Jenkins v. Donahoe et al

Filing 4

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis by Plaintiff Theodore G Jenkins, Jr; DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE 1 PRO SE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT with Jury Demand filed by Theodore G Jenkins, Jr. The case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Signed by Chief Judge Philip P Simon on 3/4/15. (cer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
THEODORE G. JENKINS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:15-cv-61-PPS

OPINION and ORDER
Theodore Jenkins, a pro se plaintiff, has filed a form complaint alleging he was
discriminated against [DE 1] along with a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
[DE 3]. As explained below Jenkins’s complaint does not state a cognizable claim upon
which relief could be granted. Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Jenkins’s
Motion will be denied and his complaint will be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Jenkins has filed a complaint alleging the Postmaster General and six defendants
violated his civil rights. This much is clear. Jenkins, a 58-year-old African-American
man, alleges he was discriminated against on account of his race, sex, and age and has
brought claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Beyond that, Jenkins’s complaint is confusing. The sole factual-seeming
allegation is as follows:
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“The USPS managerial overt discriminatory practices acknowledges and
confirms the USPS agency arbitrary and capricious anoesis (a known federal
decision) that incurred proof-texting and plausible denied culpability impacting
humanity and the known plaintiff.”
[DE 1 at 3].
The remainder of the complaint’s “facts” section contains citations to federal
statutes and regulations, as well as a list of EEOC cases where “the USPS/EEO Agency
proactive discriminatory dilemma are acknowledge[d] and denied remedy. Id.
DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee of $400 to bring an action in
federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1915, provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the
federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that
access. To authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must make two
determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the
action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
With respect to the second of these determinations, district courts have the
power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the
complaint on the defendants, and courts must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a
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claim. Courts apply the same standard under § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). DeWalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2000). To survive a motion to dismiss under federal pleading
standards,
[the] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Here, Jenkins has not pled any factual content that I can discern. The complaint
alleges that the Postal Service engaged in “arbitrary and capricious anoeis” that
“incurred proof-texting” [DE 1 at 3]. I do not know what that statement means on a
semantic level, and so certainly cannot reasonably infer from it that the Defendants
discriminated against Jenkins. Since Jenkins has not plausibly alleged a discrimination
claim, his complaint must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Jenkins’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis [DE 3] is DENIED, and his Complaint [DE 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
SO ORDERED.
Entered: March 4, 2015.

s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, CHIEF JUDGE
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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