Wadsley et al v. REV Recreation Group Inc
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by REV Recreation Group Inc and 33 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claims (Claims III, IV and V) of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint filed by REV Recreation Group Inc. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 3/19/2018. (lns)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DONNA WADSLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
REV RECREATION GROUP, INC,
Defendant.
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CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-339-TLS
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’
Complaint [ECF No. 11] for failure to state a claim, filed on October 10, 2017. The Plaintiffs
filed a Response [ECF No. 24] on November 21, 2017, as well as a Motion to Amend Complaint
[ECF No. 25]. On December 7, 2017, the Magistrate Judge granted [ECF No. 30] the Plaintiffs’
Motion to Amend, and an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 31] was filed into the record that same
day. Subsequently, on December 28, 2017, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint [ECF No. 33], to which the Plaintiffs responded on January 9,
2018 [ECF No. 35]. The Defendant filed a Reply on January 23, 2018. For the reasons discussed
below, the Court denies the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The basic factual allegations underlying the Amended Complaint are as follows: The
Plaintiffs purchased a 2016 American Coach Eagle 45 C recreational vehicle (“the RV”) built in
Indiana and sold in Michigan for $432,000 in October of 2016. Over the ensuing nine months,
the Plaintiffs discovered over two hundred defects in the RV. The Plaintiffs had the RV serviced
numerous times, but various authorized servicing dealers were unable to satisfactorily cure the
defects. The Plaintiffs notified the Defendant that they wanted their money back, but the
Defendant refused to refund them.
In their original Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege five causes of action: (1) breach of
warranty and/or contract, (2) violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, (3) violation of the
Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (“the IDCSA”), (4) product liability, and (5) negligence.
The Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss concerns the third and fourth causes of action. The
Defendant’s second Motion to Dismiss concerns the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action.
In support of their claim that the Defendant violated the IDCSA, the Plaintiffs allege that
“[m]ore than 30 days prior to the filing hereof, specifically in 2016 and 2017, Plaintiff gave
written notice to defendant of one or more abusive and/or unfair and/or deceptive and/or
unconscionable acts, omissions, or practices were committed by Defendant and which were and
remain uncured and/or were incurable.” (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Plaintiffs proceed to list seventeen of
these alleged acts. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Thus, the Plaintiffs allege, the Defendant “committed one or
more abusive and/or unfair and/or deceptive and/or unconscionable acts, omissions, or practices
in violation of applicable state Udap law(s), before, during or after a consumer transaction
between one or both Plaintiffs and a supplier in relation to [the RV].” (Id. at ¶ 40.) In response to
the Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to remove
references to “incurable” acts and to append copies of the relevant written warranty and the
written notices to the Defendant of the defects.
In support of their claim that the Defendant is liable under a theory of product liability,
the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant “designed, tested, manufactured, and assembled [the RV],
and placed it in the stream of commerce.” (Id. at ¶ 43.) The Plaintiffs allege that “[a] stationary
entry step and/or step system in Plaintiff’s [RV] was defective” and that “[o]n or about
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November 21, 2016, due to the defective manufacture . . . an interior entry step in Plaintiffs’
[RV] collapsed during Plaintiff Donna Wadsley’s normal and foreseeable use of the interior
entry step and/or step system, causing severe injury to Plaintiff Donna Wadsley.” (Id. at ¶¶ 44–
45.) The Plaintiffs further allege that the stationary interior entry step and/or step system (“the
defective step”) was defective at the time of manufacture and sale, that it was not intended to
collapse during normal use, that it was not reasonably safe, and that there was a feasible
alternative design available at the time of manufacture that would not have significantly impaired
the usefulness or desirability of the feature. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–49.) The Plaintiffs allege that the
Defendant owed foreseeable users and consumers a “duty of care to reasonably warn of an
unreasonable risk of harm associated with the intended use of [the RV],” that the Defendant
knew of the hazards of the defective step, that the Defendant “had no reason to believe that
foreseeable users and consumers, including Plaintiffs, would realize the dangerous condition,”
and that the Defendant “failed to use reasonable care to warn users or consumers, including
Plaintiffs, of the dangerous condition and unreasonable risk of harm associated with the interior
entry step and/or step system.” (Id. at ¶¶ 50–53.) Thus, as a direct and proximate result of the
defect, Plaintiff Donna Wadsley sustained “severe physical injuries.” (Id. at ¶ 54.) In response to
the Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to specify that
their product liability claim arose “under Indiana and/or Michigan and/or Delaware state law.”
(Amend. Compl. ¶ 42.)
In support of their claim that the Defendant is liable under a theory of negligence, the
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant breached its duty to (1) “reasonably warn of an unreasonable
risk of harm associated with the intended use of the [RV],” (2) “manufacture and distribute [the
RV] in a condition free from defects and suitable for its intended use and not unreasonably
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dangerous”, and (3) “utilize an alternative design for [the RV]” that would “not significantly
impair the usefulness or desirability of [the RV].” (Id. at ¶ 57.) The Plaintiffs claim that the
Defendant breached one or more of these duties and that said breach was the proximate cause of
Plaintiff Donna Wadsley’s injury. (Id. at ¶¶ 58–59.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the
factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Complaint need not contain detailed facts, but surviving a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion “requires more than labels and conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
ANALYSIS
The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case premised both upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, because the Plaintiffs have asserted a federal claim, and upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the citizenship of the parties is diverse—the
Defendant is a citizen of Indiana and the Plaintiffs are citizens of Maryland. As to the state law
claims, the Court “must apply the law of the state as it believes the highest court of the state
would apply it if the issues were presently before that tribunal.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2001). “When the state Supreme Court has not decided the
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issue, the rulings of the state intermediate appellate courts must be accorded great weight, unless
there are persuasive indications that the state’s highest court would decide the case differently.”
Id.
A.
The IDCSA
In its first Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff’s IDCSA
claims because (1) the Plaintiffs failed to allege a “consumer transaction” in Indiana, (2) the
Plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitations because they failed to show that the allegedly
deceptive acts were incurable or that they gave timely written notice to the Defendant, and (3)
the Plaintiffs failed to meet the required heightened pleading standard when alleging incurable
acts. The Defendant’s second and third arguments are moot in light of the Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint, in which they removed all references to “incurable acts” and attached documents in
support of the fact that they gave timely written notice to the Defendant. The only argument
asserted in the Defendant’s second Motion to Dismiss is that the Plaintiffs failed to adequately
allege a “consumer transaction” under the IDCSA.
The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege a “consumer transaction” in
Indiana because they are Maryland residents that participated in a Michigan transaction and are
therefore not protected by the statute. The Defendant argues that the purpose of the IDCSA is to
protect only Indiana residents, citing dicta from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See In re
Actiq Sales and Mktg. Practices Litig., 790 F. Supp. 2d 313, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting that the
IDCSA “was created to protect Indiana residents from the deceptive and unconscionable act and
practices of suppliers”).
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The Plaintiff responds that the IDCSA is to be “liberally construed and applied to promote
its purposes and policies.” Ind. Code. § 24-5-0.5-1(a). The IDCSA explicitly lays out its purposes:
The purposes and policies of this chapter are to:
(1) simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing deceptive and
unconscionable consumer sales practices;
(2) protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and
unconscionable sales acts; and
(3) encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices.
Ind. Code. § 24-5-0.5-1(b). The Court must construe the statute by looking to the plain and
ordinary meaning “unless the construction is plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or
of the context of the statute.” Ind. Code. § 1-1-4-1. Nowhere does the IDCSA explicitly limit its
application to Indiana residents. Moreover, the Plaintiffs argue, nowhere in the IDCSA is there a
requirement that the transaction at issue actually occur in Indiana.
The IDCSA defines “consumer transaction” as:
a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of
personal property, real property, a service, or an intangible . . . to a person for
purposes that are primarily personal, familial, charitable, agricultural, or household,
or a solicitation to supply any of these things.
Ind. Code. § 24-5-0.5-2(a).
The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. The Defendant has come forward with no authority
that a consumer transaction for the purposes of the IDCSA must actually occur in Indiana or that
only an Indiana resident may bring a claim under the IDCSA. Nor does the Court find that it
would be “plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature” to allow an out-of-state plaintiff who
engaged in an out-of-state purchase to bring a claim under the IDCSA. Rather, disallowing such
claims would not promote the IDCSA’s purpose of “encourag[ing] the development of fair
consumer sales practices” if Indiana suppliers were able to engage in deceptive practices so long
as the consumer was not an Indiana resident.
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Moreover, this Court has previously permitted similar claims to proceed. See Castagna v.
Newmar Corp., No. 3:15-CV-249, 2016 WL 3413770 (N.D. Ind. June 22, 2016) (denying motion
to dismiss claim where Florida resident purchased an RV manufactured by Indiana corporation);
Hoopes v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-365, 2014 WL 4829623 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29,
2014) (applying IDCSA where Ohio residents purchased an RV manufactured by an Indiana
corporation from a dealer in Ohio). In the instant case, the Plaintiffs have alleged that a
transaction occurred (the purchase of the RV) and that the alleged deceptive acts and/or
omissions related to the transaction are the fault of the Defendant, an Indiana manufacturer.
Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a “consumer transaction” within
the meaning of the IDCSA.
Therefore, the Court denies the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to the Plaintiffs’ claim
under the IDCSA.
B.
Product Liability and Negligence
In its first Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs’ claim for product
liability should be dismissed because the Plaintiffs failed to identify under which state statute the
Defendant is allegedly liable. The Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to state that they are
bringing their product liability claim under “Indiana and/or Michigan and/or Delaware law.” In
its second Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant maintains that this allegation is still too vague as it
does not point to any specific statute on which the Plaintiffs’ claims are founded, and the
Defendant is not required “to speculate under which state substantive law Plaintiffs are
premising their product liability and negligence claims[.]” (Def. 2d. Mot. to Dismiss 4.) The
Defendant makes the same argument as to the Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
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The Plaintiffs note that the Defendant does not allege that they have failed to plead
sufficient facts, but rather argues that the Plaintiffs are required to specifically state the law or
code applicable to their claim. However, “[f]ederal pleading requires only notice of one’s claim
and need not point to a specific statute.” Parnello v. Time Ins. Co., No. 91 C 20160, 1992 WL
184291, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 1992); see also Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 210-CV-279,
2011 WL 5408351, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2011) (finding that “[the plaintiff’s] failure to
identify the correct statute in her complaint is not fatal to her claim”); McDaniel v. Elgin, No.
209-CV-119, 2010 WL 339082, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2010) (noting that “[a] complaint need
not plead law or be tied to one legal theory”).
Moreover, parties are entitled to plead alternative, and even conflicting, theories in their
complaints. See Clevenger v. City of N. Webster Police Dept., 1:15-CV-337, 2016 WL 3537193,
at *7 (N.D. Ind. June 28, 2016) (finding that “a party is allowed to plead alternative theories of
relief, even if the theories are inconsistent”) (citing Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc. v. AB
Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 397 (7th Cir. 2003)). As the Plaintiffs point out, the Plaintiffs’ claims may
be governed under either Indiana, Michigan, or Delaware law because events related to the
Plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in all three states, and the parties have not briefed any choice of law
issues that may affect this case. 1 Pleading under the laws of three different states amounts to
nothing more than pleading three alternative theories.
Thus, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint gives the Defendant fair notice
regarding their products liability and negligence claims, and the Court will deny the Defendant’s
Motions to Dismiss.
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Neither party has argued which state’s law should apply, and the Court will not undergo a choice of law analysis at
this time because it is not relevant to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss [ECF
Nos. 11, 33].
SO ORDERED on March 19, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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