Carnahan v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER: The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 11/6/17. (ksp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
TONYA A. CARNAHAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:16-CV-398

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for review of a final decision by the Commissioner
denying an award of benefits to the Plaintiff, Tonya A. Carnahan. Carnahan filed her opening
brief on May 26, 2017 (ECF 12), along with a summary of her medical history (ECF 12-1). On
July 27, 2017, the Commissioner filed a memorandum in support of the decision by the
Administrative Law Judge to deny benefits (ECF 17). Carnahan chose not to file a reply. The
official Social Security Administrative Record, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), appears at
ECF 5.1 For the reasons explained below, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Tonya Carnahan applied for Social Security Disability benefits (SSD) and
Supplemental Security Income benefits (SSI) on July 16, 2014, alleging “an onset of disability of
May 16, 2012.” Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 2 (citing transcript of administrative record (ECF 5)), pp. 9091, 209-216. “Her applications were denied initially . . . and after reconsideration.” Id. (citing Tr.,

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Section 405(g) of the Act mandates that “the Commissioner . . . shall file a certified
copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision
complained of are based.”

pp. 114-131, 134-147). Carnahan requested and was granted a hearing before Administrative
Law Judge William D. Pierson, which was held on March 1, 2016. Id. Carnahan explains in her
brief that “[a]t the hearing, Ms. Carnahan amended her onset to November 20, 2013.” Id. (citing
Tr., pp. 47-48, 23). Carnahan “appeared and testified at [the] hearing . . . , as did a vocational
expert.” Commissioner’s Response, p. 1. The ALJ concluded that Carnahan was not disabled and
issued a decision on July 20, 2016, explaining his reasoning. Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 2 (citing Tr., pp.
14-40). Carnahan then “requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council . . . [but]
the Appeals Council denied review on September 20, 2016.” Id. (citing Tr., pp. 1-6). That denial
rendered the ALJ’s decision final, and Carnahan now seeks review by this Court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) “request[ing] that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed
for an award of benefits.” Id., p. 15. Carnahan argues that “[a]lternatively, the claim should be
remanded for a new hearing and decision[.]” Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this Court has explained, the Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of a final
decision denying benefits, but also provides that an ALJ’s findings must be accepted as
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Visinaiz v. Berryhill, 243 F.Supp.3d 1008, 1011
(N.D. Ind. 2017). “Thus, a court reviewing the findings of an ALJ will reverse only if the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence or if the ALJ has applied an erroneous legal
standard.” Id. (citing Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005)). Substantial
evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (citations omitted).

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Importantly, the district court “reviews the entire administrative record but does not
reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Id. (citing Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Butera v. Apfel,
173 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 1999)). The question on judicial review of an ALJ’s finding that a
claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act is not whether the
claimant is, in fact, disabled, but whether the ALJ “‘uses the correct legal standards and the
decision is supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. at 1011-12 (quoting Roddy v. Astrue, 705
F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2013) and citing O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, 618 (7th
Cir. 2010); Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2006); Barnett v. Barnhart,
381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). “‘[I]f the Commissioner commits an error of law,’ the Court
may reverse the decision ‘without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual
findings.’” Id. at 1012 (quoting White v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999)). Put another
way, this Court must review an ALJ’s findings and conclusions to ensure that they are not
contrary to applicable law and that the ALJ adequately explains the reasoning for those
conclusions. As Magistrate Judge Martin explained in Visinaiz:
At a minimum, an ALJ must articulate his or her analysis of the evidence in order
to allow the reviewing court to trace the path of her reasoning and to be assured
that the ALJ considered the important evidence. See Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d
589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995); Green
v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995). An ALJ must “‘build an accurate and
logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing court,
we may assess the validity of the agency’s final decision and afford [a claimant]
meaningful review.” Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Scott, 297 F.3d at 595)); see also O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618 (“An ALJ
need not specifically address every piece of evidence, but must provide a ‘logical
bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d
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881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into
the reasoning behind [the] decision to deny benefits.”).
Id. With this standard firmly in mind, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision in this case
must be affirmed for the reasons discussed below.
DISCUSSION
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions in this case:
1. Carnahan “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 20, 2013 . . . , the
amended alleged onset date[.]” ALJ Decision (Tr., p. 25);
2. Carnahan “has the following severe impairments: disorders of the neck and back (degenerative
changes in the cervical and lumbar spine, and sacroiliac joint arthritis), chronic pain disorder,
obesity, complex partial seizure disorder, and migraines[.]” Id.;
3. Carnahan “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments” under the Act. Id., p. 27;
4. Carnahan “has the residual function capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) (lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling 10 pounds frequently and 20
pounds occasionally and, in an eight-hour period, sitting or standing/walking for a total of at least
6 hours each) except that she cannot climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds and she can only
occasionally kneel, crouch, crawl, and balance. She can also occasionally bend and stoop in
addition to what is required to sit. She can occasionally use ramps and stairs but, aside from use
of ramps and stairs on an occasional basis, the claimant should not work [on] uneven surfaces.
The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to wetness, such as when working [on] wet and
slippery surfaces. She also needs to avoid work within close proximity to open and exposed

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heights and open and dangerous machinery, such as open flames and fast moving exposed blades.
She further needs to avoid work involving concentrated exposure to vibration, such as using
heavy sanders, and she is limited from concentrated exposure to excessive airborne particulate,
dusts, fumes, and gases and excessive heat, humidity, and cold, such as when working outside or
within a sawmill, boiler room, chemical plant, green house, refrigerator, or sewage plant. She
needs to avoid work within close proximity to very loud noises, such as fire alarms, and very
bright/flashing lights, such as a strobe, more than occasionally. The claimant is also not able to
engage in overhead work and overhead reaching. She is further limited to work within a low
stress job, defined as requiring only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in
the work setting. She can tolerate predictable changes in the work environment and meet
production requirements in an environment that allows her to sustain a flexible and goal-oriented
pace. She is limited from fast-paced work, such as assembly line production work with rigid or
strict productivity requirements. The claimant is limited to work that involves only simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks that can be learned through short demonstration and up to 30 days.
She can maintain the concentration required to perform simple tasks, remember simple work-like
procedures, and make simple work-related decisions. The work she can perform will require little
or no judgment to perform simple duties, consistent with the reasoning levels 1, 2, and 3 as
defined [in] the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and SVP levels of 1 and 2 as rated by the SCO.
Id., p. 29;
5. Carnahan “is unable to perform any past relevant work . . . . The claimant has past relevant
work as a cashier/stocker (semi-skilled, heavy work) . . . . Because she is able to perform only a
reduced range of light work, she is not able to perform her past relevant work. This is consistent
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with the vocational expert’s testimony.” Id., p. 35;
6. Carnahan “was 41 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the
alleged disability onset date[.]” Id.
7. Carnahan “has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English[.]” Id.;
8. “Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform[.]” Id., p. 36; and
9. Carnahan “has not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from
November 20, 2013, through the date of this decision[.]” Id.
The ALJ concluded that the medical evidence Carnahan submitted in support of her claim
was insufficient “to establish that the symptoms argued are supportive of alleged severity of
condition and symptoms.” Id., pp. 33-34. That conclusion was based in part on the ALJ’s
determination that the medical opinions of Dr. Shantanu Kulkarni, claimant’s treating physician,
were inconsistent with the rest of the medical evidence (including the opinions of the two nontreating physicians). Because of those inconsistencies the ALJ refused to give Dr. Kulkarni’s
opinions controlling weight when determining whether Carnahan was entitled to benefits. This is
Carnahan’s first point of contention–that the ALJ improperly gave too much weight to the
opinions of non-treating physicians and too little to Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions. Carnahan contends
that the ALJ incorrectly concluded that Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions were inconsistent with other
medical evidence and that they contained internal inconsistencies. Indeed, the ALJ stated quite
unequivocally that “many factors significantly undermine any weight that could have been
accorded to Dr. Kulkarni’s opinion.” Id., p. 35. Carnahan contends that was error.
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The ALJ also found that Carnahan’s own testimony “concerning the intensity, persistence
and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [was] not entirely consistent with the medical and other
evidence of record . . .” and that “the . . . objective medical findings and facts indicate severe
conditions, but appear inconsistent with, or unsupportive of, allegations for greater limitations of
function than those reflected in the residual functional capacity.” Id., pp. 31, 33. In other words,
the ALJ did not find Carnahan’s testimony entirely credible–which she also argues was error.
Thus, Carnahan’s challenge to the ALJ’s decision is twofold. First, she argues that “the ALJ
failed to properly weigh the medical opinion evidence[,]” and second she contends that “[t]he
ALJ failed to properly evaluate Ms. Carnahan’s testimony” regarding her symptoms and their
limiting effects. Plaintiff’s Brief, generally.
I. ALJ’s assessment of medical opinion evidence.
Carnahan argues that the ALJ “gave little weight to the opinions from treating boardcertified physiatrist Dr. Kulkarni[,]” who was Carnahan’s treating physician, and “[i]nstead . . .
gave ‘significant weight’ to the opinions from non-examining state agency medical
consultants[.]” Id., p. 8. Carnahan contends that the ALJ erred by placing too much significance
on the opinions of medical experts who never examined her and too little on the opinions of Dr.
Kulkarni, who did examine and treat her. Id. Carnahan argues that “[t]he ALJ’s conclusion that
the opinions from treating specialist Dr. Kulkarni are unsupported by sufficient clinical or
objective evidence . . . is contradicted by the record.” Id. Carnahan maintains that the ALJ’s
conclusion was flat out wrong and that Dr. Kulkarni’s “findings are wholly consistent with
treatment records, which consistently documented limited motion and tenderness in the spine,
and positive orthopedic maneuvers[.]” Id. (citations to record omitted). Carnahan notes that “Dr.
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Kulkarni stated that his opinions were based on MRIs of the cervical and lumbar spine and x-rays
of the lumbar spine, as well as clinical evidence of decreased range of motion in the cervical and
lumbar spine, constant pain in the neck radiating to the shoulders, and lower back pain with
radiating and tingling into the legs . . . . These findings are wholly consistent with treatment
records, which consistently documented limited motion and tenderness in the spine, and positive
orthopedic maneuvers[.]” Id. (citations to record omitted).
The Commissioner argues that “the ALJ provided good reasons for discounting Dr.
Kulkarni’s inconsistent opinions . . . [and] the ALJ’s analysis is supported by substantial
evidence.” Commissioner’s Response, p. 3. The Commissioner maintains that “the ALJ provided
two principal reasons for discounting the opinion of Dr. Kulkarni . . . . First, Dr. Kulkarni’s
extremely limiting restrictions were well out-of-sync with the evidence, including the doctor’s
own findings . . . . Likewise, Dr. Kulkarni’s limitations were plainly rebutted by Plaintiff’s own
testimony . . . . As Courts will uphold all but the most patently erroneous reasons for discounting
a treating source, the ALJ’s decision should stand.” Id., p. 4. The Commissioner argues that the
ALJ was correct to place greater weight on the opinions of non-treating physicians in this case
since “Dr. Kulkarni’s opinion differed incredibly from the other opinions of record. The two
other opinions of record in addition to that of Dr. Kulkarni–those of State agency medical
consultants J.V. Corcoran, M.D. and M. Brill, M.D.–each released Plaintiff to the full range of
light work . . . . While the ALJ accorded significant weight to these doctors, he did not stop there,
and instead added a litany of restrictions addressing Plaintiff’s postural, environmental, mental,
and reaching limitations . . . . A review of the medical evidence shows findings far more in-sync
with those of Drs. Corcoran and Brill than that of Dr. Kulkarni, thus the ALJ’s analysis was
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proper.” Id. The Commissioner also contends that “the ALJ noted that Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions
were incompatible with one another[,]” because “[i]nitially the orthopedist found in October
2014 that Plaintiff was so restricted that she could carry no weight whatsoever, could sit for a
mere two hours, could do no reaching, and would miss more than three days of work per month .
. . . A mere four months later, Dr. Kulkarni revised his assessment to allow for lifting of ten
pounds, sitting for four hours, missing work two or three times a month, and entirely discarding
any and all reaching limitations (Compare Tr. 730-32 with Tr. 509-11).” Id., p. 5.
An ALJ must consider the opinions of both treating and non-treating physicians and
decide which to assign greater significance. As another district court explained:
If a non-treating physician contradicts the treating physician’s opinion, it is the
ALJ’s responsibility to resolve the conflict. Books [v. Chater], 91 F.3d [972], 979
[(7th Cir.1996)] (ALJ must decide which doctor to believe). An ALJ may reject
the opinion of a treating physician in favor of the opinion of a non-treating
physician where the non-treating physician has special, pertinent expertise and
where the issue is one of interpretation of records or results rather than one of
judgment based on observations over a period of time. Micus v. Bowen, 979 F.2d
602, 608 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is up to the ALJ to decide which doctor to
believe–the treating physician who has experience and knowledge of the case, but
may be biased, or . . . the consulting physician, who may bring expertise and
knowledge of similar cases–subject only to the requirement that the ALJ’s
decision be supported by substantial evidence.”); Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d
375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006) (“So the weight properly to be given to testimony or
other evidence of a treating physician depends on circumstances.”). In sum,
“whenever an ALJ does reject a treating source’s opinion, a sound explanation
must be given for that decision.” Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). It is well-established that “[i]f an ALJ
does not give a treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the regulations
require the ALJ to consider the length, nature, and extent of the treatment
relationship, frequency of examination, the physician’s specialty, the types of tests
performed, and the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion.”
Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011).
Suess v. Colvin, 945 F.Supp.2d 920, 932-33 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (italics added). “It is

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well-established that a treating physician, even a physician with a relatively short treatment
relationship with his patient, usually is more familiar with a claimant’s condition than a
reviewing physician who never met or examined the claimant . . . and, therefore, is in a better
position to assess his limitations.” Minett v. Colvin, 2015 WL 7776560, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
2015) (citing Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003) and Suess, 945 F.Supp.2d at
932 (N.D. Ill. 2013)).
In the present case, the ALJ discounted Dr. Kulkarni’s findings and opinions, concluding
that the medical evidence as a whole supported, and was more consistent with, the opinions of
non-treating physicians. This Court’s duty is to determine whether the ALJ articulated a logical
and reasonable basis for his decision. Carnahan contends that he didn’t–and that in fact his
decision to discount Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions was contrary to law. Carnahan directs the Court’s
attention to the case of Scrogham v. Colvin, in which the Seventh Circuit explained that “an ALJ
should ‘give more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to the
opinion of a source who has not examined [the claimant].’” Scrogham, 765 F.3d 685, 696 (7th
Cir. 2014) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)). For this reason, argues Carnahan, the ALJ
should have credited Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions over those of the non-treating physicians since it
was Dr. Kulkarni who personally examined and treated her. She elaborates on her argument by
quoting the following passage from Scrogham:
Even when an ALJ decides not to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s
opinion, the ALJ is not permitted simply to discard it. Rather, the ALJ is required
by regulation to consider certain factors in order to decide how much weight to
give the opinion: (1) the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination,” because the longer a treating physician has seen a claimant, and
particularly if the treating physician has seen a claimant “long enough to have
obtained a longitudinal picture” of the impairment, the more weight his opinion
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deserves; (2) the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship”; (3)
“[s]upportability,” i.e., whether a physician’s opinion is supported by relevant
evidence, such as “medical signs and laboratory findings”; (4) consistency “with
the record as a whole”; and (5) whether the treating physician was a specialist in
the relevant area. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(5) (italics added).
Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 6 (quoting Scrogham, 765 F.3d at 697). But in this case the ALJ did not
“discard” Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions at all, nor did he ignore the fact that Dr. Kulkarni examined
and treated Carnahan on several occasions. Rather, he reviewed and considered Dr. Kulkarni’s
opinions as he was required to do, and concluded that they were unsupported by the rest of the
medical evidence presented and even inconsistent with Carnahan’s own testimony. If he had a
reasonable basis for this conclusion then Carnahan’s argument fails, since even the Scrogham
case makes clear that an ALJ can discount a treating physician’s opinions if he or she determines
that those opinions are inconsistent “with the record as a whole.” Again, the Commissioner
counters that the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions because “Dr. Kulkarni’s
extremely limiting restrictions were well out-of-sync with the evidence,” and because “Dr.
Kulkarni’s limitations were plainly rebutted by Plaintiff’s own testimony.” Commissioner’s
Response, p. 4. Furthermore, argues the Commissioner, “[a]n ALJ is not required to ‘blindly
accept’ a treating physician’s opinion, and ‘may discount a treating physician’s medical opinion
if the opinion is inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician or when the treating
physician’s opinion is internally inconsistent, as long as he minimally articulates his reasons’ for
doing so.” Id. (quoting Schreiber v. Colvin, 519 F.App’x 951, 958 (7th Cir. 2013)).
In this case, the ALJ reviewed and considered the medical evidence as a whole, including
the opinions of Dr. Kulkarni, Dr. Corcoran and Dr. Brill, and explained his decision to discount
Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions due to their inconsistency with the bulk of the additional medical
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evidence. The ALJ wrote as follows:
With respect to medical opinions, significant weight is given to the opinion of the
State Agency physicians that the claimant was able to perform light work . . . with
additional limitations of function . . . due to her headaches, seizure disorder, pain,
and medication side effects. Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions are that the claimant’s
symptoms frequently interfered with her attention and concentration, that she was
able to perform seated work for just 2 or 4 hours in an eight-hour workday, that
she was able to stand/walk for less than 1 hour to just 2 hours in an eight-hour
workday, that she needed to be able to get up and move around as needed or that
she needed to change position every 30 minutes, that she was able to lift and carry
either nothing or just up to 5 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally, that
she would be absent at least 2 or more times per month, that she was only
occasionally able to engage in gross and fine manipulative movements, that she
was never or rarely able to reach, and that she would need to take unscheduled
breaks lasting 5 minutes every 3 or 4 hours . . . . In an accompanying letter, Dr.
Kulkarni noted the claimant suffers from epilepsy and lupus. These findings and
statements (including nearly no lifting, no carrying, no reaching) are extreme and
appear inconsistent with even normal activities of daily living including picking
up toothbrushes, eating utensils, etc. Kulkarni’s own notes and his letter, reflect
ambulation without a device and normal upper and lower extremity bulk. Further,
despite Kulkarni’s findings, as noted per Dr. Von Bargen, the claimant denied
depression and the claimant also denied the [sic] depression and anxiety at
hearing. Further, Von Bargen found a pain disorder unlike Dr. Kulkarni. The
claimant, at hearing, reported only three seizures since early 2014 and denied antiseizure meds for the previous 7 years. The claimant denied lupus was an issue for
her. These many factors significantly undermine any weight that could have been
accorded to Dr. Kulkarni’s opinion. Little weight is assigned to Kulkarni’s
medical source statement for these many reasons. Further, the functional capacity
evaluation from September 2014 . . . is not supported by the many normal
objective findings noted above, and diagnostic testing and so is accorded little
weight. That functional capacity evaluation assessment was that the claimant was
not able to work even part-time, that she was only occasionally able to sit, that she
was able to stand or walk for only a few minutes at a time, and that she was not
able to lift, push, carry, pull, or reach at all . . . . Such limitations are rather
extreme in nature and not consistent with the claimant’s reported ability to care
for her personal needs, drive, fold laundry, or shop; nor are they consistent with
her being the sole adult in her household and not seeking any mental health
treatment. Further undermining the persuasiveness of Dr. Kulkarni are the
unexplained inconsistencies in his opinions from October 2014 to February 2015.
His opinions and the functional capacity evaluation assessment are also not
supported by the claimant’s lack of muscle atrophy and lack of significant deficits
in muscle strength, sensation, grip strength, and fine finger manipulative ability.
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Little weight is assigned to [Dr. Kulkarni’s] assessments and opinions.
ALJ’s Decision (Tr., pp. 34-35). The long and short of it is that the ALJ found Dr. Kulkarni’s
opinions concerning Carnahan’s physical impairments and limitations to be inconsistent with
(and therefore unsupported by) the rest of the medical evidence. The ALJ did not “discard” Dr.
Kulkarni’s opinions, and even acknowledged that Carnahan suffered from many of the physical
impairments described in those opinions (as discussed below), but concluded that they were not
“persuasive” in light of the rest of the medical evidence, which supported a finding that Carnahan
was able to perform a range of light duty jobs. In addition, it is important to note that the ALJ
based his determination not just on the opinions of the non-treating physicians, but also on the
testimony of a vocational expert. The ALJ specifically acknowledged that Carnahan’s “ability to
perform all or substantially all of the requirements of [the full range of light work] has been
impeded by additional limitations.” Tr., p. 36. So, “[t]o determine the extent to which these
limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base, the [ALJ] asked the vocational expert
whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with [Carnahan’s] age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity. The vocational expert testified that, given all
of these factors, the individual would be able to perform the requirements of representative
unskilled occupations such as an office helper . . . , mail clerk . . . , and router.” Id. The ALJ
wrote that “[b]ased on the testimony of the vocational expert the undersigned concludes that,
considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the
claimant is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. A finding of ‘not disabled’ is therefore appropriate[.]” Id.

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At the risk of being redundant, it bears noting again that this Court’s task is to determine
whether the ALJ’s decision on this issue is supported by substantial evidence and, more
specifically, whether his written decision “provide[s] a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and
his conclusions.” O’Connor-Spinner, 627 F.3d at 618. This Court is expressly prohibited from
“reconsider[ing] facts, re-weigh[ing] the evidence, resolv[ing] conflicts in evidence, decid[ing]
questions of credibility, or substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the ALJ[,]” Visinaiz v. Berryhill,
243 F.Supp.3d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Ind. 2017). The ALJ accorded less weight to Dr. Kulkarni’s
opinion after determining that the weight of the evidence as a whole, including the opinions of
two non-treating physicians, the testimony of a vocational expert, and Carnahan’s own testimony,
was supportive of and consistent with his conclusion that Carnahan is capable of performing light
duty work.
Carnahan’s challenge is simply that the ALJ committed an error of law by not assigning
controlling weight to her treating physician’s opinion. She claims that since there is objective
medical evidence that confirms many of her complaints (in the form of x-rays, MRIs and exams),
Dr. Kulkarni’s opinion that she is unable to perform even light duty work is “based on
appropriate medical findings and uncontradicted by other substantial evidence in the record.”
Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 10. But this is a conclusion, not an argument. While it is true (and
undisputed) that some of Dr. Kulkarni’s conclusions are supported by other medical evidence, at
least with respect to some of her impairments, such as the degenerative problems in her neck and
spine, the ALJ specifically noted those opinions and considered Dr. Kulkarni’s findings when
calculating Carnahan’s residual functional capacity. See ALR’s Decision (Tr., pp. 29-31).
Carnahan’s argument implies that since Dr. Kulkarni’s findings were not completely or wholly
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contradicted by other medical evidence, his opinion should have been accorded controlling
weight–a legal conclusion for which Carnahan cites no authority. Carnahan’s argument–that her
treating physician’s opinion concerning her level of impairment should have been given
controlling weight since it wasn’t rendered complete bunk by other evidence–is not supported by
the facts of this case or the law.
Carnahan’s argument is based on the general principle, stated in Scrogham, that an ALJ
should give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician over those of non-treating
physicians, but it ignores the fact that an ALJ has the discretion–and indeed the obligation–to
accord less weight to that opinion if he concludes that it is inconsistent with or contradicted by
the rest of the medical evidence. As the Commissioner notes, “the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly
found that the opinions of State agency doctors may outweigh those of treating physicians when
supported by substantial evidence.” Commissioner’s Response, p. 7 (citing Ketelboeter v. Astrue,
550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008) and Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[a]n ALJ . . . may discount a treating physician’s medical opinion if it the opinion ‘is
inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician or when the treating physician’s opinion
is internally inconsistent, as long as he minimally articulates his reasons for crediting or rejecting
evidence of disability.’”)). In this case, that was the ALJ’s conclusion, and he explained his
reasoning in his decision, as discussed above. This Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to accord
less weight to Dr. Kulkarni’s opinions was supported by substantial evidence and therefore
affirms the ALJ’s decision on this issue.
II. ALJ’s assessment of Carnahan’s testimony.
Carnahan’s second challenge to the ALJ’s decision is her contention that the ALJ “failed
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to properly evaluate Ms. Carnahan’s testimony.” Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 11. Carnahan acknowledges
that “[a] claimant must provide both subjective testimony and objective medical evidence to
qualify for disability insurance benefits for allegations of disabling pain.” Id., pp. 11-12 (citing
Moothart v. Bowen, 934 F.2d 114, 117 (7th Cir. 1991)). Carnahan notes that “[t]he ALJ here
conceded Ms. Carnahan’s ‘medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause some of the alleged symptoms’ but found her statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms ‘not entirely consistent with the medical and
other evidence of record[.]” Id., p. 12 (quoting Tr., pp. 24-25). Carnahan seizes on the phrase
“not entirely consistent” and argues that “[t]he ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Carnahan’s statements
must be ‘entirely consistent’ with all other evidence in the record to be credited . . . is not an
accurate recitation of the law, as 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and § 416.929 require[] the ALJ to
evaluate the validity of a claimant’s statements against the entire record even when he finds the
statements are not supported by objective medical findings.” Id. And, argues Carnahan, “[t]he
Seventh Circuit has . . . repeatedly held ‘complaints of severe pain . . . need not be confirmed by
diagnostic tests.’” Id. (quoting Engstrand v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Carnahan argues that “the fact that particular objective evidence did not explain all of Ms.
Carnahan’s subjective statements is not reason to discount them.” Id., p. 14.
Once again, Carnahan’s argument does not carry the day, because once again she ignores
the proverbial other side of the coin. While it is true, as Carnahan states, that a disability
claimant’s subjective testimony regarding her level of pain does not have to be “entirely
consistent” with the objective medical evidence and should not necessarily be discounted if it’s
not, it is also well established–as the Seventh Circuit explained in Engstrand–that the courts
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must “defer to an ALJ’s credibility finding that is not patently wrong, Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d
645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015), [and] an ALJ still must competently explain an adverse-credibility
finding with specific reasons ‘supported by the record,’ Minnick [v. Colvin], 775 F.3d [929,] 937
[7th Cir. 2015]. ‘An erroneous credibility finding requires remand unless the claimant’s
testimony is incredible on its face or the ALJ explains that the decision did not depend on the
credibility finding.’ Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 2014).” Engstrand, 788 F.3d
at 660.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not discount Carnahan’s testimony only
because it was not “entirely consistent” with the objective medical evidence nor because he
found her testimony to be “incredible on its face.” Rather, according to the Commissioner, he
considered her testimony in light of the record as a whole and then concluded that her testimony
regarding her pain level and its alleged disabling effects was not completely credible. The
Commissioner points to specific findings and conclusions by the ALJ to support this argument
and explains as follows:
Spanning three pages, the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s subjective allegations
initially found that some of Plaintiff’s allegations were supported by the objective
evidence (Tr. 24-26). The ALJ pointed out that her obesity, neck and back pain,
and positive examination findings supported her claims of limitations in lifting,
sitting, standing, and walking (Tr. 24). Upon closer inspection, however, the ALJ
noted that generally mild MRI findings coupled with many negative examination
findings did not support her allegations of disabling symptomatology to the degree
alleged (Tr. 25). Likewise, the remainder of her complaints pertaining to migraine
headaches and other impairments were not corroborated by her complaints to
physicians, and appeared at most as intermittent, non-continuous, and non-lasting
(Tr. 25-26). So while the ALJ credited many of Plaintiff’s symptoms, he did not
find her incapable of performing a reduced range of light work (Tr. 23).
Commissioner’s Response, pp. 8-9.

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A claimant challenging an ALJ’s credibility determination faces an almost Sisyphean
burden. The Seventh Circuit, addressing this specific issue, explained as follows:
. . . Social Security Ruling 96-7p . . . governs the assessment of an applicant’s
credibility. “Because the ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses, we will
not disturb [his] credibility determinations as long as they find some support in
the record.” Dixon [v. Massanari], 270 F.3d [1171,] 1178-79 [7th Cir. 2001].
Accordingly, “‘[w]e will reverse an ALJ’s credibility determination only if the
claimant can show it was patently wrong.’” Jens [v. Barnhart], 347 F.3d [209,]
213 [7th Cir. 2003] (quoting Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007). In Schmidt, a case that is on point in many
respects,2 the plaintiff challenged an ALJ’s conclusion that her testimony concerning her pain
level was not credible because it was not supported by the objective medical evidence. The
district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, as did the Seventh Circuit, which explained as
follows:
Here, contrary to Schmidt’s assertions, the ALJ specifically stated in his opinion
that he considered Schmidt’s testimony and the entire records under Social
Security Ruling 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ then summarized
Schmidt’s testimony, in particular her assertions of pain and the limitations she
claimed as a result of her impairments. After discussing Schmidt’s testimony and
the medical evidence in the record, the ALJ stated that Schmidt’s “allegations of
disabling pain and incapacitating limitations [were] not consistent with or
supported by the objective medical record of treating and examining physicians,”
in addition to reiterating that “the objective findings do not support the level of
chronic pain asserted by [Schmidt].” These conclusions were supported by
evidence in the medical record indicating that Schmidt regularly exhibited normal
2

Ms. Schmidt also challenged the ALJ’s decision not to give controlling weight to her
treating physicians’ opinions, which indicated that she was unable to perform even sedentary
work. Instead, the ALJ discounted those opinions after concluding that they were inconsistent
with objective medical evidence. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ALJ
on this issue also, holding that “the ALJ provided an adequate explanation of his decision not to
give controlling weight to [the treating physicians’] opinions[]” and that “the ALJ’s decision not
to accord controlling weight to [the treating physicians’] opinions was reasonable and that the
ALJ sufficiently articulated the reasons for his decision.” Schmidt, 496 F.3d at 842, 844.
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neurological findings, strength, reflexes, and sensation. In short, the diagnostic
evidence in Schmidt’s medical records conflicts with testimony and claims of
disabling pain. Further, Schmidt’s medical history indicates that she voluntarily
discontinued physical therapy and declined to pursue pain management, both of
which cast doubt on the severity of Schmidt’s pain and her need to alleviate it.
The ALJ also noted that while Schmidt claimed in her brief that her daily
activities were “minimal,” the record indicated that she engaged in significant
daily activities, including working part-time as a bookkeeper, attending college
classes, spending time with her granddaughter, babysitting, performing household
chores, preparing meals, taking vacations, socializing with family and friends,
driving, and reading. Finally, the ALJ did not totally discount Schmidt’s testimony
regarding how her pain affected her ability to perform certain activities, as evinced
by the ALJ’s decision to limit Schmidt’s range of work to sedentary when
assessing her residual functional capacity. Accordingly, we find that the ALJ
provided sufficient reasons for his finding that Schmidt’s allegations regarding her
limitations were not fully credible, and we will not disturb those findings.
Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d at 843-44.
The result is the same in the present case. The ALJ considered the record in its entirety,
acknowledged that the medical evidence supported many of Carnahan’s complaints, made a
credibility determination about Carnahan’s testimony in light of the rest of the evidence, and
ultimately concluded–based on his review of the entire record–that Carnahan’s impairments do
not preclude her from a wide range of light duty work. The ALJ explained in his decision that
“[i]n making this finding [of non-entitlement to benefits] the undersigned has considered all
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with
the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 and 416.929 and SSR 96-4p. The undersigned has also considered opinion evidence in
accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 416.927 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p,
96-6p and 06-3p.” Tr., p. 29. But the ALJ did not just recite the applicable standard of review and
then render his decision. He elaborated as follows:

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After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
cause some of the alleged symptoms. The record reflects that the claimant’s mass
body index has ranged from about 31 to 38 since the amended alleged onset date.
Thus, she is severely obese. In addition, she suffers from nonconvulsive seizures
and migraines, for which she has taken various medications . . . . She also suffers
from a severe chronic pain disorder. Furthermore, she has neck and back pain and
the record contains imaging study evidence (including x-rays in December 2013
and MRI studies done in November 2013 and March 2015) of abnormalities in her
cervical and lumbar spine[.] . . . She has undergone lumbar spine surgery (prior to
the alleged onset date), received physical therapy, used a heating pad, received
numerous steroid injections . . . , had L1-3 and C4-7 medial branch blocks,
undergone C4-7 medial branch radiofrequency ablation, seen a pain specialist
frequently, is being considered for a spinal cord stimulator, and has taken various
types and dosages of medications[.]”
Tr., p. 30 (italics added). Then, the ALJ addresses the issue of Carnahan’s credibility:
However, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical and
other evidence of record. The record reflects that, since the amended alleged onset
date, the claimant’s physical examination findings have been largely within
normal limits, except for obesity . . . , decreased reflexes in her upper and lower
extremities, tenderness over her left sternocleidomastoid and trapezius muscles,
decreased range of motion in her neck and back, mild head tremor, cranial and
TMJ tenderness, tenderness over her neck and back, positive Spurling’s, positive
SLR, an antalgic gait at times, positive FABER, and muscle spasms in her next.
She has not exhibited any muscle atrophy or deficits in sensation, grip strength or
fine finger manipulative ability and her muscle strength in her extremities was
graded, at worst, a “4” out of “5[.]”
Id., p. 31. The ALJ went on to discuss many more details of Carnahan’s complaints and the
objective medical evidence (see id., pp. 31-34), which need not be repeated now. What is
determinative is that the ALJ in this case heard and considered Carnahan’s testimony in the
context of the entire record, as he is obligated to do, and made a credibility determination
regarding that testimony, as he is also obligated to do, and then explained his reason for
discounting part of that testimony (which just happened to be the part when Carnahan testified as

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to the severity and disabling nature of her symptoms). Carnahan is understandably upset that the
ALJ didn’t “entirely” believe her testimony, given that she was denied benefits in part for that
reason. But the ALJ did what he was supposed to do and explained his reasoning thoroughly.
Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ on this issue is affirmed.
In this case the ALJ, in accordance with his duty, made his findings and conclusions after
reviewing the objective medical evidence, considering the subjective testimony of the claimant,
and considering the testimony of a vocational expert. Most importantly, he applied the proper
standards of review and based his conclusions on substantial evidence–as he explained in careful
detail in his decision.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying
the award of benefits to the Plaintiff is AFFIRMED.

Date: November 6, 2017.
/s/ William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Indiana

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