Hatch v. Indiana Department of Child Services et al

Filing 34

OPINOIN AND ORDER granting 17 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The Court finds that the circumstances of this case require abstention. Thereis an ongoing state court proceeding regarding the same issue, child custody and welfare is an important state interest, and the Plaintiffs constitutional claims have an adequate remedy in state court. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 4/5/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(mlc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DEANGELO L. HATCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILD SERVICES, et al.
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-357-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
DeAngelo L. Hatch, a Plaintiff proceeding pro se, filed an Amended Complaint on
October 2, 2017 [ECF No. 4], naming the Indiana Department of Child Services (IDCS), Jamie
Fletcher, and Chrystal Graham as Defendants. He also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in
forma pauperis [ECF No. 5]. On February 1, 2018, Defendants Fletcher and Graham filed a
Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 17] under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Plaintiff
has not responded and has not provided good cause as to why the Court should extend his time to
respond. (See ECF No. 29.) Therefore, this matter is ripe for review.

BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff alleged that the Indiana Department of Child Services and some of its
employees violated the Plaintiff’s rights by taking custody of his minor daughter from her
mother instead of transferring custody to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff alleged several causes of
action against the Defendants, which included violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court screened his Amended Complaint, see Rowe v.
Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999), and permitted him to proceed only against Defendants

Fletcher and Graham and only under the theory that they interfered with his Fourteenth
Amendment rights in violation of § 1983. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to “custody, care, and management of [his] daughter,” “to rear
[his] child without state interference,” and to due process of law. The Plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief in the form of the immediate return of his daughter to his custody.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.
2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although pro se complaints are to be liberally construed and are held
to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013), the factual allegations in the complaint must nevertheless
be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual
allegations are accepted as true at the pleading stage, but “allegations in the form of legal
conclusions are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (internal
citations omitted).

ANALYSIS
The Defendants argue that the Court should abstain from hearing this case pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The basic principle of the

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Younger abstention doctrine is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a federal court should
not interfere with pending state judicial proceedings. Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1330
(7th Cir. 1986). This principle, based on federalism and comity concerns, particularly applies to
civil proceedings when important state interests are involved. Id. (citing Ohio Civil Rights
Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626–28 (1986)); Middlesex Cty. Ethics
Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). The Supreme Court has
articulated three factors to aid in the determination of whether the Younger abstention doctrine
applies in a civil proceeding. A court should consider whether: (1) there is “an ongoing state
judicial proceeding”; (2) the “proceedings implicate important state interests”; and (3) “there is
an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex
Cty. Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S. at 432.
The Plaintiff seeks relief regarding the issue of custody of his child, and the Defendants
have represented to the Court that there is an ongoing Child in Need of Services (CHINS)
proceeding in the Indiana state court system regarding the custody of his child. Therefore, the
first part of the test is met.
Next, the Court looks to the State’s interests implicated by the proceeding. An important
motivation for the Supreme Court’s decision to abstain in Younger was the notion of comity:
‘that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.’” Hickey v. Duffy, 827 F.2d 234, 245 (7th Cir.
1987) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44).

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The Court finds that the Plaintiff’s particular complaints implicate important Indiana state
interests because “the interests of the State of Indiana in the welfare of children cannot be
gainsaid.” Rangel v. Reynolds, No. 4:07-CV-20, 2007 WL 1189356, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18,
2007). “The Seventh Circuit has applied the Younger doctrine to child custody matters because
the state is so ‘heavily involved’ in the proceedings and because the state has an independent
interest in the child’s health and welfare.” Id. Therefore, the second part of the test is met.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit has “decline[d] to presume that the Indiana courts . . . will
not discharge th[e] obligation” to protect a party’s federal rights. Lumen Constr., Inc. v. Brant
Constr. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 697 (7th Cir. 1985). Though the Plaintiff’s claims implicate purported
violations of the Plaintiff’s federal rights by the Defendants, “[s]tate courts are just as able to
enforce federal constitutional rights as federal courts.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S.
at 431. Moreover, Indiana authority indicates that parties to a CHINS proceeding are able to
bring constitutional claims of due process violations at the time of the proceeding as well as
appeal an adverse decision on due process grounds. See, e.g., In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 108
(Ind. 2010) (vacating CHINS judgment for potential due process violation); McBride v. Monroe
Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that
parent waived right to challenge due process violation during CHINS proceeding by not raising it
until appeal); Smith v. Marion Cty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 635 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (same). Therefore, the third part of the test is met.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case require abstention. There
is an ongoing state court proceeding regarding the same issue, child custody and welfare is an

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important state interest, and the Plaintiff’s constitutional claims have an adequate remedy in state
court. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 17].

SO ORDERED on April 5, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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