Taylor v. State of Indiana

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 10/30/2014. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DEANTE TYRELL TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Defendant.

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No. 1:14 CV 325

OPINION AND ORDER
Deante Tyrell Taylor, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint seeking $2,600,000 from
the State of Indiana for violating his speedy trial rights. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
The Eleventh Amendment generally precludes a citizen from suing a state or one
of its agencies or departments in federal court. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th
Cir. 2001). There are three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) suits against
state officials seeking prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law; (2)
suits involving circumstances where Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity from
suit; and (3) suits involving circumstances where the state has waived its sovereign
immunity and consented to suit in federal court. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Ill.

Commerce Comm’n, 183 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 1999). None of these exceptions applies in
this case. First, Taylor is not suing a state official and is not seeking injunctive relief.
Second, State immunity was not abrogated by the enactment of Section 1983. Joseph v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 432 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2005). Third, Indiana has not
consented to this lawsuit. Therefore this case must be dismissed because the State of
Indiana is immune from suit.
It is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended
complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th
Cir. 2013), but not when any amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588
F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend
where . . . the amendment would be futile.”) Such is the case here. Taylor cannot amend
to name either his State court trial judge nor the prosecuting attorney because they have
absolute immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) and Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Neither can he amend to seek injunctive relief to overturn his
criminal conviction because “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner
who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier
release . . ..” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).
For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
SO ORDERED.
Date: October 30, 2014
s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT