Perkins v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 20

OPINION AND ORDER: The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion and Order. The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment in favor of Perkins and against the Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan L Collins on 9/28/2018. (lhc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DOREEN FRANCES PERKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY, sued as Nancy A Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO. 1:16-cv-00267-SLC

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Doreen Frances Perkins appeals to the district court from a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application under the Social
Security Act (the “Act”) for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).2 For the following reasons,
the Commissioner’s decision will be REVERSED, and the case will be REMANDED to the
Commissioner for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion and Order.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2013, Perkins filed an application for DIB, alleging disability as of
January 10, 2008. (DE 6 Administrative Record (“AR”) 15, 212-13). Perkins was last insured
for purposes of DIB on December 31, 2014 (AR 22), and therefore, she must establish that she
was disabled as of that date, see Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that with respect to a DIB claim, a claimant must establish that she was disabled as

1
Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, see Casey v. Berryhill, 853 F.3d
322 (7th Cir. 2017), and thus, she is automatically substituted for Carolyn W. Colvin in this case, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d).
2

All parties have consented to the Magistrate Judge. (DE 10); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

of her date last insured in order to recover DIB). Perkins’s application was denied initially and
upon reconsideration. (AR 165-68, 170-72). At Perkins’s request, a hearing was held before
Administrative Law Judge Matthias Onderak (the “ALJ”) on August 13, 2015. (AR 66-114,
175-76). At the hearing, Perkins, who was represented by an attorney, and vocational expert
Charles McBee testified. (AR 67-68). On September 11, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision, finding that Perkins was not disabled. (AR 17-38). Perkins requested that the Appeals
Council review the ALJ’s decision (AR 14-16), and the Appeals Council denied her request,
making the ALJ’s decision the final, appealable decision of the Commissioner (AR 1-4).
Perkins filed a complaint with this Court on July 11, 2016, seeking relief from the
Commissioner’s final decision. (DE 1). In her appeal, Perkins alleges that the ALJ: (1) failed to
appropriately weigh the opinions of Ron Sloan, M.D., in assigning the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”); and (2) failed to properly evaluate the credibility of Perkins’s symptom
testimony. (DE 9 at 14-20).
II. THE ALJ’s FINDINGS
Under the Act, a claimant is entitled to DIB if she establishes an “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to . . . last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is “an
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(3).
In determining whether Perkins is disabled as defined by the Act, the ALJ conducted the
familiar five-step analytical process, which required him to consider the following issues in
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sequence: (1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a
severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the
impairments listed by the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1; (4) whether the
claimant is unable to perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is incapable of
performing work in the national economy.3 See Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th
Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on
steps three and five, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881,
886 (7th Cir. 2001). A negative answer at any point other than step three stops the inquiry and
leads to a finding that the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden of proof lies with the
claimant at every step except the fifth, where it shifts to the Commissioner. Id. at 885-86.
At step one, the ALJ found that Perkins had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since her alleged onset date of October 12, 2012, through the date she was last insured,
December 31, 2014. (AR 22). At step two, the ALJ found that Perkins had the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease of the spine, fibromyalgia, obesity, and lung disease.
(AR 22-24).
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Perkins did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments severe enough to meet or equal a listing. (AR 24). Before proceeding to step
four, the ALJ determined that Perkins’s symptom testimony was “not entirely credible” (AR 29),
and assigned her the following RFC:
[T]he claimant has the [RFC] to perform sedentary work . . .
except she can occasionally climb ramps or stairs but never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolding. She can occasionally be on flooring
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Before performing steps four and five, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, or what tasks the
claimant can do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a). The RFC is then used during steps
four and five to help determine what, if any, employment the claimant is capable of. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
404.1545(a)(5).

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that is slick or uneven or otherwise requires balance. The claimant
can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She should avoid
concentrated exposure to inordinate amounts of respiratory
irritants, meaning inordinate amounts of fumes, odors, dust, gases,
and areas of poor ventilation. For example, the claimant cannot
work with levels of respiratory irritants similar to those found in
chemical plants, automotive garages, coal[]mines, farms, or grain
silos. She must avoid exposure to unprotected heights. The
claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to dangerous or
hazardous machinery, meaning machinery that has exposed
moving parts used to cut or grind that fails to stop when human
contact is lost or machinery that has open flames or hot surfaces
that would burn someone if he or she fell onto them. She can
ambulate with the use of one cane and is able to maintain balance
while using her unoccupied upper extremity to lift/carry items.
(AR 24-25). Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Perkins could perform her past
relevant work in data entry, and therefore, her application for DIB was denied. (AR 32).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 405(g) of the Act grants this Court “the power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court’s task is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence, which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744
(7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The decision will be reversed only if it is not supported by
substantial evidence or if the ALJ applied an erroneous legal standard. Clifford v. Apfel, 227
F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000).
To determine if substantial evidence exists, the Court reviews the entire administrative
record but does not re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or
substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s. Id. Rather, if the findings of the Commissioner
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are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive. Id. Nonetheless, “substantial
evidence” review should not be a simple rubber-stamp of the Commissioner’s decision. Id.
(citing Ehrhart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1992)).
IV. ANALYSIS
Perkins claims that the ALJ erred in rejecting two of Dr. Sloan’s reports in determining
the RFC: an examination report from June 24, 2014, and an examination report from July 28,
2015. The RFC is “the individual’s maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities
in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis,” meaning eight hours a day, for
five days a week. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996); see Young v. Barnhart,
362 F.3d 995, 1000-02 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (“Your
[RFC] is the most you can still do despite your limitations.”). The RFC assessment:
is based upon consideration of all relevant evidence in the case
record, including medical evidence and relevant nonmedical
evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an individual’s
apparent symptomology, an individual’s own statement of what he
or she is able or unable to do, and many other factors that could
help the adjudicator determine the most reasonable findings in
light of all the evidence.
SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “more weight is generally given to
the opinion of a treating physician because of his greater familiarity with the claimant’s
conditions and circumstances.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (citations omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2). Each medical opinion, other than a treating physician’s opinion, must be
evaluated pursuant to factors articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) to determine the proper
weight to apply to it. See White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658-60 (7th Cir. 2005). Whether the
doctor examined the claimant is one of the factors considered when weighing opinions under this
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regulation. Payne v. Colvin, No. 4:15-CV-43-JVB-PRC, 2017 WL 655863, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb.
17, 2107) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)). “Medical opinions from examining sources are
generally given more weight than those from non-examining sources.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(1)). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[a]n ALJ can reject an
examining physician’s opinion only for reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record;
a contradictory opinion of a non-examining physician does not, by itself, suffice.” Gudgel v.
Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
995, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the circumstance presented was “not a case where the
ALJ improperly rejected an examining physician’s opinion in favor of a non-examining
physician’s decision”).
Dr. Sloan’s June 24, 2014, report includes clinical findings that Perkins suffers from
“low[er] back pain,” radiating pain in her legs, and that she can stand for about 20 minutes at a
time. (AR 1385). Dr. Sloan stated that on a scale of one to 10, Perkins’s pain averages a four
and can get up to an eight or a nine “when bad.” (AR 1387). Dr. Sloan estimated that Perkins
could sit for less than an hour and stand or walk for less than an hour in an eight-hour workday.
(AR 1387). Dr. Sloan opined that it was necessary or recommended that Perkins not sit
continuously in a work setting. (AR 1387). Dr. Sloan concluded that Perkins had “significant
limitations in doing repetitive reach, handling, fingering or lifting,” and he recorded “Marked
(Essentially Precluded)” limitations in her ability to use her upper extremities in a competitive
eight-hour workday. (AR 1388). Dr. Sloan opined that Perkins’s symptoms would increase if
she were placed in a competitive work environment; that she could not work at a competitive
job, full time, on a sustained basis; that her symptoms would constantly interfere with her
attention and concentration; and that she was not capable of even a “low stress” position. (AR
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1389-91).
On July 28, 2015, Dr. Sloan examined Perkins again, diagnosing her with back pain,
degenerative disc disorder, and fibromyalgia. (AR 1412). Dr. Sloan recorded the following
clinical findings in support of these diagnoses: an MRI in March 2013 and a physical exam.
(AR 1412). Dr. Sloan estimated that Perkins could perform a job in a seated position for two
hours in an eight-hour work day, and that she could perform a job standing or walking for one
hour in an eight-hour work day. (AR 1413). Dr. Sloan opined that Perkins could never or rarely
lift 10 to 20 pounds, occasionally lift five to 10 pounds, never or rarely carry 10 to 20 pounds,
occasionally carry five to 10 pounds, and frequently carry less than five pounds. (AR 1413). Dr.
Sloan also opined that Perkins did not have significant limitations in reaching, handling, or
fingering; she could never or rarely grasp, turn, or twist objects; never or rarely use her arms for
reaching; and frequently use her hands or fingering for fine manipulations. (AR 1413).
The ALJ assigned “no weight” to Dr. Sloan’s opinions, providing the following reasons
for his determination: (1) Dr. Sloan’s opinions “were conclusory in nature and without
specificity”; (2) Dr. Sloan’s July 2015 exam indicates that Perkins’s condition improved since
Dr. Sloan’s June 2014 exam, which is inconsistent with other “objective record evidence”; (3)
Dr. Sloan did not prescribe Perkins a wheelchair or see her on an emergency basis, “indicating
her limitations [were] not as severe as Dr. Sloan’s opinions indicate”; and (4) Dr. Sloan opined
that Perkins could not sustain employment, which is an issue reserved to the ALJ. (AR 29-30).
The ALJ’s first reason for discrediting Dr. Sloan’s opinion—that is, Dr. Sloan’s opinions
were conclusory—is flawed. It is true that Dr. Sloan’s reports of June 24, 2014, and July 28,
2015, do not contain much diagnostic or laboratory testing. However, Dr. Sloan did support his
opinions with “physical exams” and “clinical findings” that Perkins has “low[er] back pain . . .
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radiating pain [down] legs bilateral[ly] . . . [and] she can stand about 20 min[utes].” (AR 1385,
1412). The ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Sloan’s opinions were “conclusory” despite these exams
and clinical findings “ignores the accepted notion that ‘fibromyalgia often produce[s] pain and
other symptoms out of proportion to the objective medical evidence, [and therefore] it is crucial
that the disability adjudicator evaluate credibility with great care and a proper understanding of
the disease.’” Buttaccio v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 5447, 2017 WL 3895566, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6,
2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 5152, 2017 WL 2215022,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2017)); see Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]here are no laboratory tests to confirm the diagnosis.” (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
that the ALJ erred by “depreciated the gravity of [the claimant’s] fibromyalgia because of the
lack of any evidence of objectively discernible symptoms, such as a swelling of the joints”).
Second, according to the ALJ, the July 2015 report indicates that Perkins’s condition
significantly improved since June 2014, which is “inconsistent with the objective record
evidence.” (AR 30). However, it is not clear what “objective record evidence” the ALJ is
referring to. Indeed, the ALJ mentioned only two medical reports documenting Perkins’s
condition between June 2014 and July 2015: a December 2014 report stating that a CT scan of
Perkins’s chest showed that diffuse right-sided infiltrates had resolved (AR 29 (citing AR 1415)),
and a February 2015 report by Brian Zehr, M.D. (AR 30 (citing AR 1393-405)). However, the
December 2014 report does not discuss any functional limitations, and the ALJ assigned Dr.
Zehr’s report “no weight.” (AR 30). Therefore, the ALJ could not rely on these reports in
discrediting the functional limitations assigned in Dr. Sloan’s reports.
The ALJ did not discuss, and the record appears to lack, any other “objective record
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evidence” between June 2014 and July 2015. This leaves the Court to guess whether there is any
objective medical evidence that contradicts Dr. Sloan’s reports between June 2014 and July 2015
that would support the ALJ’s rejections of these reports. See Betts v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-6540,
2016 WL 1569414, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2016) (remanding the ALJ’s decision where the ALJ
failed to articulate which medical records provided support for the assigned RFC, leaving the
court to guess where there was support for the RFC in the medical records or whether the ALJ
“fabricated [the RFC] out of whole cloth”).
Moreover, medical evidence of record prior to the time period of June 2014 to July 2015
largely confirms Dr. Sloan’s findings. For example, in October, November, and December 2012,
Kelly Anderson, N.P., assessed Perkins with multiple points of tenderness; pain with range of
motion in the lumber and/or cervical spine, shoulders, and/or hips; and positive straight-leg tests
bilaterally. (AR 1127, 1133, 1137-39). Social Security Regulations require “[a]t least 11
positive tender points on physical examination” to medically determine that a claimant has
fibromyalgia. SSR 12-2P, 2012 WL 3104869, at *3 (July 25, 2012). Additionally, Ajit Pai,
M.D., examined Perkins in March 2013 and found that she had “moderate tenderness in bilateral
posterior cervical area,” an antalgic gait, and chronic low back pain. (AR 1323). Dr. Pai
examined Perkins again in April and May 2013, reiterating his findings from March and finding
positive straight-leg tests. (AR 1327, 1331). In June 2013, Dr. Pai described Perkins’s
tenderness in her right cervical spine and right clavicle as “severe.” (AR 1339). Dr. Sloan
examined Perkins in September 2013 and found that she had “18 out of 18 fibromyalgia points of
tenderness” through objective testing. (AR 893). Similarly, David Campbell, M.D., examined
Perkins on April 13, 2014, and found that she had “diffuse fibromyalgia trigger points in all
characteristic sites” and that she had decreased range of motion in her right shoulder and both
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hips. (AR 1378).
The Commissioner argues that the state agency physicians and the consultative
examining physician assigned less restrictive functional limitations than Dr. Sloan, and that the
ALJ was justified in rejecting Dr. Sloan’s reports based on these physicians’ opinions. The state
agency physicians, who reviewed Perkins’s record in November 2013 and February 2014,
concluded that Perkins could lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,
stand or walk about six hours in an eight-hour workday, sit about six hours in an eight-hour
workday, and push or pull (including operations of hand or foot controls) an unlimited amount.
(AR 147, 161). Additionally, the state agency physicians opined that Perkins could occasionally
climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and occasionally balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch, or crawl. (AR 148, 162). The ALJ assigned these opinions “some weight” but
found that other “objective evidence” warrant a reduction to sedentary work. (AR 30-31).
Additionally, in October 2013, Abdall Jan, M.D., a consultative internal medicine
physician, examined Perkins and found no muscle weakness, no muscle cramps, and no
decreased range of motion. (AR 1308). Dr. Jan performed a physical exam, which revealed
normal posture; four out of five strength bilaterally in all extremities; four out of five grip
strength; muscle pain in her left hip with palpation; and tenderness to palpation in her lumbar
spine. (AR 1309). She had a normal tandem walk, but was unable to heel/toe walk due to pain;
and she used a cane. (AR 1309). Dr. Jan’s “Medical Source Statement” reads:
[Perkins] can step up 16 inches, she has normal fine motor skills
with normal handling of fine objects. . . . [S]he states that she has
difficulties with walking, sitting and standing for prolonged
periods of time; she states that she has bilateral knee pain, . . . she
does use a cane to ambulate.
(AR 1310).
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The problem with the Commissioner’s argument is that the state agency physicians and
Dr. Jan did not examine Perkins or evaluate her medical record during or close to the relevant
time period of June 2014 to July 2015. Therefore, the ALJ could not have relied on these
opinions in concluding that Dr. Sloan’s reports of June 2014 and July 2015 were inconsistent
with objective medical evidence of record.
Moreover, the state agency physicians did not examine Perkins. “[A] contradictory
opinion of a non-examining physician does not, by itself,” serve as a basis to “reject an
examining physician’s opinion.” Gudgel, 345 F.3d at 470 (citations omitted). And while Dr. Jan
did examine Perkins, the only apparent inconsistencies between Dr. Jan’s report and Dr. Sloan’s
reports are that Dr. Jan opined that Perkins had normal fine motor skills with normal handling of
objects, whereas Dr. Sloan opined that Perkins was limited in being able to carry or lift objects,
and could not reach. However, “a person with fibromyalgia may have ‘muscle strength, sensory
functions, and reflexes [that] are normal.’” Revels, 874 F.3d at 663 (alteration in original)
(quoting Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir. 2001)). Thus, even if the ALJ did
rely on Dr. Jan’s report in discrediting Dr. Sloan’s reports, such a determination would
demonstrate a lack of understanding of Perkins’s fibromyalgia. Buttaccio, 2017 WL 3895566, at
*5 (“[I]t is crucial that the disability adjudicator evaluate credibility with great care and a proper
understanding of the disease.”).
Third, the ALJ erred in concluding that Dr. Sloan’s reports were not credible because he
did not prescribe a wheelchair for Perkins or see her on an emergency basis. Again, this
demonstrates the ALJ’s “fundamental misunderstanding of fibromyalgia.” Herrmann v.
Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-56, 2017 WL 6523931, at *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2017). Perkins may
not require a wheelchair or emergency care but still suffer from disabling levels of pain. See
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Kennedy v. Lilly Extended Disability Plan, 856 F.3d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Fibromyalgia
is . . . characterized by chronic, widespread pain, fatigue, cognitive impairments, poor sleep, and
mood difficulties. . . . These symptoms . . . appear to undergo periods of exacerbation or
worsening, often colloquially referred to as flares by patients and their health care providers.”
(alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Buttaccio, 2017 WL
3895566, at *5 (remanding a case where an ALJ ignored the “accepted notion” that fibromyalgia
“often produce[s] pain and other symptoms out of proportion to the objective medical evidence”
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Furthermore, the ALJ impermissibly “substituted his own judgment” for that of a
physician without relying on a medical opinion or authority. Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421,
425 (7th Cir. 2005). “ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their
own independent medical findings.” Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted). No medical source of record opined that if Perkins’s condition was as severe
as Dr. Sloan described, that she would require emergency room visits or a wheelchair.
Therefore, in finding that Dr. Sloan’s opinions were not credible because he did not prescribe her
a wheelchair or see her on an emergency basis, the ALJ impermissibly “played doctor.” See,
e.g., Chase v. Astrue, 458 F. App’x 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding a case where the ALJ
determined that the claimant could perform sedentary work by elevating his foot 15 to 20
degrees, whereas the claimant’s treating physician had opined that the claimant needed his foot
elevated to 90 degrees); Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The inference
that [insulin] was not prescribed because Myles was not experiencing significant problems
appears to be the ALJ’s own inference, and is wholly unsupported by the record.”).
Finally, the ALJ was not permitted to reject all of the findings in Dr. Sloan’s reports for
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the reason that Dr. Sloan opined in his June 2014 report that Perkins could not work at all. It is
true that whether a claimant is able to work is an issue reserved to the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d); see Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[a]lthough a medical
opinion on an ultimate issue such as whether the claimant is disabled is not entitled to controlling
weight, the ALJ must consider the opinion and should recontact the doctor for clarification if
necessary.” (citing SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *5 (July 2, 1996))). While the ALJ was
permitted to reject Dr. Sloan’s conclusion as to whether Perkins was able to return to work, Dr.
Sloan’s June 2014 and July 2015 reports contain more than conclusions as to whether Perkins is
able to work at all. The reports indicate that Perkins was limited in her ability to stand, walk, sit,
use her hands, lift, and carry objects. The ALJ did not cite evidence demonstrating that the
limitations assessed by Dr. Sloan were not credible. The ALJ “must ‘evaluate all the evidence in
the case record to determine the extent to which the opinion is supported by the record.’” Long
v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-CV-408-JEM, 2017 WL 1161012, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 28,
2017) (quoting SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *3, 5 (July 2, 1996)). Thus, the ALJ’s rejection
of Dr. Sloan’s opinion that Perkins was completely unable to work did not serve as a basis to
reject Dr. Sloan’s opinion with respect to Perkins’s functional limitations.
“When an ALJ denies benefits, he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the
evidence to his conclusion . . . .” Chase, 458 F. App’x at 556-57 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). The ALJ must articulate which medical or treatment records “provide support
for [his] opinion” and not leave the Court guessing “whether there is support for the RFC
determination” or “fabricate [the RFC] out of whole cloth.” Betts, 2016 WL 1569414, at *3; see
Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2010). As discussed above, the ALJ’s assignment
of “no weight” to Dr. Sloan’s reports of June 24, 2014, and July 28, 2015, is not supported by
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substantial evidence. Thus, a remand is required for the ALJ to properly consider Dr. Sloan’s
reports in assigning Perkins’s RFC.4
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and
the case is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings in accordance with this
Opinion and Order. The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment in favor of Perkins and against the
Commissioner.
SO ORDERED.
Entered this 28th day of September 2018.
/s/ Susan Collins
Susan Collins
United States Magistrate Judge

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Because the Court finds that remand is warranted due to the ALJ’s flawed analysis of Dr. Sloan’s opinion
in the RFC determination, the Court need not reach the remainder of Perkins’s arguments.

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