Estabrook v. Mazak Corporation

Filing 113

OPINION AND ORDER denying 112 Defendant Mazak Corporations' Motion for Recusal of Judge. Signed by Judge Holly A Brady on 9/11/19. (nal)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
BRADLEY A. ESTABROOK,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-87-HAB

MAZAK CORPORATION,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Mazak Corporations’ Motion for
Recusal of Judge [ECF No. 112], filed on September 3, 2019. Defendant requests that the
undersigned recuse herself from this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned on the basis of a previous professional
relationship with Plaintiff’s counsel.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Defendant submits that this
objective standard is satisfied in this case because Plaintiff is represented by Theisen &
Associates, LLC, and one of the lawyers appearing in the case is John C. Theisen. Plaintiff
notes, correctly, that the course of the undersigned’s professional career has intersected
with Attorney Theisen’s. In particular, the undersigned began her legal career in 1994 as
an associate in the law firm where Attorney Theisen was a named partner. The
undersigned’s association with that firm ended in 1998. Then, from 2002 to 2007 both the
undersigned and Attorney Theisen were named partners in the firm of Theisen, Bowers

& Brady. Defendant claims that this relationship would cause an objective, disinterested
observer to entertain doubts that the relationship could be disregarded.
When making a determination under § 455(a), the court considers whether an
“astute observer” in either the legal or the lay culture “would conclude that the relation
between the judge and lawyer (a) is very much out of the ordinary course, and (b)
presents a potential for actual impropriety if the worst implications are realized.” United
States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985). The question of whether conduct
presents the appearance of impropriety, however, is not reached “[u]nless the conduct is
substantially out of the ordinary.” Id.
The undersigned was appointed to the bench earlier this year. It has been twelve
years since she was business and legal partners with Attorney Theisen. Since that
association, and up until her appointment to the judiciary, she has been a partner in an
entirely different firm. That the undersigned began her career as an associate in a law
firm where Attorney Theisen was one of the named partners, and later joined in
partnership with Attorney Theisen is not out of the ordinary, or unusual. Most people, in
either the lay or legal communities, would not be surprised to learn of these associations
existing in Fort Wayne, Indiana—a relatively small legal community. Cf. Murphy, 768 F.3d
at 1538 (“Most people would be greatly surprised to learn that the judge and the
prosecutor in a trial of political corruption had secret plans to take a joint vacation
immediately after trial.”). Indeed, every judge who comes to the bench does so with
previous experience, most of it in close connection with other members of the local bar.

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In today’s legal culture friendships among judges and lawyers are common.
They are more than common; they are desirable. A judge need not cut
himself off from the rest of the legal community. Social as well as official
communications among judges and lawyers may improve the quality of
legal decisions. Social interactions also make service on the bench, quite
isolated as a rule, more tolerable to judges. Many well-qualified people
would hesitate to become judges if they knew that wearing the robe meant
either discharging one’s friends or risking disqualification in substantial
numbers of cases. Many courts therefore have held that a judge need not
disqualify himself just because a friend—even a close friend—appears as a
lawyer.
Id. at 1537 (citing cases).
In support of the presider’s recusal, Defendant references guidance set forth in an
Advisory Opinion from the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct for
Judges and Judicial Employees. Defendant notes that a two year “cooling off period” is
suggested when a newly-appointed judge withdraws from private practice and is faced
with hearing cases involving that firm. Defendant suggests, however, that an even longer
period of disqualification is necessary in this case based on the level of the previous
relationship. Nothing in Advisory Opinion 24 dictates, nor even suggests, that recusal is
appropriate in this case. One of the factors cited—the length of time since the judge left
the law firm—suggests quite the opposite. To accept Defendant’s position would be to
impose a life-time ban on Attorney Theisen’s practice before this Court, needlessly
impacting his federal court practice in the city where his firm is located, and imposing
duties on judges outside of this division to preside over a Fort Wayne case.
It is precisely for these reasons that furthering the efficient administration of justice
imposes a duty on a judge with neither a conflict nor an appearance of impartiality not to
recuse. See In re United States, 572 F.3d 301, 308 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Of course, needless
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recusals exact a significant toll; judges therefore should exercise care in determining
whether recusal is necessary, especially when proceedings already are underway.”).
Here, the relationship is not out of the ordinary and no reasonable person would perceive
a significant risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Defendant Mazak Corporations’
Motion for Recusal of Judge [ECF No. 112].
SO ORDERED on September 11, 2019.
s/ Holly A. Brady
JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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