Phillips v. Young et al

Filing 61

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment 39 and DENIES Plaintiff's miscellaneous requests 35 ; 46 ; 48 as moot. As this Order disposes of all Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants, the Clerk is hereby DIRECTED to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Jon E DeGuilio on 3/13/2018. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JAMES L. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff, pro se,
v.
RANDY YOUNG, TODD MILLER,
and DICK COONS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:16-CV-176 JD

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff James Phillips filed his pro se complaint on May 23, 2016. [DE 1] It contained a
single allegation: “They destroyed my property that I own by taking the building I own down to
the ground.” Id. at 2.1 The case proceeded to discovery and Defendants moved for summary
judgment on May 17, 2017. [DE 39] Phillips did not respond until after the Court ordered
Defendants to remedy their noncompliance with Local Rule 56-1(f), requiring them to give
proper notice to Phillips in accordance with Faulkner. He eventually responded, albeit
unconventionally. [DE 54 at 2]
He also submitted three letters, which the Court construes as motions, requesting default
judgment [DE 35], subpoenas for people to testify at trial [DE 48], and “a hearing on [the
Defendants] stealing my land” [DE 46].2 For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant

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His prayer for relief is likewise a single sentence: “I want them stopped and off my property and
damages.” [DE 1 at 3]
 Even after the Court struck several of Phillips’s early filings for failing to seek specific relief [DE 24],
he has flooded the docket with various other papers. The Court has reviewed all of them, but apart from
the docket entries mentioned above, these papers are filled with unintelligible ramblings that do not
appear to seek any kind of relief. [DE 29, 34, 41-45, 47, 50, 51, 53, 57-60]
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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny Phillips’s motions for default judgment,3
subpoenas, and a hearing as moot.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there “is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one identified by the substantive law as
affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
“genuine issue” exists with respect to any material fact when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. Where a factual record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court
must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party’s favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697
(7th Cir. 2008); King v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
Defendants are all employees of the Town of Redkey, Indiana. They move for summary
judgment on two grounds: (1) that Phillips does not own the property at issue, nor did he ever
own it; and (2) the doctrine of res judicata bars his claim. Defendants identify what they believe
to be the property at issue and indicate through their exhibits that the property belongs to

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The Court granted Defendants until July 15, 2016, to file their answer to Phillips’s complaint. [DE 12]
They did so on July 11, 2016, several days before that deadline. [DE 15] Thus, they did not fail to “plead
or otherwise defend” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), and so Phillips’s “motion” for default judgment will be
denied as moot.

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Redkey, not Phillips. [DE 40 at 3] In support, they attach corporate quitclaim deeds and a quiet
title order indicating that Redkey owns the property. [Exh. A to Motion] They further state that
Phillips never owned the property he complains about in this lawsuit. Lastly, Defendants point to
a 2009 state court lawsuit filed by Phillips against the Redkey Town Board alleging that the
Board owed him rent for occupying the same property at issue here. In granting summary
judgment for the Board in that case, the state court determined that Phillips has no rights to the
property because it is owned by Redkey itself.4 [Exh. B to Motion]
The bottom line of Defendants’ motion is that Phillips does not own the property that
makes up the subject matter of his very own lawsuit, and indeed Phillips does not present any
evidence to dispute this contention, thus failing to create a material issue of fact here. On
October 30, 2017, Phillips responded to Defendants’ arguments. [DE 54 at 2] On the Faulker
notice he received in the mail from Defendants, Phillips underlined the following sentence:
“[The summary judgment motion] says that there should not be a full trial because you cannot
win some or all of your claims.” Id. He then hand-wrote his only response directly above: “I’ll
win them all if you give George Washington’s veteran brother a trial by jury like the Constitution
says.” Id.
As the Supreme Court noted in Celotex, “[o]nce the moving party has attacked whatever
record evidence—if any—the nonmoving party purports to rely upon, the burden of production
shifts to the nonmoving party ….” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 n. 3 (1986). The

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Defendants contend that this earlier state court case bars Phillips’s current claims via res judicata but
they provide little analysis to substantiate this argument (although, the Court recognizes that this may be
due in large part to the difficulty in comparing Phillips’s claims from case to case because they are so
bare-boned). Regardless, the Court need not address whether res judicata applies because the sum of
Defendants’ arguments and exhibits demonstrates that Phillips does not own the very property he
complains was destroyed.

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nonmovant must either: (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers; (2)
produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial; or (3) submit an
affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary. Id. (citing 10A Wright, Miller & Kane §
2727, pp. 138-143). “Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to
respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party responds, the court
determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is
no genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities
Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)).
Phillips’s response fails in all regards. Even though his complaint does not identify what
specific property he owns, once the Defendants presented evidence of what they contend to be
the property at issue, Phillips did not produce any additional information to create a genuine
issue of material fact for trial (i.e., that the property Defendants identified is not the property at
issue, that Phillips indeed owns the property Defendants identified, etc.). So, the Court is left
with the Defendants’ submissions: quitclaim deeds and a quiet title decree affirming that Redkey
is the owner of the instant property; and a 2009 state court order confirming that Phillips has no
rights to the real estate at issue here. Phillips has not created a factual dispute as to these matters
that would preclude summary judgment. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment [DE 39] and DENIES Plaintiff’s miscellaneous requests [DE 35; DE 46; DE
48] as moot. As this Order disposes of all Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants, the Clerk is
hereby DIRECTED to enter judgment.

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SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: March 13, 2018

/s/ JON E. DEGUILIO
Judge
United States District Court

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