Moore v. FWCS South Transportation

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 25 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the defendant and close the case ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 8/28/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
APRIL L. MOORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
FWCS SOUTH TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

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CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-266-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff April L. Moore, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against
Defendant FWCS South Transportation on June 26, 2017. In the Complaint, she alleged that she
was fired from her position with the Defendant because of her race, in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (Title VII). On June 18, 2018, the
Defendant moved for summary judgment [ECF No. 25], and provided notice of the same to the
Plaintiff [ECF No. 28]. The Plaintiff did not respond, and instead moved the Court for the
appointment of counsel [ECF No. 30] on July 23, 2018. The Court denied the motion on July 27,
2018 [ECF No. 31]. As of the date of this Opinion and Order, the Plaintiff has not responded to
the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff is an African-American woman, who worked as a bus assistant for the Fort
Wayne Community Schools (FWCS) prior to her termination. Bus assistants at FWCS are
typically assigned to special needs buses. They also ride with students who have Individual
Education Plans or Behavioral Intervention Plans. These students often have mental or emotional

issues, which can lead to disruptive behavior. Transportation management has found that an
aggressive approach is often ineffective when these special needs students are verbally disruptive
on the bus. Thus, bus assistants are discouraged from taking aggressive, confrontational
approaches to resolve disruptive behavior. Instead, whenever possible, de-escalation techniques
are preferred.
FWCS has established Bus Assistant Responsibilities and Guidelines. The Guidelines
outline many of the basic expectations for bus assistants. These expectations note, among other
things, that:
The first priority of the Bus Assistant is the safety of all students. Nothing should
compromise this priority. . . . The transportation of special needs . . . students is a
highly personal service and requires a thorough assessment of the student’s
physical, social, emotional and intellectual capacities. Mutual respect . . . [is] an
absolute necessity. . . . Bus Assistants are to work with students in a positive and
professional manner. Whether you realize it or not, you serve as a role model for
each of your students. Situations will arise to test your patience, but you must
conduct yourself in a professional manner at all times. . . . Be diplomatic at all times
to students, parents, and others. Language that is demeaning or belittling to a
student should not be used in any conversation. An argumentative response to
comments should be avoided and great care should be used to remain composed.
Confrontation by word or action will only escalate the opportunity for negative
responses.
(Ex. A, ECF No. 25-1.) Additionally, all FWCS employees are bound by the FWCS policy on
corporal punishment, which provides that “the School Board does not condone the use of
unreasonable force and fear as an appropriate procedure in student discipline.” (Jackson Decl.
¶ 10, ECF No. 25-1). Employees are also subject to the Code of Ethics, which requires them to
“[m]ake the well-being of students the fundamental value in all decision-making and actions,”
and “[d]emonstrate commitment to [their] role as educational leaders and role models through
[their] language . . . and behavior.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Finally, the Plaintiff, as a classified employee,

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was also prohibited from making “[a]ny statement, action, or conduct not in the best interests of
the school corporation.” (Id. at ¶ 12.)
The Defendant also presented evidence that transportation department employees receive
training that is consistent with these expectations. For instance, they are taught that the use of
force against a student is only appropriate where a child is a danger to himself or others. (Id. at
¶ 13–14.) Employees are also taught to use de-escalation techniques when a student becomes
unruly. (Id. at ¶ 15.) In her deposition, the Plaintiff acknowledged the appropriate course of
action when confronted with a disruptive student is de-escalation. (Moore Dep. 48:1–5.) She also
acknowledged that this is especially true for students with mental or emotional issues. (Id. at
48:6–9.)
In the fall of 2016, the Plaintiff worked as a bus assistance on buses that carried special
education students, many of whom had mental or emotional problems. On October 18, 2016, the
Plaintiff was working an afternoon route on Bus #227. There were a few elementary students on
the bus at that time. One of the students, referred to as “B.” by the Defendant, was approximately
nine years old at the time of the ride. The Plaintiff knew B., and was aware that B. was a special
education student with mental and emotional issues.
That day B. was disruptive on the bus. During the course of the ride, B. stood up after he
was accused of kicking a student who was walking down the bus aisle. B. then made a scene.
The driver asked the Plaintiff to intervene, but initially the Plaintiff remained in her seat and
indicated to the driver that the driver should handle it herself. However, shortly afterward the
Plaintiff told B. to sit down. Rather than sit down, B. began to yell at the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff
then responded by standing up, approaching B., and yelling at him to sit down. When she
reached B., the Plaintiff grabbed him and wrestled him into his seat.

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Thereafter, and for the next several minutes, the Plaintiff tangled with B. She held his
arms, and used her body to wedge him inside the wall of the bus. At times, she also pinned B. to
his seat using her arm against his upper chest and neck. Throughout, B. protested, cried, and
begged to be released. Despite these pleas, the Plaintiff continued to restrain him. At one point,
the driver asked the Plaintiff if she wanted a mobile unit to assist.1 She declined.
Other students on the bus became disruptive, too. One student, referencing B., shouted,
“Kill him! Kill him! Kill him!” Another made some remark, to which the Plaintiff responded
with a threat to impose a five day suspension. Throughout the incident, and thereafter, the
Plaintiff made numerous loud and angry remarks to B. Towards the end of the incident, the
Plaintiff told the driver to “burn rubber” to get B. home. She also declared that she was going to
press charges against B. The entire encounter was captured on the bus’s video recording system.
(See ECF No. 27.)
After the incident, the Plaintiff reported to transportation management that B. had pulled
her hair. To verify this account, the Supervisor of Driver Operations reviewed the video from the
bus. The Director of Transportation did too. After reviewing the video, they concluded that the
Plaintiff used improper force against B. They consulted a human resources (HR) employee who
agreed with their conclusion. As a result, the Plaintiff was suspended on October 19, 2016, one
day after the incident.
On October 27, 2016, the Director and HR employee met with the Plaintiff and her union
representative. They asked the Plaintiff to review the video and provide her side of the story. The
HR employee felt that the Plaintiff did not satisfactorily explain her behavior in the video. After
the meeting, the Supervisor, HR employee, Director of Transportation, and the Director of South

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A mobile unit is a school resource officer or police officer who meets the bus en route to deal with a
disruptive student.
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Transportation unanimously concluded that the Plaintiff used improper force against the student,
and that she should be terminated. Thereafter, the Plaintiff was recommended for termination on
November 11, 2016. Although the Plaintiff wanted her union to challenge the recommendation,
the Plaintiff’s union refused to assist her. The FWCS Board of School Trustees then approved
the Plaintiff’s termination.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary
judgment is the moment in litigation where the non-moving party is required to marshal and
present the court with evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely to find in his favor.
Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Although facts and
reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party, this does not extend to
inferences supported only by speculation or conjecture. Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 533
(7th Cir. 2010). Material facts are those that are outcome determinative under the applicable law.
Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to . . . discharge any individual . . .
because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Seventh Circuit follows the
McDonell Douglas framework for analyzing Title VII claims on summary judgment. See David
v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017). Under this
framework, the Plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination by:
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[E]stablishing that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she performed
reasonably on the job in accord with her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3)
despite her reasonable performance, she was subjected to an adverse employment
action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were
treated more favorably by the employer.
Id. at 225 (quoting Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014)) (internal
quotation marks and alternations omitted). When a plaintiff meets this burden, then a defendant
must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action[.]” Id.
(citing Andrews, 743 F.3d at 234). The plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the
defendant’s given reason is pretextual. Id.
In this case, the Plaintiff has not made a prima facie case of discrimination. She has not
presented any evidence that (a) she performed reasonably on the job in accordance with her
employer’s legitimate expectations, and that (b) similarly situated employees outside of her
protected class were treated more favorably by the employer. In fact, the Defendant has put forth
evidence showing that multiple employees outside of the Plaintiff’s protected class were
similarly disciplined for similar behavior towards students. The Defendant also asserts, and puts
forth evidence documenting the same, that the Plaintiff was terminated because she did not
perform her job reasonably in accordance with the Defendant’s legitimate expectations, which
are provided by the Bus Assistant Responsibilities and Guidelines and the Defendant’s policy on
corporal punishment. The Defendant presented evidence that the Plaintiff violated both the
Guidelines and the policy.
The Plaintiff’s primary argument, put forth the Complaint, is that the school district knew
that the bus she was on at the time of the incident was disruptive, but that the school district did
nothing about it until after the incident. That is not an adequate basis for a claim of racial
discrimination in employment. The Plaintiff also acknowledged in her deposition that she has no

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evidence to show that the Defendant’s stated rationale for her termination was pretextual. (Moore
Dep. 179:22–180:23, ECF No. 25-1.)
Therefore, the Plaintiff has not met her burden to make a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination in employment under Title VII. Additionally, even if she had, the Defendant has
provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Plaintiff’s termination, and the Plaintiff
has no evidence that the decision was pretextual. Accordingly, no genuine issues of material fact
remain for trial, and the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 25]. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for the Defendant, and
close the case.
SO ORDERED on August 28, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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