Marsh v. Huntington County Sheriff's Department et al
Filing
76
OPINION AND ORDER: DENYING 68 MOTION to Dismiss PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, IN PART, by Defendant Huntington County Sheriff's Department. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 8/17/2016. (lhc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JULIE MARSH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HUNTINGTON COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
et al.,
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO. 1:15-CV-00301
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the “Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s
Second
Amended
Complaint,
In
Part,
by
Defendant
Huntington County Sheriff’s Department,” filed by Defendant, the
Huntington County Sheriff’s Department, on April 14, 2016 (DE #68).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion (DE #68) is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case stems from the incarceration and ultimate suicide of
Joshua Eckert, an inmate at the Huntington County Jail. Plaintiff,
Julie Marsh, brings this action individually and as the special
administrator for the Estate of Joshua Eckert against a number of
Defendants, including the Huntington County Sheriff’s Department
(hereinafter the “Department”).
In her second amended complaint, Plaintiff includes claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Department failed to adequately
train its correctional officers and other staff.
The
Department
argues
that
Marsh’s
factual
(DE #63 ¶ 42.)
allegations
are
insufficient (specifically, it argues she fails to set forth any
facts to demonstrate that deficient training programs actually
exist, how they amount to deliberate indifference, or how the
Department’s alleged practice or policy could have caused the
constitutional
violation).
As
such,
the
Department
requests
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to train.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to
be dismissed if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Allegations other than fraud
and mistake are governed by the pleading standard outlined in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and
plain statement” that the pleader is entitled to relief. Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts must
be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences from those facts
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must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
521 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2008).
Pugh v. Tribune Co.,
However, pleadings consisting
of no more than mere conclusions are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
conclusions
couched
as
factual
This includes legal
allegations,
as
well
as
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Id. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Facts
Plaintiff points to the following allegations in the second
amended complaint in support of her claim that she sufficiently
alleged proper failure to train claims:
A.
The Huntington County Jail had a policy that
required the Defendant confinement officers to
provide “continuous uninterrupted observation”
of suicidal inmates. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)
B.
Eckert hung himself from the surveillance
camera in his cell while on suicide watch,
while he was the only inmate on observation
status, while he was “acting strange all day,”
and while he was clearly observable via the
surveillance camera, which showed him pulling
on, stripping and tearing the threads of a
suicide blanket, throwing blanket threads into
the toilet, and tying some of the blanket
fabric together. (Id. ¶¶ 20-26.)
C.
The Huntington County Jail had policies and
procedures that restricted Eckert’s ability to
obtain his needed mental health medications
because those medications could not be filled
until a “Non-Preferred Medication Request
Form” was completed by an off-site corporate
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representative of the
Providers. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Defendant
Medical
D.
The Huntington County Jail had no medical
personnel at the Jail on weekends.
(Id. ¶
27.)
E.
After Eckert was finally found in his cell
hanging from the surveillance camera, the
Defendant confinement officers dragged him out
into the hall, cuffed him, and waited for a
cook
at
the
Jail
with
some
“nursing
experience” to check for a pulse before
initiating CPR just prior to the EMS arrival.
(Id. ¶ 27.)
F.
The Huntington County Sheriff’s Department,
through its agents and/or employees, had a
duty to provide a safe environment to inmates,
including having medical personnel at the jail
on the weekends, and otherwise training and
supervising its officers, physicians, nurses
and staff regarding how to appropriately
monitor and provide a safe environment for
potentially suicidal inmates such as Eckert.
(Id. ¶ 40.)
G.
The Huntington County Sheriff’s Department was
deliberately indifferent to the obvious need
for (1) having medical personnel at the jail
on the weekends, (2) providing supervision and
training of their officers, physicians, nurses
and staff regarding proper detainment and
monitoring procedures for potentially suicidal
inmates such as Eckert, and (3) timely
providing necessary mental health medications
to inmates such as Eckert, among other things.
(Id. ¶ 41.)
H.
The deficiencies in the Huntington County
Sheriff’s Department’s medical staffing and
suicide training program, as well as its
failure to provide necessary mental health
medications to inmates such as Eckert,
constitute deliberate indifference to the
rights of those persons, such as Eckert, with
whom the officers, physicians, nurses and
staff come into contact, and such failure is
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an unconstitutional policy or custom that is
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
(Id. ¶ 42.)
I.
The deficiencies in the Huntington County
Sheriff’s Department’s medical staffing and
suicide training program, as well as its
failure to provide necessary mental health
medications to inmates such as Eckert, is
closely related to, and a direct and proximate
cause of, Eckert’s death. (Id. ¶ 43.)
Motion to Dismiss
In this case, the Department argues that the claims for
failure to adequately train its correctional officers and staff
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Monell v.
Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978), because Plaintiff has not provided any factual basis
for those claims.
In her response, Plaintiff contends she has
alleged sufficient factual allegations to support her failure to
train claim, which rises above the level of speculation and
constitutes a valid claim for relief.
To state a claim for municipal liability under section 1983,
a
plaintiff
must
establish
that
the
alleged
constitutional
deprivation was pursuant to an official policy, practice, or custom
of the municipality.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
The Supreme Court
of the United States held “that the inadequacy of police training
may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure
to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact.”
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City of Canton,
Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
This can be met if “in
light of the duties assigned to specific officers of employees the
need
for
more
or
different
training
is
so
obvious,
and
the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need.”
prevail
on
a
claim
against
the
Department,
Id. at 390.
Plaintiff
To
must
ultimately demonstrate that Eckert’s constitutional rights were
violated and that the Department’s policy or custom of failing to
train its employees caused the constitutional violation.
Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992).
The Seventh Circuit is clear that a plaintiff must “plead
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the City maintained a policy, custom, or practice”
that caused the violation of the plaintiff’s Constitutional rights.
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
Moreover, it is insufficient to rely on mere legal conclusions or
boilerplate allegations. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765,
767 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Department cites to a number of cases in its memoranda in
which a failure to train claim was dismissed for failure to allege
sufficient facts or inferring a lack of training based upon the
occurrence of a single incident.
See, e.g., Srauss, 760 F.2d at
767; Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 596 F.Supp. 13, 20
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(N.D. Ill. 1984); Sheehan v. Noble Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:14cv-324, 2015 WL 3670092, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 12, 2015); Hodge v.
County of Delaware, No. 1:09-cv-519-WTL-DML, 2009 WL 3415131, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Oct. 16, 2009); Sanders v. City of Indianapolis, No.
1:09-cv-622-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 2484772, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 11,
2010); Suber v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 2876, 2011 WL 1706156, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2011).
However, this case is more like Doffin
v. Ballas, No. 2:12-CV-411 JD-PRC, 2013 WL 3777231 (N.D. Ind. July
18, 2013) (cited by the Department), where the Court found that:
Assuming the allegations contained in the Complaint
are true, Doffin has supplied enough facts to
establish a plausibility of success on his Monell
claim, such that only further discovery will
determine whether the claim will in fact ultimately
succeed.
Id. at *8.
While this is a close case, the Court believes that, like in
Doffin, the pleadings here are sufficient.
Plaintiff did allege
that the Department’s medical staffing (having no medical personnel
at the jail on weekends) and suicide training program “constitute
deliberate indifference to the rights of those persons, such as
[Eckert], with whom the officers, physicians, nurses and staff come
into contact.”
that
the
(Second Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) Moreover, she alleges
Department
was
deliberately
indifferent
to
“timely
providing necessary mental health medications to inmates such as
[Eckert]” and had a duty to train and supervise its staff regarding
how to appropriately monitor and provide a safe environment “for
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potentially suicidal inmates like [Eckert].” (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.)
As
such, Plaintiff has alleged some specific facts, she does allege
that the policy affects other inmates (and is not just based upon
this
one
incident),
indifference.
and
Plaintiff
does
allege
deliberate
She also alleges that the Department is the moving
force in causing the injury. (Id. ¶¶ 38.)
Construing all well-pled factual allegations contained in the
second amended complaint as true, and drawing all inferences in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has supplied enough factual content in her allegations which, if
true, provide a plausible claim for relief.
The Department’s
reliance upon City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821-24
(1985), is misplaced, because in that case the Supreme Court
reviewed jury instructions after a trial, finding evidence of more
than a single incident is required before municipal liability may
be found under section 1983.
This case is only at the motion to
dismiss stage, and this Court is merely ruling that Plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, could plausibly
suggest a policy or practice.
At the summary judgment stage,
Plaintiff will have to support these allegations with sufficient
evidence.
Finally,
in
making
this
finding,
this
Court
has
recognized Judge Marshall’s concerns:
We are at loss as to how any plaintiff, including a
civil rights plaintiff, is supposed to allege with
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also
specificity prior to discovery acts to which he or
she personally was not exposed, but which provide
evidence necessary to sustain the plaintiff’s
claim, i.e., that there was an official policy or a
de facto custom which violated the Constitution.
Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F.Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
CONCLUSION
For
the
Plaintiff’s
aforementioned
Second
Amended
reasons,
the
Complaint,
In
“Motion
Part,
to
by
Dismiss
Defendant
Huntington County Sheriff’s Department,” filed by Defendant, the
Huntington County Sheriff’s Department, on April 14, 2016 (DE #68),
is DENIED.
DATED: August 17, 2016
/s/ RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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