr. 16). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the council. (Tr. 6–9).
The ALJ found that Godsey met the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through March 31, 2011, but not thereafter. (Tr. 18). At step one of the five step sequential

analysis for determining whether an individual is disabled, the ALJ found that Godsey had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 31, 2007, his alleged onset date. (Tr. 18).
At step two, the ALJ determined that Godsey had the following severe impairments: low back
pain with degenerative changes, bilateral foot pain/foot neuromas, chronic headaches,
depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and cognitive disorder. (Tr. 18). At step three, the
ALJ concluded that Godsey did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 19).
In determining whether Godsey had an impairment or combination of impairments that
met the severity of one of the listed impairments, the ALJ considered Listing 1.04, spine
disorders, and Listing 12.04, affective disorders. (Tr. 19). In finding that Godsey did not meet
Listing 12.04, the ALJ considered the Paragraph B criteria for mental impairments, which
required at least two of the following:
marked restriction of activities of daily living; marked difficulties in
maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of
decompensation, each of extended duration.
(Tr. 19). The ALJ defined a marked limitation as more than moderate but less than extreme and
repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, as three episodes within one
year or once every four months with each episode lasting at least two weeks. (Tr. 19–20).
The ALJ found that Godsey had moderate restrictions in daily living activities. (Tr. 20).
Godsey reported that he could dress himself, tie his shoes, manipulate buttons, pick up small
items, prepare meals, drive a car, and clean. (Tr. 20). However, Godsey testified that dressing
and bathing himself worsened his back pain, that he could not sit still while watching television,
and that he needed to lean on the cart while shopping. (Tr. 20). Despite Godsey’s difficulties,
the ALJ found that the medical evidence supported only moderate restrictions in daily living
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activities. (Tr. 20). The ALJ also found that Godsey had moderate difficulties in social
functioning. (Tr. 20). He indicated that he had felt depressed for two years, that he felt fatigued
most days, that he had low self-esteem, and that he had a negative outlook. (Tr. 20).
Additionally, Godsey stated that bad news caused him to become angry and agitated instantly
and that he did not have a social life. (Tr. 20). The ALJ concluded that the medical evidence did
not support a marked limitation in social functioning. (Tr. 20).
The ALJ found that Godsey had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or
pace. (Tr. 20). Dr. Fervida found that Godsey had a significant impairment in memory ability.
(Tr. 20). Additionally, he concluded that Godsey would have significant difficulty remembering
visually presented information and some difficulty remembering auditory information presented
illogically. (Tr. 20). Although the ALJ found that Godsey’s recognition ability was significantly
impaired, he concluded that the evidence did not support a marked limitation. (Tr. 20).
Moreover, the ALJ determined that Godsey had not experienced any extended episodes of
decompensation. (Tr. 20). The ALJ concluded that Godsey did not satisfy the Paragraph B
criteria because his mental impairments did not cause at least two marked limitations or one
marked limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation of extended duration. (Tr. 20).
Additionally, he found that Godsey did not meet the requirements for Paragraph C. (Tr. 20).
The ALJ then assessed Godsey’s residual function capacity (RFC) as follows:
the claimant has the residual function capacity to perform “light”
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the
following additional restrictions: only occasional climbing of
ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, as well as occasional
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. He can do frequent
balancing. In addition, the claimant should avoid concentrated
exposure to wetness, loud noise, and bright/flashing lights. The
claimant should avoid hazards including operational control of
dangerous moving machinery, work at unprotected heights, and
work around slippery/uneven/moving surfaces. Mentally, the
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individual cannot understand, remember, or carry out detailed or
complex job instructions. The claimant could perform simple,
repetitive tasks on a sustained basis (meaning eight hours a day, five
days a week or an equivalent work schedule); no sudden or
unpredictable workplace changes; cannot perform tasks requiring
intense or focused attention for prolonged periods; and work at a
flexible pace (where the employee is allowed some independence in
determining either the timing of different work activities, or pace of
work). Socially, he can have only occasional interactions with the
general public.
(Tr. 21). The ALJ explained that in considering Godsey’s symptoms he followed a two-step
process. (Tr. 21). First, he determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that was shown by a medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic technique that reasonably could be expected to produce Godsey’s pain or other
symptoms. (Tr. 21). Then, he evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the
symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited Godsey’s functioning. (Tr. 21).
Godsey was forty-one years old, single, and lived with a friend. (Tr. 21). Godsey
indicated that his main physical problems were back pain, headaches, and feet and right elbow
problems. (Tr. 22). He reported trouble bending, twisting, and standing. (Tr. 22). Godsey
testified that his doctor informed him that his pain could not be alleviated and that his doctor did
not recommend surgery. (Tr. 22). He stated that his pain level was “eight out of ten,” that he
had right elbow pain, that he had spots on the middle of his foot below his toes, and numbness
and sharp pains in his feet. (Tr. 22).
Godsey testified that he could walk only for five to ten minutes and that his ability to
stand was worse. (Tr. 22). He reported that he took medicine for acid reflux previously but had
not taken any medication for two months. (Tr. 22). The ALJ noted that Godsey’s behavior at
the hearing did not demonstrate major pain. (Tr. 22). For example, Godsey did not leave his

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seat, sat still through most of the hearing, did not have a limited gait, and did not walk or stand
abnormally. (Tr. 22).
The ALJ concluded that Godsey received minimal treatment based on the medical
evidence. (Tr. 22). Godsey received free or low-cost treatment at the Kenny Burkett Clinic,
where he complained of ongoing abdominal pain. (Tr. 22). However, his testing was within
normal limits and no objective findings were consistent with the severity of his complaints. (Tr.
22). Godsey was told to have an MRI for his headaches, but he could not afford it. (Tr. 22).
Godsey had a fatty liver, was not diabetic, and was not at risk for diabetes. (Tr. 22). The clinic
prescribed Flexeril for Godsey’s back pain and Zantac for his GERD problems. (Tr. 22).
Additionally, the clinic ordered a podiatry consultation for Godsey’s foot pain, but the ALJ did
not find a record for that appointment. (Tr. 22).
A gallbladder ultrasound revealed a fatty infiltration of Godsey’s liver, and a CT scan
showed a small, noncalcified left lower lobe pulmonary nodule. (Tr. 22). Therefore, the doctor
recommended a follow up CT scan six months later. (Tr. 22). Godsey also received treatment
for pilonidal sinus and colitis. (Tr. 22). The doctor offered an excision under local anesthesia,
and Godsey indicated that he would consider the operation and schedule an appointment. (Tr.
22). An April 29, 2011, lumbar spine x-ray demonstrated mild degenerative changes. (Tr. 22).
While a March 22, 2013, lumbar spine x-ray revealed early degenerative disc changes at L5-S1.
(Tr. 22). Godsey’s L5-S1 disc space had early thinning and his sacroiliacs were not well
visualized, but he did not have any fractures or dislocations. (Tr. 22).
Godsey told Dr. Kamineni that he did not sleep well, denied having a CT or MRI of his
brain for headaches, denied having a neck x-ray, and reported a normal colonoscopy and EGD.
(Tr. 22–23). Despite finding that Godsey had abnormal joint movement, Dr. Kamineni

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concluded that he had no muscle pain, no tenderness to palpation in his lumbosacral spine, and
normal heel toe and tandem walking. (Tr. 23). The ALJ found that Godsey had chronic low
back pain, chronic foot pain without deformity, and chronic headaches without neurological
deficits. (Tr. 23). Godsey reported that he could lift and carry twenty pounds for short distances
and could lift ten pounds over his head. (Tr. 23). Godsey also saw Dr. Coda, who evaluated his
foot pain and found no calluses or foot sores. (Tr. 23).
On June 4, 2013, Dr. Fervida performed a consultative evaluation on Godsey. (Tr. 23).
Godsey reported that his unemployment and homelessness increased his depression, that he felt
overwhelmed, and that he experienced audible hallucinations. (Tr. 23). Godsey denied having
manic symptoms. (Tr. 23). Dr. Fervida concluded that Godsey’s mood and affect were flat and
mildly depressed, that he had average persistence and insight, and that he could understand what
he was doing. (Tr. 23). However, Dr. Fervida found Godsey’s understanding below average and
concluded that Godsey’s poor recognition demonstrated that more than his depression affected
his memory. (Tr. 23). Dr. Fervida assessed Godsey’s GAF as 42. (Tr. 23). The ALJ did not
give Dr. Fervida’s low GAF score great weight. (Tr. 23). Despite Dr. Fervida’s low GAF
assessment, the ALJ noted that Godsey could perform simple repetitive tasks on a sustained
basis, he could understand and follow instructions normally, and his concentration and
frustration tolerance was average. (Tr. 23).
The ALJ found that Godsey’s medically determinable impairments reasonably could
cause the alleged symptoms, but he found Godsey incredible regarding the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of the symptoms. (Tr. 23). The ALJ stated that neither the medical evidence
nor the medical opinions demonstrated that Godsey could not work. (Tr. 23). In considering
Godsey’s credibility, the ALJ indicated that he considered Godsey’s daily living activities, his

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treatment, and the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of his medication. (Tr. 23). The
ALJ also noted that his conclusion was consistent with the State Agency physicians and
psychologists with some alterations. (Tr. 24). For example, the physicians found that Godsey
could perform a limited range of light work, and the psychologists concluded that Godsey had
three moderate restrictions under the Paragraph B criteria. (Tr. 24).
At step four, the ALJ determined that Godsey could not perform his past relevant work.
(Tr. 24). Considering Godsey’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded
that there were jobs in the national economy that he could perform, including electrical
accessories assembler (175 jobs regionally, 2,000 jobs in Indiana, and 100,000 jobs nationally),
folder (100 jobs regionally, 3,000 jobs in Indiana, and 200,000 jobs nationally), and electronics
worker (175 jobs regionally, 2,000 jobs in Indiana, and 100,000 jobs nationally). (Tr. 24–25).
Discussion
The standard for judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act is limited to a determination of whether those findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”);
Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014); Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1097
(7th Cir. 2013) (“We will uphold the Commissioner’s final decision if the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards and supported her decision with substantial evidence.”); Pepper v. Colvin,
712 F.3d 351, 361–62 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005);
Lopez ex rel Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence has
been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support such a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 852

7

(1972) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed.
2d 140 (1938)); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098; Pepper, 712 F.3d at 361–62; Jens v. Barnhart, 347
F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 2002). An ALJ’s
decision must be affirmed if the findings are supported by substantial evidence and if there have
been no errors of law. Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013); Rice v. Barnhart,
384 F.3d 363, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2004); Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002).
However, “the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of
the issues.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539.
Disability and supplemental insurance benefits are available only to those individuals
who can establish “disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. The claimant must
show that he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security regulations enumerate the five-step sequential
evaluation to be followed when determining whether a claimant has met the burden of
establishing disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ first considers whether the
claimant is presently employed or “engaged in substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation process is over.
If he is not, the ALJ next addresses whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination
of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see Williams v. Colvin, 757 F.3d 610, 613
(7th Cir. 2014) (discussing that the ALJ must consider the combined effects of the claimant’s
impairments). Third, the ALJ determines whether that severe impairment meets any of the

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impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 401, pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. If it does, then
the impairment is acknowledged by the Commissioner to be conclusively disabling. However, if
the impairment does not so limit the claimant’s remaining capabilities, the ALJ reviews the
claimant’s “residual functional capacity” and the physical and mental demands of his past work.
If, at this fourth step, the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he will be found not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). However, if the claimant shows that his
impairment is so severe that he is unable to engage in his past relevant work, then the burden of
proof shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant, in light of his age, education, job
experience, and functional capacity to work, is capable of performing other work and that such
work exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
416.920(f).
Godsey has argued that the ALJ’s credibility finding was patently wrong. This court will
sustain the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the
record. Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833,
843 (7th Cir. 2007); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Only if the trier
of fact grounds his credibility finding in an observation or argument that is unreasonable or
unsupported . . . can the finding be reversed.”). The ALJ’s “unique position to observe a
witness” entitles his opinion to great deference. Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir.
1997); Allord v. Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2006). However, if the ALJ does not
make explicit findings and does not explain them “in a way that affords meaningful review,” the
ALJ’s credibility determination is not entitled to deference. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936,
942 (7th Cir. 2002). Further, “when such determinations rest on objective factors or fundamental
implausibilities rather than subjective considerations [such as a claimant’s demeanor], appellate

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courts have greater freedom to review the ALJ’s decision.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872
(7th Cir. 2000); see Bates, 736 F.3d at 1098.
The ALJ must determine a claimant’s credibility only after considering all of the
claimant’s “symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [the claimant’s] symptoms can
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubjective
complaints need not be accepted insofar as they clash with other, objective medical evidence in
the record.”); Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2004). If the claimant’s
impairments reasonably could produce the symptoms of which the claimant is complaining, the
ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms through
consideration of the claimant’s “medical history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, and
statements from [the claimant, the claimant’s] treating or examining physician or psychologist,
or other persons about how [the claimant’s] symptoms affect [the claimant].” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c); see Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2005) (“These
regulations and cases, taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for
discounting a claimant’s testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from merely
ignoring the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence and
the claimant’s testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.”).
Although a claimant’s complaints of pain cannot be totally unsupported by the medical
evidence, the ALJ may not make a credibility determination “solely on the basis of objective
medical evidence.” SSR 96-7p, at *1; see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1125 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“‘[T]he ALJ cannot reject a claimant’s testimony about limitations on her daily activities solely
by stating that such testimony is unsupported by the medical evidence.’”) (quoting Indoranto,

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374 F.3d at 474); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If pain is
disabling, the fact that its source is purely psychological does not disentitle the applicant to
benefits.”). Rather, if the
[c]laimant indicates that pain is a significant factor of his or her
alleged inability to work, the ALJ must obtain detailed descriptions
of the claimant’s daily activities by directing specific inquiries about
the pain and its effects to the claimant. She must investigate all
avenues presented that relate to pain, including claimant’s prior
work record, information and observations by treating physicians,
examining physicians, and third parties. Factors that must be
considered include the nature and intensity of the claimant’s pain,
precipitation and aggravating factors, dosage and effectiveness of
any pain medications, other treatment for relief of pain, functional
restrictions, and the claimant’s daily activities. (internal citations
omitted).
Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1994); see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881,
887-88 (7th Cir. 2001).
In addition, when the ALJ discounts the claimant’s description of pain because it is
inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, he must make more than “a single, conclusory
statement . . . . The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on
credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to
make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to
the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-7p, at *2; see Minnick v.
Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[A] failure to adequately explain his or her
credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record is grounds for
reversal.”) (citations omitted); Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887; Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307-08
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the ALJ must articulate, at some minimum level, his analysis of the
evidence). He must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion.”
Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887 (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)). A
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minor discrepancy, coupled with the ALJ’s observations is sufficient to support a finding that the
claimant was incredible. Bates, 736 F.3d at 1099. However, this must be weighed against the
ALJ’s duty to build the record and not to ignore a line of evidence that suggests a disability.
Bates, 736 F.3d at 1099.
Godsey has argued that the ALJ’s credibility finding was patently wrong. He has
claimed that the ALJ relied on the “sit and squirm” standard, which provided little probative
value. The ALJ indicated that Godsey’s behavior at the hearing did not demonstrate that he was
in major pain. The ALJ noted that he did not get up from his seat, that he sat through most of the
hearing, that his gait was not limited, and that he walked and stood normally. At the hearing,
Godsey testified that he was in pain and indicated that he remained seated only because of the
hearing. Godsey has questioned the ALJ’s observations because the ALJ presided over the
hearing via a video monitor.
Godsey also has argued that the ALJ incorrectly drew a negative inference from his
minimal treatment. The ALJ stated that Godsey received minimal treatment from a free or lowcost health clinic. Additionally, he noted that Godsey failed to follow up on occasion. Godsey
has claimed that he attempted to receive consistent treatment, but he indicated that he could not
afford treatment due to his unemployment, homelessness, and lack of health insurance. Godsey
has argued that he followed through on all treatment he could afford. Therefore, the ALJ should
not have drawn a negative inference from his minimal treatment.
Finally, Godsey has claimed that the ALJ erred by finding him incredible based on his
daily living activities. Godsey noted Dr. Fervida’s opinion, which concluded that he was
substantially impaired and that he needed assistance to complete his daily living activities.
Additionally, Godsey has argued that his activities were necessary for survival and that they did

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not demonstrate an ability to perform substantial gainful activity. He has opined that the ALJ
failed to explain how his daily living activities contradicted his assertions.
The Commissioner has argued that the ALJ considered Godsey’s demeanor, treatment,
and daily living activities properly. She has indicated that the ALJ could consider Godsey’s
demeanor at the hearing and that the ALJ did not place undue emphasis on his observations. The
Commissioner has argued that the ALJ did not draw a negative inference based on Godsey’s
minimal treatment, rather he only was commenting on Godsey’s lack of treatment without
finding him less credible. However, the Commissioner also has argued that the objective
medical evidence did not support Godsey’s allegations.
The ALJ’s credibility finding was patently wrong. Although the Commissioner has
argued that the ALJ did not draw a negative inference based on Godsey’s minimal treatment, the
ALJ did hold Godsey’s minimal treatment against him. The ALJ cited Godsey’s minimal
treatment as part of his credibility assessment without further explanation. On its face, it appears
that the ALJ drew a negative inference based on Godsey’s minimal treatment. However, the
ALJ failed to explain why Godsey received only minimal treatment. Godsey indicated that he
could not afford additional treatment. Therefore, the ALJ should not have drawn a negative
credibility inference from Godsey’s minimal treatment. See S.S.R. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at
*7; Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2012).
Additionally, the ALJ failed to explain his credibility finding adequately. He stated that
he considered Godsey’s daily living activities, treatment, and medications when discounting
Godsey’s credibility. (Tr. 23). However, the ALJ provided no explanation for why Godsey’s
daily living activities, treatment, or medications contradicted his allegations. The ALJ failed to
build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion. Moreover, the ALJ made a

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conclusory statement about the objective medical evidence in support of his adverse credibility
finding. The ALJ stated that the medical evidence and opinions did not support Godsey’s
allegations without further explanation. (Tr. 23). Although the ALJ did review the objective
medical evidence, he failed to make explicit findings in support of his credibility determination.
The ALJ did not explain how Godsey’s subjective complaints contradicted the objective medical
evidence.
Lastly, the ALJ used the “sit and squirm” test to support his adverse credibility finding.
The ALJ indicated that Godsey did not demonstrate major pain at the hearing, that he did not
leave his seat, that he sat through most of the hearing, that his gait was not limited, and that he
walked and stood normally. The ALJ should consider Godsey’s demeanor when assessing his
credibility. However, the Seventh Circuit has questioned the “sit and squirm” test. See Powers
v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We doubt the probative value of any evidence that
can be so easily manipulated as watching whether someone acts like they are in discomfort.”).
But the “sit and squirm” test alone does not render a credibility finding patently wrong. Powers,
207 F.3d at 436.
Godsey testified at the hearing that he was in pain throughout the hearing and that he
remained seated only because of the hearing. (Tr. 53). The ALJ did not address Godsey’s
testimony. Therefore, it was not clear why the ALJ rejected Godsey’s explanation for his lack of
observable pain or discomfort. Without an explanation of Godsey’s testimony, the probative
value of the ALJ’s observations are questionable.
Considering the ALJ’s failure to explain his findings and Godsey’s testimony, the ALJ
did not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his credibility finding. The
ALJ should provide more than a conclusory statement and explain why the objective medical

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evidence, Godsey’s daily living activities, and his treatment contradicted his allegations.
Additionally, he should indicate whether he accepted or rejected Godsey’s testimony about his
pain throughout the hearing and why he remained seated. Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility
finding was patently wrong requiring remand.
Next, Godsey has argued that the ALJ failed to include limitations in his RFC
assessment. SSR 96-8p explains how an ALJ should assess a claimant’s RFC at steps four and
five of the sequential evaluation. In a section entitled, “Narrative Discussion Requirements,”
SSR 96-8p specifically spells out what is needed in the ALJ’s RFC analysis. This section of the
Ruling provides:
The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing
how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical
facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily
activities, observations). In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must
discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities
in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and
describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the
individual can perform based on the evidence available in the case
record. The adjudicator must also explain how any material
inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record
were considered and resolved.
SSR 96-8p (footnote omitted). Thus, as explained in this section of the Ruling, there is a
difference between what the ALJ must contemplate and what he must articulate in his written
decision. “The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented,
but he must provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.” Getch v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir.
2000)); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 2014). Although the ALJ does not
need to discuss every piece of evidence, he cannot ignore evidence that undermines his ultimate
conclusions. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123 (“The ALJ must confront the evidence that does not
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support her conclusion and explain why that evidence was rejected.”) (citing Terry v. Astrue,
580 F.3d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 2009); Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); Arnett v.
Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A decision that lacks adequate discussion of the
issues will be remanded.” Moore, 743 F.3d at 1121.
Godsey has argued that the ALJ failed to include limitations in the RFC based on his
memory limitations, foot pain, and headaches. First, Godsey has claimed that the ALJ failed to
account for the memory limitations found by Dr. Fervida. Dr. Fervida concluded that Godsey
had a significant memory impairment, a significant recognition impairment, and a major visual
memory deficit. (Tr. 312). Furthermore, he found that Godsey would have significant difficulty
with assembly tasks and that Godsey needed support to accomplish his daily tasks. (Tr. 312).
Dr. Fervida also stated that Godsey’s ability to complete his daily tasks would be substantially
impaired. (Tr. 312).
The ALJ rejected Dr. Fervida’s GAF finding of 42 but did not identify whether he
accepted the remainder of Dr. Fervida’s conclusions. Ultimately, the ALJ found that Dr.
Fervida’s opinion supported an ability to perform simple, routine tasks because Dr. Fervida
found that Godsey could understand and follow instructions adequately and that Godsey had
average concentration and frustration tolerance. However, the ALJ did not explain how
Godsey’s significant memory impairments affected his ability to work.
The Commissioner has argued that the ALJ considered and accounted for Godsey’s
memory limitations. She noted that the ALJ reviewed Dr. Fervida’s opinion and Dr. Gange’s
opinion, which concluded that Godsey could perform simple, routine tasks. The Commissioner
further has argued that the ALJ accounted for Godsey’s memory impairment by limiting him to

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simple, routine tasks, restricting intense or attention demanding tasks, and requiring a flexible
pace.
It is clear that the ALJ considered Dr. Fervida’s opinion, including the finding of
significant memory impairments. However, the ALJ could have further discussed Dr. Fervida’s
findings. The ALJ did not explain why Godsey’s significant memory impairments did not affect
his ability to perform simple, routine tasks. Considering that Dr. Fervida concluded that
Godsey’s memory significantly impaired his ability to perform his simple daily living activities,
the ALJ should have discussed Dr. Fervida’s findings. The ALJ did not need to discuss every
piece of evidence, but he needed to discuss evidence that undermined his ultimate conclusions.
Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123. Dr. Fervida’s opinion undermined the ALJ’s conclusion that Godsey
could perform simple, routine tasks. Therefore, the ALJ should have explained why he rejected
Dr. Fervida’s opinion. Godsey also has argued that the ALJ should have included his memory
impairments in the hypotheticals asked to the VE. Because this court has found that the ALJ
should further discuss Dr. Fervida’s opinion on remand, the ALJ also should consider whether to
include Godsey’s memory limitations in any hypotheticals.
Godsey has claimed that the ALJ also failed to account for his foot pain and headaches in
the RFC. The ALJ found that Godsey’s foot pain and headaches were severe impairments, but
he did not include any limitations based on those impairments in the RFC. Furthermore, the ALJ
did not explain why he did not include any limitations based on those impairments. Dr.
Kamineni concluded that Godsey could stand only for thirty minutes and could walk only for six
minutes. (Tr. 306). Additionally, he noted that Godsey had chronic foot pain. (Tr. 306). The
ALJ reviewed Dr. Kamineni’s opinion, but he did not discuss Dr. Kamineni’s standing and
walking limitations. Because the ALJ did not include any standing or walking limitations in the

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RFC, Dr. Kamineni’s opinion undermines his ultimate conclusion. Therefore, the ALJ should
have confronted that evidence and explained why it was rejected.
Similarly, the ALJ did not discuss how Godsey’s headaches affected his ability to work.
Godsey’s headaches were documented in the medical record, and Dr. Fervida suggested that a
possible organic source could have increased Godsey’s headaches. Considering that this matter
is being remanded on a separate issue, the ALJ may further consider Godsey’s headaches on
remand. Additionally, the ALJ may determine whether to include limitations based on Godsey’s
foot pain and headaches in the hypotheticals posed to the VE on remand.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED.
ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2015.
/s/ Andrew P. Rodovich
United States Magistrate Judge

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