Thrivent Financial v. Gonzalez, individually and as representative of The Estate of David L. Boon et al

Filing 110

OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES, WITH LEAVE TO REFILE the 49 Motion for Summary Judgment by 5/7/2018; DENIES AS MOOT the 85 Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike; INSTRUCTS the parties not to file further Rule 56 Motions to Strike in conjunction with the instant briefing; DIRECTS the Clerk to DEPOSIT check number K128135 in an interesting bearing account; and GRANTS LEAVE to any party to object to the deposit funds by Thrivent by 4/16/2018. Court to address 109 STIPULATION to Dismiss by separate order at a later date. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 4/6/2018. (jjj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
THRIVENT FINANCIAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SARAH GONZALEZ, individually and
as Representative of THE ESTATE OF
DAVID L. BOON, RAJAT K.
CHOWDHURY, ADAM BOON,
MARISSA BOON, and PAMELA C.
BOON,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-144-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court in interpleader and on several filings, including a
Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 49] and a Motion to Strike [ECF No. 85] filed by
Claimant Sarah Gonzalez. Thrivent Financial, the Plaintiff-in-Interpleader, also attempted to
deposit a check with the Clerk of the Court [ECF No. 108]. These issues have been briefed by
the parties, and the Court will review each in turn.

BACKGROUND
The instant case can be summarized as follows. David L. Boon purchased a life insurance
policy through his employer, Vision Lighting Corporation. The death benefits total $500,000.
His employer was a small company that he ran with the help of a business partner named Rajat
Chowdhury. Throughout Boon’s life, and in accordance with the policy, he changed the
beneficiary of the policy. The premiums under the policy were paid, at least in part, by Vision
Lighting. On January 1, 2017, Boon passed away. At the time of his death, Boone’s estate was

the named beneficiary of the policy. Sarah Gonzalez, Boon’s daughter, is the administrator of
Boon’s estate. She tried to collect on the policy from Thrivent Financial, the policy issuer.
Chowdhury objected, claiming that he and Boon had a buy/sell agreement which entitled him to
$150,000 of the death benefits. At various times, Chowdhury was a named beneficiary of the
policy. He notified Thrivent of his competing claim, and Thrivent conducted its own
investigation of Chowdhury’s claim. Afterwards, Thrivent initiated this interpleader action in
federal court in an attempt to avoid double liability from the estate’s and Chowdhury’s
competing claims. Gonzalez did not believe that Thrivent adequately investigated the viability of
Chowdhury’s claim, and argued that the interpleader action was done prematurely and in bad
faith. Thrivent has indicated that it has settled with Gonzalez, and it deposited a check for
$480,000 with the Clerk of this Court. Gonzalez and Chowdhury continue to dispute each other’s
claim to the death benefits.

DISCUSSION
A.

Interpleader Review
A stakeholder may bring a suit in interpleader in federal court through two different

mechanisms. First, the party may proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, also known as Statutory
Interpleader. Alternatively, the party may proceed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22, also
known as Rule Interpleader. These two methods have different requirements, which will be
discussed in turn. As discussed below, the instant case can proceed only under Rule 22.

2

1.

Statutory Interpleader
District courts have original jurisdiction over interpleader claims where (1) a stakeholder

has some instrument of value greater than or equal to $500, and (2) there is “minimal diversity”
between two or more adverse claimants. 28 U.S.C. § 1335; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967). “The citizenship of the stakeholder is irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes in statutory-interpleader actions.” 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1703 (3d ed.). In this case, the stakeholder is a Wisconsin
citizen for diversity purposes, and all adverse claimants are Indiana citizens. Hence, there is no
diversity of citizenship between the adverse claimants. Therefore, this case cannot be maintained
under 28 U.S.C. § 1335.

2.

Rule Interpleader
A party can also bring an interpleader claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22.

Unlike § 1335, Rule 22 is merely a procedural device and does not provide its own basis for
subject matter jurisdiction. Aaron v. Mahl, 550 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Officer v.
Chase Ins. Life & Annuity Co., 541 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2008)). The plaintiff, therefore, must
provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction to initiate a suit in interpleader under
Rule 22. See Mahl, 550 F.3d at 662. Additionally, unlike Statutory Interpleader, Rule
Interpleader does not require a deposit to establish jurisdiction. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v.
Barton, 250 F.R.D. 388, 389 (S.D. Ill. 2008) (citing In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
“Erisa” Litig., 391 F. Supp. 2d 541, 560 (S.D. Tex. 2005)).
In this case, the Plaintiff contends that the Court has federal question jurisdiction because
the death benefits at issue are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

3

The Court agrees. Thrivent alleges that the decedent’s employer paid premiums to his life
insurance policy and that Thrivent is a fiduciary for the purposes of making claim determinations
under the life insurance policy. This is sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. See
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Matula, No. 05-C-0788, 2007 WL 1029527, at *12 (E.D. Wis.
Mar. 30, 2007) (collecting cases of “numerous courts [that] have found that subject matter
jurisdiction exists under § 1132(e) over interpleader suits brought by insurance companies,
acting as fiduciaries, to determine which competing beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds”).
However, the parties have not briefed the Court on important considerations in the
summary judgment briefing. For example, ERISA-plans present preemption concerns. See, e.g.,
Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Miscevic, 880 F.3d 927, 932–34 (7th Cir. 2018) (ERISA does not
preempt Illinois slayer statute); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 565–66 (7th Cir.
2002) (ERISA preempts state law doctrine of substantial compliance). Additionally, where
federal law provides the rule of decision, state dead-man statutes do not apply. Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.554, 556 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to apply a state dead-man statute to
evidence in a life insurance policy lawsuit governed by ERISA because the Federal Rules of
Evidence, not state evidentiary rules, determine admissibility of evidence for claims based on
federal law); see also Fed. R. Evid. 601.
This case illustrates one reason why the type of subject matter jurisdiction matters to the
ultimate resolution of a case. For example, Gonzalez filed a Motion to Strike an affidavit on the
basis that Chowdhury cannot testify as to the buy/sell agreement because of the Indiana DeadMan’s Statute. But, as explained above, the Indiana Dead-Man’s Statute does not apply in this
case because federal law governs. Similarly, Chowdhury appears to argue that he is owed
$150,000 of the death benefits based on an oral contract between him and Boon. But neither

4

party advised whether, as a matter of ERISA federal common law, Boon substantially complied
with ERISA’s change of beneficiary requirements or whether the alleged oral contract has any
bearing on the change in beneficiary analysis. These issues are necessary to the Court’s ultimate
resolution of the issues, but the parties have not adequately briefed the Court on the same. The
briefing includes little authority, and the parties largely support their arguments with state law.
As such, the Court will order further briefing on these issues. Sarah Gonzalez may file an
amended motion for summary judgment by May 7, 2018. Any response and subsequent reply
must conform to the local rules. The parties should refrain from filing additional motions to
strike under Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory comm.’s note to 2010 amendment (“There
is no need to make a separate motion to strike.”). Instead, the parties should raise any concerns
regarding the admissibility of evidence in their summary judgment briefing.

B.

Deposit to the Clerk of the Court
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67 governs deposits into federal courts. Rule 67(a)

provides that:
If any part of the relief sought is a money judgment or the disposition of a sum of
money or some other deliverable thing, a party—on notice to every other party and
by leave of court—may deposit with the court all or part of the money or thing,
whether or not that party claims any of it. The depositing party must deliver to the
clerk a copy of the order permitting deposit.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 67(a). Upon receipt by the clerk, “[t]he money must be deposited in an interestbearing account or invested in a court-approved, interest-bearing instrument.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
67(b). In this case, the parties have notified the Court of a potential settlement between Thrivent
and Gonzalez. (See ECF No. 105, Notice of Partial Case Resolution as to Thrivent Financial). On
March 28, 2018, Thrivent mailed a check for $480,000 to the Clerk of the Court. (See ECF No.

5

108, Receipt.) On April 5, 2018, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal of Thrivent Financial
[ECF No. 109]. Based on the Notice, the Receipt, and the Stipulation, the Court has discerned
that Thrivent notified all parties of its intent to deposit the stake with the Clerk of the Court, and
that the parties wish to proceed after the stake has been deposited. As such, the Court directs the
Clerk of the Court to deposit the funds in an interest bearing account. Any objections to the
deposit must be filed by April 16, 2018. The Court will issue a separate order regarding the
Stipulation of Dismissal [ECF No. 109] at a later date.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court:


DENIES, WITH LEAVE TO REFILE by May 7, 2018, Sarah Gonzalez’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 49];



DENIES AS MOOT Sarah Gonzalez’s Motion to Strike [ECF No. 85];



INSTRUCTS the parties not to file further Rule 56 Motions to Strike in conjunction with
the instant briefing;



DIRECTS the Clerk to DEPOSIT check number K128135 in an interesting bearing
account; and



GRANTS LEAVE to any party to object to the deposit funds by Thrivent by April 16,
2018.
SO ORDERED on April 6, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6