McClure v. H-N-R Block
Filing
10
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 3 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by LaLeta M McClure. Pla is free to attempt to secure counsel on her own. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan L Collins on 2/19/2015. (lns)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
LALETA M. MCCLURE,
Plaintiff,
v.
H-N-R BLOCK,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CAUSE NO. 1:15-cv-17
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a motion filed by pro se Plaintiff LaLeta McClure in this Title VII
discrimination and retaliation case against her former employer, H&R Block, asking that the
Court recruit an attorney to represent her. Because McClure’s case is not a difficult one at this
juncture, and since she is competent to litigate it, the motion will be DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARD
Civil litigants do not have a right, either constitutional or statutory, to court-appointed
counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007); Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288
(7th Cir. 1995). Rather, district courts are empowered to appoint an attorney to represent a
plaintiff without charge when she is “unable to afford counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), or in
Title VII cases “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that several factors should be weighed by
the district court when determining whether appointment of counsel is warranted: (1) whether
the plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from
doing so; and (2) given the difficulty of the case, whether the plaintiff appears competent to
litigate it herself. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654-58; Sherrill v. Potter, 329 F. App’x 672, 675 (7th Cir.
2009) (unpublished) (applying the Pruitt factors in a Title VII case); see also Darden v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 500-501 (7th Cir. 1986) (instructing the court to consider “the merits of
the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff’s diligence in attempting to obtain a lawyer, and the plaintiff’s
financial ability to retain counsel” when considering a motion to appoint counsel under Title
VII).
ANALYSIS
Applying the foregoing analysis to the instant circumstances, it is difficult at present to
assess the merits of McClure’s claims. We do know, however, that at least seven attorneys she
contacted have chosen to pass up the opportunity to represent her. (Docket # 3.) This
circumstance speaks rather directly to the merits of her case and raises a fair inference that these
attorneys did not view her case as meritorious. See Jackson v. Cnty. of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070,
1073 (7th Cir. 1992) (considering plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempts to retain counsel when
denying his motion to appoint counsel).
Perhaps equally important is the fact that McClure seems fully capable of litigating these
claims herself, at least at this stage of the proceedings. This suit is a relatively straightforward
employment discrimination and retaliation action: McClure claims that H&R Block
discriminated against her based on her race and sex, and then retaliated against her when she
complained about it; she also advances a claim for unpaid wages for training hours. (Docket #
1); see, e.g., Jagla v. LaSalle Bank, No. 05 C 6460, 2006 WL 1005728, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12,
2006) (denying plaintiff’s request for counsel in a straightforward national origin discrimination
case, observing that the issue did not involve any “nonintuitive procedural requirements applied
in a setting of complex legal doctrine” (quoting Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 429
(7th Cir. 1991))).
McClure has already adequately articulated her claims in her complaint and prepared two
written motions seeking specific relief. (See Docket # 1-3.) And in her complaint, McClure
asserts that she was “hired by H&R Block as an office manager and was being trained as a tax
preparer,” which purportedly involved testing and “81 hours of tax training.” (Docket # 1.)
Thus, it is clear that McClure is literate and has adequate communication skills, at least for
purposes of representing herself. Cf. Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2014)
(reversing a district court’s denial of request for counsel pertaining to “a blind and indigent
prisoner with a tenth-grade education and no legal experience” in a case involving complicated
medical matters); Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing a district
court’s denial of request for counsel where the record reflected plaintiff’s low IQ, functional
illiteracy, and poor education).
To a major degree, the facts of this case are within McClure’s personal knowledge, so the
task of discovery is apt to be quite limited. She also has the freedom and ability to perform her
own legal research.
Furthermore, H&R Block has filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay and
to compel arbitration, contending that as a condition of her employment, McClure signed an
employment agreement in which she agreed to submit all employment-related disputes to final,
binding arbitration. (Docket # 8.) Therefore, the issue currently pending in this case is quite
narrow, and McClure is certainly capable of responding to H&R Block’s motion on this limited
topic.
In the event McClure’s claims survive H&R Block’s motion and proceed to summary
judgment or trial, the Court will, upon further motion, reconsider her request for counsel. See
Mungiovi v. Chicago Housing Auth., No. 94 C 6663, 1994 WL 735413, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19,
1994) (“The court’s general practice is to consider appointment of counsel if and when it appears
that the action has sufficient merit to require complex discovery or an evidentiary hearing.”).
In short, McClure appears to be competent and fully capable of representing herself in
this suit at this juncture. See Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 289. Consequently, her motion will be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion requesting the appointment of counsel
(Docket # 3) is DENIED. Plaintiff is, of course, free to attempt to secure counsel on her own.
SO ORDERED.
Enter for this 19th day of February 2015.
/s Susan Collins
Susan Collins,
United States Magistrate Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?