Bey v. Allen County Jail et al

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER re 5 SECOND Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Tyquan Stewart; 7 SUPPLEMENT to 5 Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Tyquan Stewart. Plaintiff will be allowed to PROCEED against Parkview Behavioral Hospital and Kisha Housto n as outlined in Order. Plaintiff's claims against the Allen County Jail and the Unknown Correctional Officers are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims against Westville State Prison and the Unknown Correctional Officers are DISMISSED. Plaintiff&# 039;s claims against the Social Security Administration and an Unknown Employee are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's claims against the State of Indiana and an Unknown Employee are DISMISSED. Plaintiff's 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed In Forma Paupe ris is TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. Clerk DIRECTED to forward to Plaintiff four blank Summons forms and two blank USM-285 forms. Plaintiff GRANTED until 8/16/2016 to return the properly completed forms. Plaintiff CAUTIONED if he does not respond by the deadline, this case will be dismissed. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 8/2/16. (cc: Tyquan Stewart with Order and Summons forms).(cer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
TYQUAN STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, et al.
Defendants.

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No. 1:16 CV 138

OPINION AND ORDER
Tyquan Stewart, a pro se plaintiff, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (DE
# 2). The court previously screened his first amended complaint (DE # 3) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and ordered him to show cause why his case should not be
dismissed. (DE # 4.) In response, plaintiff has submitted a second amended complaint
consisting of four 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form complaints against various parties. (DE # 5.)
Plaintiff has supplemented his second amended complaint by adding a fifth § 1983 form
complaint. (DE # 7.) The court will address the sufficiency of each form complaint in
turn.
The first form complaint brings claims against defendants Parkview Behavioral
Hospital (“Parkview”) and Kisha Houston. (DE # 5 at 1-5.) Plaintiff alleges that
defendants violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (“EMTALA”), by refusing to admit him for screening or stabilization when he
was in the midst of a mental health emergency. (Id.) He states that he arrived at
Parkview and informed defendant Houston of his condition and that he was a danger

to himself. (Id. at 2-3.) He alleges that Houston refused to admit him and instructed him
to leave and go elsewhere. (Id.) Upon being turned away, plaintiff alleges that he
attempted suicide by driving his car into a building. (Id.)
EMTALA was enacted to address the problem of “patient dumping” where
hospitals transferred indigent patients from one hospital to the next while their
emergency medical conditions worsened. Curry v. Advocate Bethany Hosp. 204 Fed.
App’x 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 982 F.2d 230, 233 n.
7 (7th Cir. 1993); Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 770 (11th Cir. 2002)). “EMTALA
requires hospitals receiving federal funds to screen for an emergency medical condition
any patient who comes to the hospital; if an emergency condition exists, the patient may
not be transferred to another hospital or discharged until he or she has received
stabilizing treatment.”Curry, 204 Fed App’x at 556. An acute psychiatric condition can
qualify as an “emergency medical condition” under EMTALA. See Thomas v. Christ
Hosp. and Medical Center, 328 F.3d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Once an emergency
medical condition is detected, the hospital must act to stabilize the condition--whether
physical or psychiatric--before the patient can be transferred or released”). Plaintiff’s
complaint sufficiently states a claim under EMTALA and he will be allowed to proceed
on this claim.
Plaintiff’s second form complaint (Id. at 6-10) raises claims against the Allen
County Jail and four unknown correctional officers. Plaintiff alleges violations of his
Eighth Amendment rights while he was in custody between May 31, 2014 and August

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6, 2014. (Id at 7-8.) He makes two specific allegations. First he alleges that on June 3,
2014, he was confined in a cell without access to water or bathroom facilities for a threeand-a-half-hour period. (Id. at 7.) He states that he was left with no choice but to urinate
on the floor and was subsequently punished for having done so. (Id.) Next he alleges
that between the dates of June 5, 2014 and August 6, 2014, and unknown officer gave
him “old” food. (Id. at 8.) He states that he reported this to another officer who in turn
replaced the food for him. (Id.)
It is not clear from plaintiff’s complaint whether he was serving a sentence or
was being held in the Allen County Jail as a pretrial detainee. If plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee his claims arise under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable to convicted prisoners Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, -- U.S. –, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015). In either case, the
Eighth Amendment can guide the court’s analysis of his complaint. Smith v. Dart, 803
F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015); Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013); Board v.
Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (“we have found it convenient and entirely
appropriate to apply the same standard to claims arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment (detainees) and the Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) without
differentiation”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conditions of confinement that
deprive inmates of basic human needs such as food, medical care, sanitation and
physical safety may violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
346 (1981). In either case, the alleged condition must be sufficiently serious enough to

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amount to a constitutional deprivation. Dart, 803 F.3d at 309; Farnham, 394 F.3d at 478.
The conditions that plaintiff complains of do not amount to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s lack of access to a bathroom for only a few hours is not
sufficiently serious to rise to a constitutional deprivation. See, e.g., Clark v. Spey, No. 01C-9669, 2002 WL 31133198 at * 2-3 (N.D. Ill. Sept 26, 2002) (inmate held overnight in
cold cell with no toilet did not state a claim); Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kansas, (318 F.3d
1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (pretrial detainee held for five hours without access to a toilet
did not state a claim); cf., Phelps v. Godinez, No. 15-CV-073-SMY, 2015 WL 681007 at *4
(S.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2015) (denying bathroom access to a wheelchair-bound inmate who
lacked bladder control, and forcing him to sit in his urine soaked-clothes for two hours
suggested an Eighth Amendment violation) (citing Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 61415 (7th Cir. 2012)). Furthermore, whatever plaintiff’s complaints were regarding the
food, they were apparently remedied when he notified the staff. Plaintiff’s claims
against the Allen County Jail and the unknown correctional officers are dismissed.
Plaintiff’s third form complaint (DE # 5 at 11-15) raises claims against Westville
State Prison and unknown correctional officers. Plaintiff raises claims regarding three
separate incidents surrounding his meals. On one occasion between February 23, 2015
and March 31, 2015, he was forced to throw away his food despite the fact that he is
diabetic. (Id. at 12.) On another, between May 12, 2015 and July 30, 2015, he “was not
allowed to go to chow and eat.” (Id.) On a third occasion around the same time, an
unknown officer attempted to force him to throw away his food. (Id.)

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As discussed supra, adequate access to food and other necessities are guaranteed
by the Eighth Amendment. However, the length, duration and consequences of any
such incidents are relevant in assessing whether the deprivation of food violates the
Eighth Amendment. Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1999); Knox v. Wainscott,
No. 03-C-1429, 2003 WL 21148973 at * 8 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2003) (“While systemic
malnourishment of a prisoner would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the
occasional missed meal does not”). At most, plaintiff was deprived of food just twice
over a period of months and does not allege that he suffered any consequences from
this deprivation. As such he has failed to allege a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. Therefore his claims against Westville State Prison and the unknown correctional
officers are dismissed.
Plaintiff’s fourth form complaint raises claims against the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) and an unknown employee. (DE # 5 at 16-20.) Plaintiff’s claims
stem from the fact that he believes that his 2009 claim for disability benefits was
wrongfully denied. (Id. at 18-19.) The court already explained in its prior order, that it
lacks authority to review SSA determinations decisions unless plaintiff can satisfy the
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (DE # 4 at 4.) Plaintiff has failed to make any such
showing. Therefore his claims against the SSA and an unknown employee are
dismissed.
Plaintiff’s final form complaint comes via an addendum to his complaint
(DE # 7), and raises claims against the State of Indiana and an unknown employee. In

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his complaint he alleges that he was denied the right to a fair trial because there was
“negligence in improprieties involving his criminal case.” (Id. at 2.) In support of his
claims, plaintiff points to alleged discrepancies in the “discovery” of his criminal case.
(Id.)
By bringing these claims against the State of Indiana, plaintiff presumably
intends to sue the Prosecuting Attorney who prosecuted his criminal case. However,
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for all actions and decisions undertaken in
furtherance of their prosecutorial duties. Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). Furthermore, to the extent that the
denial of plaintiff’s right to a fair trial resulted in a conviction, his claims would run
squarely into the bar of Heck v. Humphrey which prohibits collateral attacks on a
criminal conviction. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). For these reasons, plaintiff’s claims against the
State of Indiana and an unknown employee are dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiff’s second amended
complaint states a claim against defendants Parkview and Houston. All other
defendants and all other claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B).
However, because plaintiff has not submitted two summons forms and one USM-285
for each of the remaining defendants, plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (DE # 2), is TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. The court: DIRECTS the clerk to
send plaintiff four blank summons forms and two blank USM-285's; GRANTS Tyquan
Stewart to and including August 16, 2016, to return these properly completed forms for

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Parkview and Houston; and CAUTIONS Tyquan Stewart that if he does not do so by
that deadline, this case will be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
SO ORDERED.
Date: August 2, 2016
s/ James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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