Brown v. Hartman et al

Filing 101

OPINION AND ORDER: Defendant Halsell's Motion to Dismiss ECF No. 82 is GRANTED. All claims against Defendant Vicki Halsell are DISMISSED. Signed by Judge Holly A Brady on 6/24/19. (nal)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JEFFREY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO.: 1:16-CV-337-HAB-SLC

DEPUTY KYLE HARTMAN, DET.
SHAUN DUNAFIN, WANDA
TRUELOVE, SHERIFF OF NOBLE
COUNTY DOUGLAS A. HARP, STATE
OF INDIANA / INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
(seeking perspective injunctive relief
only), VICKI HALSELL, and APRIL
WILBURN,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jeffrey Brown has filed this action against Defendant Vicki Halsell and
other Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional rights. He alleges that Halsell, as a Re-Entry Specialist for the
State of Indiana, forced him to register as a sex offender, although he was not legally
required to do so, resulting in Plaintiff being maliciously prosecuted for failure to register
as a sex offender when he later changed residences.
Halsell has filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 82] Plaintiff’s claims against her
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes Halsell’s Motion
[ECF No. 98], arguing that his Second Amended Complaint sufficiently states a claim for
malicious prosecution because Halsell’s actions “were the motivating force for all that

happened after she required him to sign up as a sex offender.” (ECF No. 98 at 2.) Halsell
filed a Reply [ECF No. 99-1]. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Halsell’s
Motion and dismisses the claims against her.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To state a claim under the federal notice pleading standards, a complaint must set
forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations are accepted as true and need only give
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” EEOC v.
Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, a plaintiff’s allegations must show that his
entitlement to relief is plausible, rather than merely speculative. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526
F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are
accepted as true at the pleading stage, but “allegations in the form of legal conclusions
are insufficient.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that the State of Indiana/Indiana Department of Correction
required him to register as a sex offender in violation of the ex post facto provisions of
the United States Constitution. Halsell, as a Re-Entry Specialist for the State of Indiana
was one of the individuals
who required Plaintiff to register as a sex offender, and who directed the
Plaintiff to register as a sex offender with the Sheriff of Noble County under
pain and penalty of arrest, prosecution, and incarcerated [sic] – actions and
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directions which ultimately resulted in Plaintiff being incarcerated and
jailed as set forth in the allegations detailed below, all of which are
incorporated herein.
(Second Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff registered as directed, although “[i]n reality, Plaintiff
never needed to register even though the State of Indianan [sic] and the Noble County
Sheriff (and their employees) required him to register.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff changed residences and requested an extension of time to register, which
Defendant Wanda Truelove granted. However, during the extension period, Plaintiff was
incarcerated on an unrelated charge. Defendant Detective Shaun Dunafin investigated
possible charges surrounding Plaintiff’s failure to register. In June 2009, Plaintiff was
charged with three counts of failing to register as a sex offender. A Noble County Clerk’s
Office employee initiated the charges. Plaintiff pled guilty. He was released from
incarceration in 2012.
In 2015, Defendant Deputy Kyle Hartman falsely arrested Plaintiff and filed a
report that Plaintiff had not registered as a sex offender or a violent offender. He was
charged with four counts of failing to register and prosecuted by Defendant Kelly Morris.
In March 2016, a judge with the Noble County Circuit Court found that Plaintiff was not
required to register as a sex offender and dismissed the charges against him.
Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants “instituted or caused to be instituted a cause
of action against Plaintiff” and “acted maliciously against him and without probable
cause.” (Id. ¶ 20.)

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ANALYSIS
For any claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States by a
person acting under color of state law. Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir.
1996). “To state a claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) he has satisfied the requirements of a state law cause of action for
malicious prosecution; (2) the malicious prosecution was committed by state actors; and
(3) he was deprived of liberty.” Id.
In Indiana, malicious prosecution claims have four elements: “(1) the defendant
instituted or caused to be instituted an action against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted
maliciously in so doing; (3) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action;
and (4) the original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Crosson v. Berry, 829
N.E.2d 184, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Malice may be shown “by evidence of personal
animosity or inferred from a complete lack of probable cause or a failure to conduct an
adequate investigation under the circumstances.” Golden Years Homestead, Inc. v. Buckland,
557 F.3d 457, 462 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Anderson, 471 N.E.2d 1249,
1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and charged with failing to register as a sex
offender, and that the proceedings ended in his favor when the court ruled that requiring
him to register as a sex offender subjected Plaintiff to an ex post facto law. Plaintiff alleges
that Halsell’s specific contribution to the initiation of the cause of action against him was
that she directed him “to register as a sex offender with the Sheriff of Noble County under
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pain and penalty of arrest, prosecution, and incarcerated [sic]—actions and directions
which ultimately resulted in Plaintiff being incarcerated and jailed.” (Second Am. Compl.
¶ 5.)
After Halsell directed and required him to register as a sex offender, a detective
investigated possible charges surrounding Plaintiff’s failure to register. The detective
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to register and recommended prosecution. A Noble
County Clerk’s Office employee initiated the charges, which were prosecuted by a county
prosecutor.
Plaintiff would be hard pressed, based on the allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint, to argue that Halsell’s directive that Plaintiff register as a sex offender was
anything more than a mistake of law. In early 2009, when Halsell required Plaintiff’s
registration under the State’s existing registration laws, the Indiana Supreme Court had
not yet determined that the requirement to register as a sex offender violated the state
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws if there was no registration
requirement at the time of the original conviction. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind.
2009).1 Nothing in the Second Amended Complaint plausibly suggests that Halsell’s
directive was borne out of personal animosity toward Plaintiff, or that she did not
properly investigate the requirements of the law at the time she directed Plaintiff to

In paragraph 18 of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[i]t was
clearly established law at the time of the initiation of the charges and detention and arrest of
Plaintiff that the Plaintiff was not required to register as a Sex Offender.” This assertion does
not appear to be directed at the time frame in which Halsell was involved, or to her specific
actions.
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register. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against Halsell. See
Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding no cognizable malicious
prosecution claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts to imply malice”); Welton v. Anderson,
770 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2014) (same).
In addition, Halsell is not a prosecutor and, presumably, had no authority to
initiate proceedings against Plaintiff. Accordingly, the most analogous cases are those
analyzing malicious prosecution claims against non-prosecutor defendants, such as
police officers. These claims have been described as “anomalous” because the State’s
Attorney, not the police, prosecute a criminal action. Reed, 77 F.3d at 1053. Malicious
prosecution claims against officers must allege more than an arrest and detention without
probable cause. Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 901 (7th
Cir. 2001). “Rather, [plaintiff] must allege that the officers committed some improper act
after they arrested him without probable cause, for example, that they pressured or
influenced the prosecutors to indict, made knowing misstatements to the prosecutor,
testified untruthfully, or covered up exculpatory evidence.” Id. (citing Reed, 77 F.3d at
1053–54).
Although it is not impossible that Halsell’s directive for Plaintiff to register a sex
offender could be the first step towards a malicious prosecution, absent a claim that
Halsell played more of an essential or influential role in seeking or procuring the arrest
warrant or the charges, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient causal connection between
Halsell’s actions and the prosecutor’s decision to pursue charges. See, e.g., Glass v. Trump
Ind., Inc., 802 N.E.2d 461, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (no malicious prosecution claim where
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defendant was not consulted or the driving force in a prosecutor’s decision to charge;
independent investigation “provided the impetus for the decision to prosecute” and “that
decision, in turn, was made by [a prosecutor’s office] after reviewing” the investigation).
There is no basis to infer that Halsell’s false directive to register precluded the
investigating officer, the arresting officer, or the prosecutor from breaking any chain of
causation between the directive to register and the prosecution for failing to register. See,
e.g., Colbert v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Halsell’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 82]
is GRANTED. All claims against Defendant Vicki Halsell are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED on June 24, 2019.
s/ Holly A. Brady
JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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