Ehlerding v. American Mattress and Upholstery, Inc. et al
Filing
20
OPINION AND ORDER denying 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 9/22/16. (ksp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JASON EHLERDING,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AMERICAN MATTRESS AND
)
UPHOLSTERY, INC., et al., )
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 1:15-CV-165
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss and Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike, filed by the
Defendants,
American
Mattress
and
Upholstery,
Roedeske,1 and Lajuan Wade, on November 24, 2015.
Inc.,
(DE #16.)
Mark
For
the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff,
Jason
Ehlerding
(“Plaintiff”),
complaint on June 29, 2015.
(DE #1.)
amend
his
on
August
13,
2015;
docketed that same day.
first
filed
his
He was granted leave to
amended
(DE #7 & DE #8.)
complaint
was
The first amended
complaint brings claims against American Mattress and Upholstery,
Inc.
(“American
Mattress”),
Mark
Roedeske
(“Roedeske”),
and
Lajuan Wade (“Wade”) (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to
1
According to Defendants, Plaintiff misspelled Mark Roedeske’s name as
Ruduski. For purposes of this Order, he will be referred to as Roedeske.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section
2000(e) et seq (“Title VII”), the American with Disabilities Act
of
1990,
42
U.S.C.
section
12111
et
seq
(“ADA”),
42
U.S.C.
section 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Family Medical Leave Act
of 1993, 29 U.S.C. section 2601 et seq (“FMLA”).
The first
amended complaint incorporates and attaches a copy of Plaintiff’s
Charge
of
Discrimination,
which
was
filed
with
the
Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on or about August 25,
2014.
(DE #8.)
Plaintiff also attaches a Notice of Right to Sue
from the EEOC which is dated April 30, 2015.
(Id.)
Defendants
filed the instant motion to dismiss on November 24, 2015.
#16.)
Plaintiff filed his reply on December 7, 2015.
Defendants filed their reply on December 14, 2015.
(DE
(DE #18.)
(DE #19.)
Thus, the motion is ripe for adjudication.
DISCUSSION
Facts
As
was
memorandum
in
adequately
support
set
of
forth
the
by
motion
Defendants
to
dismiss,2
in
their
Plaintiff
alleges, through his attached Charge of Discrimination, that he
is
a
biracial
male
who
was
employed
2
as
a
sales
manager
at
In his response brief, Plaintiff states that Defendants have “sufficiently
summarize[d] the relevant factual allegations” of the first amended complaint;
thus, the Court has borrowed liberally from Defendants’ memorandum for the
background section of this Order. (See DEs #8, #17, pp. 2-3, and #18, pp. 34.)
2
American Mattress, located at 4614 Coldwater Road in Fort Wayne,
Indiana from January 21, 2013, until his wrongful termination on
April 4, 2014.
According to Plaintiff, on March 10, 2014, he
underwent hernia surgery in relation to an injury he allegedly
sustained
at
work.
Prior
to
the
surgery,
he
notified
regional manager about his need for time off of work.
the
Plaintiff
alleges that he was entitled to use FMLA to address this serious
health condition.
After his surgery, Plaintiff was placed on work restrictions
and was directed not to lift heavy objects.
American Mattress
initially indicated it would comply with the work restrictions by
having an assistant help Plaintiff when necessary.
However,
Plaintiff alleges that he was only given assistance twice during
the
remainder
Otherwise,
he
restriction.
Plaintiff
was
of
was
his
employment
required
to
with
go
American
against
this
Mattress.
lifting
In addition, upon his return from medical leave,
allegedly
given
an
increased
work
load
and
scheduled to work six days a week, at least one of those days for
which he was not paid.
Later, he returned to his normal work
schedule.
On April 4, 2014, Plaintiff encountered a customer who was
upset by a delivery driver who had failed to assemble a bed that
had been ordered.
Plaintiff contacted his regional manager,
Roedeske, about the situation.
Roedeske told Plaintiff that the
3
customer was lying and argued with Plaintiff, allegedly using
profanity.
Following the phone conversation, Plaintiff spoke
again with Roedeske and was told he was fired.
Plaintiff
contends
that
he
was
discriminated
against,
retaliated against, and wrongfully terminated on the basis of
race and disability as well as for his use of medical leave.
claims
to
have
suffered
from
emotional
distress
anguish as a result of Defendants’ wrongdoing.
and
He
mental
Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidated damages, and
attorney fees and costs.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all facts alleged
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
272 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2001).
Johnson v. Rivera,
A complaint is not required
to contain detailed factual allegations; however, the plaintiff
must allege facts that state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
It is
not enough that there might be some conceivable set of facts that
entitle the plaintiff to relief.
550
U.S.
544,
553-56
(2007).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
The
plaintiff’s
“requires more than labels and conclusions. . . .”
4
obligation
Id. at 555.
The Supreme Court has provided that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”
When
reviewing
a
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
motion
to
dismiss,
a
court
generally
considers only the factual allegations of the complaint and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those allegations;
however, a court may also examine information from documents “if
they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central
to his claim.”
Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 729
(7th Cir. 2014); see Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 443 (7th
Cir. 2013) (noting the Seventh Circuit has taken “a relatively
expansive view of the documents that a district court properly
may consider in disposing of a motion to dismiss.”).
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
attaches,
refers
directly
Here,
to,
and
incorporates the Charge of Discrimination which may be considered
by
this
Court
in
ruling
on
the
motion
to
converting it into a motion for summary judgment.
Caterpillar
Logistics,
1573179,
*1
at
(N.D.
Inc.,
Ind.
No.
Apr.
19,
dismiss
See Vasquez v.
1:15-CV-398-TLS,
2016)
without
(citing
2016
WL
Miller
v.
Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010) (documents attached to
complaint are considered part of the complaint)).
5
ADA Claim
The
ADA
“provide[s]
a
clear
and
comprehensive
national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.”
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
To state a claim
pursuant to the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he is
‘disabled’; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential function
of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and
(3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his
disability.”
Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1172
(7th Cir. 2013) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546
F.3d
438,
442
(7th
Cir.
2008)).
Therefore,
as
an
“initial
matter” under this rubric, a plaintiff must establish that he is
disabled
as
regulations.
defined
those
statutes
and
relevant
See, e.g., Steffen v. Donahoe, 680 F.3d 738, 743
(7th Cir. 2012).
disability
under
as
Enacted in 1990, the ADA originally defined
“(A)
a
physical
or
mental
impairment
that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).
Because the 1990
statute failed to define the terms ‘substantially limits’ and
‘regarded as,’ the precise meaning of each phrase was left to
judicial interpretation.
See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc.
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding that a disability
6
‘substantially limits’ a major life activity where it “prevents
or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives” and has
an impact that is “permanent or long term”); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (holding that in order to
be ‘regarded as’ having a disability, an employer must “believe
either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one
does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment
when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.”).
Effective January 1, 2009, the ADA was amended to “carry out
the
ADA’s
objectives”
by
“reinstating
a
broad
scope
of
protection.”
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L.
No.
122
110–325,
Stat.
3553
(2008).
The
ADAAA
itself
is
described as “[a]n Act to restore the intent and protections of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,” and in its findings
Congress specifically noted that the original intent of the ADA
was to provide “broad coverage” and a “clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals
with
disabilities.”
found
the
United
that
States
Id.
Specifically,
Supreme
Court
had
Congress
improperly
narrowed the protection intended to be afforded under the ADA,
and the ADAAA rejected the holdings of Sutton and Toyota Motor
Mfg.
Importantly,
the
ADAAA
left
7
the
ADA’s
three-category
definition
of
“disability”
intact1
categories are to be interpreted.
provides
a
specific
definition
but
clarified
how
the
For example, the ADAAA now
for
the
term
“Major
Life
Activities” whereas prior to the amendments, courts could only
look to previous case law and regulations interpreting the ADA
for guidance.
The definition of major life activities includes
but is not limited to “caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks,
seeing,
lifting,
hearing,
bending,
eating,
speaking,
sleeping,
breathing,
walking,
standing,
learning,
reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”
§ 12102(2)(A).
42 U.S.C.
Congress also added “[r]ules of construction
regarding the definition of disability” which provide:
(A) The definition of disability in this
chapter shall be construed in favor of broad
coverage of individuals under this chapter,
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms
of this chapter.
(B) The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be
interpreted consistently with the findings
and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008.
(C) An impairment that substantially limits
one major life activity need not limit other
major life activities in order to be
considered a disability.
(D) An impairment that is episodic or in
remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity
when active.
1
As stated above, “disability” with respect to an individual is defined as
(A) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual”; (B) “a record of such an
impairment”; or (C) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1).
8
(E)(i) The determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life
activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures .
. . .
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4).
In essence, the ADAAA reestablished the
original intent and expansive scope of the ADA.
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ADA claim should be
dismissed because he has not properly alleged a disability that
would
be
covered
by
the
ADA.
To
support
their
argument,
Defendants rely heavily on a case from this district, Brodzik v.
Contractors Steel, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
In Brodzik, the court found that the plaintiff, who alleged that
he was constructively fired after he returned to work following a
hernia surgery, had not sufficiently pled that he had a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limited him in one or
more major life activities.
Id. at 1185, 1189.
This was so,
according to the court, because “many short term impairments,
such as [the plaintiff’s] recovery period for his hernia surgery,
still do not qualify as a disability under the revised standard
of the ADAAA.”
Id. at 1189 (citing Butler v. BTC Foods Inc., No.
12-492, 2012 WL 5315034, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012).
The
court noted that “[i]mpairments that last only for a short period
of time are typically not covered, although they may be covered
if sufficiently severe.”
Id. (quoting Wanamaker v. Westport Bd.
of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 2d 193, 211 (D. Conn. 2012).
9
The court
acknowledged that while “episodic impairments are disabling if
they substantially limit a major life activity when active,”
nothing in the plaintiff’s complaint suggested that the “hernia
and the resulting surgery was anything more than a one-time
occurrence.”
Id.
(internal
quotation
marks
and
citation
omitted).
In response, Plaintiff asserts that he has pled a physical
disability “under but one definition” of the ADA in that, as a
result of his hernia surgery, he was “placed on work restrictions
by his physician” and was “not to be lifting heavy objects.”
#8, p. 6 & DE #18, p. 5.)
(DE
Plaintiff argues that the allegations
show that those restrictions substantially limited the major life
activities of “lifting, manual tasks, and working.”
5.)
(DE #18, p.
According to Plaintiff, the cases cited by Defendants as
noted above are distinguishable from the case at hand.
Giving Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences to
which he is entitled at this stage, the Court finds that the
first amended complaint adequately alleges a disability pursuant
to the ADA.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, due to his
hernia and resultant surgery, he was placed on work related
restrictions that included lifting.
qualify as major life activities.
Both working and lifting
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
So
long as an individual is limited “as compared to most people in
the general population,” nothing in the ADA as it currently
10
stands
mandates
that
the
alleged
impairment
prevent
or
significantly restrict those major life activities in order to be
deemed substantially limiting.
Plaintiff’s
allegation
that
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
he
was
limited
in
his
lifting
capabilities meets this broad definition that is “not meant to be
a demanding standard.”
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).
The Seventh
Circuit has made it clear that a person with an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity can be disabled even
when the impairment is “transitory and minor.”
at
1172.
remission”
Similarly,
are
impairments
disabilities
limiting when active.
if
that
they
are
would
Gogos, 737 F.3d
“episodic
be
or
in
substantially
Id. at 1172-73.
While Defendants argue that Brodzik precludes Plaintiff from
proceeding on his ADA claim, the Court finds that Brodzik is
distinguishable from the present case.
The plaintiff in Brodzik
had hernia surgery and returned to work after a six-week recovery
leave.
Brodzik, 48 F.Supp.3d at 1185.
In reaching its holding
that the plaintiff’s hernia was not a covered disability, the
court specifically noted that the plaintiff had “not allege[d]
that he had any physical or mental restrictions as a result of
the surgery.”
Id.; see also Butler, 2012 WL 5315034, at *3
(finding that the plaintiff’s hernia was not a substantially
limiting impairment because he had not alleged that the hernia
was
anything
more
than
a
one-time
11
occurrence).
Here,
by
contrast, Plaintiff clearly alleges that his lifting capabilities
were restricted following his return to work.
In their reply
brief, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s alleged restrictions
“if any, were temporary restrictions.”
(DE #19, p. 2.)
However,
Plaintiff’s complaint does not assign a time frame to those
restrictions, and, as Plaintiff points out, he was terminated at
the
very
time
the
restrictions
were
allegedly
substantially
limiting his major life activities of working and lifting.
It
could well be that the evidence will show Plaintiff’s impairment
was a short term, one-time occurrence; but, at this stage, the
Court
must
give
Plaintiff
the
benefit
inferences to which he is entitled.
of
all
reasonable
See Bob-Maunuel v. Chipotle
Mexican Grill, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 854, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(“Based on this Court’s reading of the ADAAA and viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
finds
that
Plaintiff’s
hernia
constituted
a
disability
that
substantially limited the major life activity of lifting.”); see
also Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F.Supp.2d 913,
920-21 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (plaintiff, who by doctor’s orders had to
refrain
from
heavy
lifting
while
pregnant,
had
“presented
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to
12
whether her high risk pregnancy rendered her disabled under the
ADAAA”).2
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim
Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(f) provides that a
district
court
“may
strike
from
a
pleading
an
insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f).
A court has significant discretion
in ruling on a motion to strike, and the matters at issue may be
addressed on its own or pursuant to a motion filed by a party.
Delta Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Const., Inc., 554 F.3d
1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Talbot v. Robert Matthews
Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 1992)).
However, Rule
12(f) is neither an authorized nor a proper way to procure the
dismissal of part of the complaint.
Pierson v. Dean, Witter,
Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 497, 504 (C.D. Ill. 1982); see also
Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“We hold that Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure does not authorize a district court to dismiss a
claim for damages on the basis it is precluded as a matter of
2
In their reply brief, Defendants argue for the first time that Plaintiff’s
first amended complaint “contains no allegations suggesting his alleged short
term impairment had any causal relation to his termination, which apparently
occurred after an issue arose with customer service.” (DE #19, p. 2.) Such
argument will not be considered by the Court because it is undeveloped,
inadequate, and was filed too late. APS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports
Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing James v. Sheahan, 137
F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief are waived.”)).
13
law.”)
As motions to strike are looked upon with disfavor, “a
court ordinarily will not strike a matter unless the court can
confidently conclude that the portion of the pleading to which
the motion is addressed is redundant or is both irrelevant to the
subject matter of the litigation and prejudicial to the objecting
party.”
1224
Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Cobb, 738 F. Supp. 1220,
(N.D.
Ind.
1990).
In
moving
to
strike
matters
as
irrelevant, a defendant must clearly show that the matter is
outside the issues in the case and is prejudicial.
Cumis Ins.
Soc’y Inc. v. Peters, 983 F. Supp. 787, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Here,
Defendants
Plaintiff’s
first
ask
this
amended
Court
complaint
to
strike
pursuant
portions
to
Rule
of
12(f)
because it violates Federal Rule of Procedure 8 by “lumping all
Defendants together” which leads to a pleading in which “clarity
is
somewhat
Defendants
lacking.”
request
(DE
that:
#17,
(1)
“to
p.
6-7.)
the
extant
Specifically,
(sic)
that
[Plaintiff] seeks redress from individuals [Roedeske] and Wade
under Title VII or the ADA, his claim should be dismissed and/or
stricken;” (2) Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claims against Roedeske
and Wade be dismissed because Plaintiff “has pleaded no specific
facts
against
Roedeske
and
Wade
to
show
intentional
racial
dissemination (sic) committed by the two individuals;” and (3)
any claims for punitive damages and emotional distress under the
FMLA be stricken.
(Id. at 7-9.)
14
Plaintiff responds by conceding
that he is not alleging ADA and/or Title VII claims against
Roedeske
and
Wade
individually,
by
arguing
that
he
has
sufficiently pled Section 1981 claims against both Roedeske and
Wade, and by stating that, while he agrees that punitive damages
are not available under the FMLA, they are available under other
statutes referenced in the first amended complaint.
takes
the
position
that
a
Rule
12(f)
motion
to
Plaintiff
strike
is
The Court declines to strike the matters outlined above.
In
inappropriate in these circumstances.
making its argument that Rule 12(f) should be employed because
Plaintiff’s
first
amended
complaint
allegedly
lacks
clarity,
Defendants cite to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and cases
such as Crumpacker v. Civiletti, 90 F.R.D. 326, 329 (N.D. Ind.
1981) and Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merch. Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d
771,
775
(7th
Cir.
misplaced.
In
different
defendants
1994).
Crumpacker,
on
The
Court
the
plaintiff
twelve
separate
finds
sued
legal
complaint spanning fifty-three legal sized pages.
F.R.D. at 328-29.
that
reliance
sixty-four
claims
in
a
Crumpacker, 90
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint
because it failed to comport with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8’s
“simple,
deficiencies.
concise,
and
direct”
mandate,
Id. at 329-37; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).
among
other
Similarly in
Vicom, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was dismayed by the
plaintiff’s “119-page, 385-paragraph less-than-coherent amended
15
complaint” and noted that it constituted an “egregious violation
of Rule 8(a).”
Vicom, 20 F.3d at 775-76.
In the instant case,
however, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is straightforward
and to the point.
He sues his employer and two individual
management representatives for discrimination and retaliation on
the basis of race and/or disability in violation of Title VII,
Section 1981, the ADA, and the FMLA.
Viewing those statutes
along with the facts alleged in the first amended complaint and
attached Charge of Discrimination, it is not difficult to discern
which theories of recovery apply to the specific defendants,
despite Plaintiff’s “lumping” of them together, once relevant
case law is considered.
See Vicom, 20 F.3d at 775 (the “primary
purpose” of Rule 8 is “rooted in fair notice”).
For example, as
is conceded by Plaintiff in his response brief, it is clear that
the Title VII and ADA claims are not applicable to Roedeske and
Wade individually.
See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,
553-55 (7th Cir. 1995) (neither the ADA nor Title VII impose
individual
liability
on
an
employer’s
agents
because
a
“supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within
[the] definition of employer”).
liability
may
circumstances.
attach
to
On the other hand, individual
Section
1981
claims
in
certain
See, e.g., Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 896 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“One key difference between § 1981 and Title VII is
that the latter authorizes suit only against the employer as an
16
entity rather than against individual people who are agents of
the
employer.
Under
§
1981,
individuals
may
be
liable.”),
overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,
No. 15-2574, 2016 WL 4411434 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016).
damages,
it
is
clear
punitive
damages,
(and
nominal
Plaintiff
damages,
concedes
and
damages
distress are not available under the FMLA.
as
much)
for
As to
that
emotional
See, e.g., Sons v.
Henry Cnty., No. 105CV00516DFHTAB, 2007 WL 968726, at *2 (S.D.
Ind. Mar. 13, 2007) (describing the specific set of remedies
provided by the FMLA as including wages, salary, benefits, lost
compensation, monetary losses suffered, and equitable relief but
noting
that
“[o]ther
kinds
of
damages,
including
punitive
damages, nominal damages, or damages for emotional distress, are
not recoverable.”)
More importantly, however, Rule 12(f) is not the proper
vehicle to attack the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims, which is
essentially what Defendants are attempting to do.
See Driveaway
and Truckaway Serv., Inc. v. Aaron Driveaway & Truckaway Co.,
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 548, 549-50 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“Plaintiffs’
prayer for punitive damages is neither a defense, redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, nor scandalous. Accordingly, Rule 12(f)
is inapplicable.”); Peterson v. Baloun, 715 F. Supp. 212, 213-14
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting that the defendants’ motion “exceed[ed]
the proper scope of a motion to strike” because it sought to
17
attack
the
merits
of
the
claims
and
the
sufficiency
of
the
complaint); see also Whittlestone, Inc., 618 F.3d at 974 (“Were
we to read Rule 12(f) in a manner that allowed litigants to use
it as a means to dismiss some or all of a pleading . . ., we
would be creating redundancies within the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,
because
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion
(or
a
motion
for
summary judgment at a later stage in the proceedings) already
serves such a purpose.”).
Because Defendants have specifically
chosen to proceed pursuant to Rule 12(f) for this portion of
their motion, the Court will not substitute a Rule 12(b)(6)
analysis in its place sua sponte, and the motion to strike is
denied in its entirety.
That said, the Court notes that none of
this is meant to imply that Plaintiff will ultimately prevail on
the
merits
or
that
his
first
amended
complaint
presents
recoverable claims on every possible theory presented.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss and Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike (DE #16) is
DENIED.
DATED: September 22, 2016
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
18
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