Stewart v. Ravenscroft Beauty College et al

Filing 3

OPINION AND ORDER: The court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the 1 Complaint, and DENIES the Plaintiff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff until 10/6/2017, to file an amended complaint, accompanied by a new Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or the filing fee. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 8/28/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(jss)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TYQUAN STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAVENSCROFT BEAUTY
COLLEGE et al.
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-274-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Tyquan Stewart’s Motion to Proceed in forma
pauperis [ECF No. 2], filed June 29, 2017. The Plaintiff filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against
Defendants Ravenscroft Beauty College and Magdalene (an employee or owner) alleging that the
Defendants denied him the opportunity to attend the vocational school. For the reasons set forth
below, the Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED, and the Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their
inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations: first,
whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1);
and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court,
without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to
pay such fees or give security therefor.” Id. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff’s Motion establishes
that he is unable to prepay the filing fee.
But the inquiry does not end there. District courts have the power under § 1915(e)(2)(B)
to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on the defendants, and must dismiss
the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts
apply the same standard under § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014,
1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013).
To state a claim under the federal notice pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations are accepted as true and need only give “fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d
773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
However, a plaintiff’s allegations must show that his entitlement to relief is plausible, rather than
merely speculative. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Plaintiff alleges that “[b]etween the months of” October 2015 and November 2015,
the Plaintiff “attempted to start” school at Ravenscroft Beauty College. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.)
The Plaintiff alleges that he spoke with an individual named Magdalene and informed her that he
was recently released from prison and suffered from mental illness. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges

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that Magdalene became defensive and started yelling that she knew a police officer “who would
inform her on who she should let in her school.” (Id.) The Plaintiff further alleges that “she told
[him] about a young man who applied and because of this police officer she didn’t let him in”
and that “she treated [him] different[ly] because of [his] mental illness.” (Id.) The Plaintiff
alleges that “Magdalene made numerous appointments for [him] to start[,] only to send [him]
away after [his] arrival.” (Id.)
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.
(Id.) The Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this violation, he attempted suicide. (Id.) He seeks
damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress. (Id. at 2.)
First, the Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the ADA. The Plaintiff has not set forth
factual allegations that show that the school admissions application or application process
discriminated against him or failed to accommodate him because of his alleged disability. See
generally, Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL
680000, at *6–13 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996). Furthermore, the Plaintiff does not make a showing
that he applied to Ravenscroft, and was thereafter rejected. Here, the Plaintiff merely alleges that
he “attempted to start school” at Ravenscroft and had numerous appointments to start, which
were canceled when he arrived.
Liberally construing the Plaintiff’s Complaint, even if he had been accepted, the Plaintiff
also does not show that he paid tuition to attend the school, or that he applied for, and received,
financial aid. If the Plaintiff had an appointment to start that was canceled, he would have been
required to apply and tender tuition. Because the Plaintiff hasn’t made a showing that his
application was rejected by the school, or that if his application was accepted, that he tendered

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tuition and was prohibited from attending class because of his mental illness, the Plaintiff has not
made a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint thus does not “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Kolbe & Kolbe Health &
Welfare Benefit Plan v. Med. Coll. of Wis. Inc., 657 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 2011). Even with the
relaxed standards that apply to pro se litigants, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
the Complaint does not set forth factual allegations that raise the Plaintiff’s right to relief above
the speculative level. Thus, the Plaintiff’s allegations do not give “fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Given the aforementioned, the Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees
is denied, and the Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court
grants the Plaintiff until October 6, 2017, to file an amended complaint. See Luevano, 722 F.3d
at 1022 (stating that a litigant proceeding under IFP statute has the same right to amend a
complaint as fee-paying plaintiffs have). When drafting his amended complaint, the Plaintiff
must state all of the key facts. Along with an amended complaint, the Plaintiff must also file a
new Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or pay the filing fee. If the
Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by October 6, 2017, the Court will direct the Clerk
of Court to close this case.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the
Complaint [ECF No. 1] and DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis [ECF No. 2]. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff until October 6, 2017, to file an

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amended complaint, accompanied by a new Petition to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and
Costs or the filing fee.

SO ORDERED on August 28, 2017.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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