Hatch v. Indiana Department of Child Services et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: The Court GRANTS the Plaintiff's 5 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; WAIVES payment of the filing fee; DISMISSES the Plaintiff's Fifth and Sixth Amended claims against all Defendants and DISMISSES the Plai ntiff's § 1983 claims against the Indiana Department of Child Services; DIRECTS, pursuant to 28 USC § 1915(d), the United States Marshals Service to effect service of process on the Defendants. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 10/20/2017. (Copy mailed to pro se party; USMS)(jss)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
DEANGELO L. HATCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILD SERVICES, et al.
Defendants.
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CAUSE NO.: 1:17-CV-357-TLS
OPINION AND ORDER
DeAngelo L. Hatch, a Plaintiff proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against
Defendants, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“IDCS”), Chrystal Graham, Jennifer
Fletcher, and Louise Dietzer. He also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
[ECF No. 2]. On August 28, 2017, the Court denied his Motion and dismissed his Complaint
without prejudice for failure to state a claim [ECF No. 3]. The Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint on October 2, 2017 [ECF No. 4], this time naming only IDCS, Fletcher, and Graham
as Defendants, and a new Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 5]. For the
reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Motion is Granted.
DISCUSSION
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal court. 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their
inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations: first,
whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action, § 1915(a)(1); and
second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief,
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Under the first inquiry, an indigent party may commence an action in federal court,
without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to
pay such fees or give security therefor.” Id. § 1915(a). Here, the Plaintiff’s Motion establishes
that he is unable to prepay the filing fee.
The inquiry does not end there, however. In assessing whether a plaintiff may proceed
IFP, a court must look to the sufficiency of the complaint to determine whether it can be
construed as stating a claim for which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B). District courts have the power
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on
the defendants and must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d
778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999). Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as
when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Luevano v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013).
To state a claim under the federal notice pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations are accepted as true and need only give “fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d
773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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However, a plaintiff’s allegations must show that his entitlement to relief is plausible, rather than
merely speculative. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Plaintiff has alleged several causes of action against the Defendants, which include
violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment rights by attempting to
compel him to be a witness against himself by “regularly ordering [him] to cooperate with The
Department of Child Services and trying to force [him] to use services [he] [does] not need.”
(Compl., ECF No. 4 ¶ 5.) The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his Sixth Amendment
rights by using hearsay evidence gathered from his daughter and that without this hearsay
evidence, the Defendants would not have successfully petitioned the Indiana state court to
remove his daughter from his custody. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to “custody, care, and management of [his] daughter,” “to rear
[his] child without state interference,” and to due process of law.
The Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief in the form of the immediate return of his
daughter to his custody. Thus, the Court notes that, because the Plaintiff does not seek monetary
damages, IDCS may not invoke sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See
Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1329–30 (7th Cir. 1986).
A.
Fifth Amendment Claim
The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Plaintiff
alleges that the Defendants attempted to force him to “cooperate” with them and to “use services
[he] [does] not need.” (ECF No. 4 ¶ 5.) However, the Fifth Amendment protects against
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compelled testimony “in any criminal case.” Because the Defendants did not compel the Plaintiff
to testify against himself in a criminal case, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which
relief can be granted under the Fifth Amendment.
B.
Sixth Amendment Claim
The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S.
Const. amend. VI. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants used hearsay evidence gathered from
his daughter. Specifically, his daughter reported that she had seen the Plaintiff sell marijuana and
did not feel safe at his house. (ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 3.) This is not hearsay evidence for multiple
reasons, including that the Plaintiff’s daughter was not reporting the statement of a third party.
See Fed. R. Evid. 801. Moreover, as with the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment is
applicable only “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.” Because the Defendants have not used hearsay
evidence against the Defendant in a criminal proceeding, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
on which relief can be granted under the Sixth Amendment.
C.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Plaintiff appears to assert multiple causes of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but each claim boils down to the allegation that the Defendants deprived him of the
custody of his daughter without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
relevant part that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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“The Supreme Court has long recognized as a component of substantive due process the
right to familial relations.” Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000)
(collecting cases). But, “the constitutional right to familial integrity is not absolute.” Id. at 1019.
Instead, “a balance must be reached between the fundamental right to the family unit and the
state’s interest in protecting children from abuse, especially in cases where children are removed
from their homes.” Id. “In balancing these competing interests, courts have recognized that a
state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some definite and
articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in
imminent danger of abuse.” Id. Whether the Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights were
violated turns on “whether the government was justified in interfering with [his] familial
relations.” Id. The Plaintiff’s Complaint shows that the Defendants, in their petition to the Allen
County Superior Court, alleged several reasons why they believed the child needed to be
removed from the Plaintiff’s custody. (ECF No. 4-1 at 5.) However, the Defendants’ allegations
are rather conclusory and, when construing all facts in the plaintiff’s favor, are backed by little
evidence. Without more facts, the Court cannot determine that the removal of the child was
justified. See id. Based on the facts of record, the Court finds that it is plausible that the removal
of the child was unjustified.
Procedural due process requires that “parental rights cannot be denied without an
‘opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.’” Id. at 1020 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). “However, no matter how much process is required, at a minimum it
requires that government officials not misrepresent the facts in order to obtain the removal of a
child from his parents.” Id. “[I]t also means that governmental officials will not remove a child
from his home without an investigation and pre-deprivation hearing resulting in a court order of
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removal, absent exigent circumstances.” Id. The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made
factual misrepresentations in order to unfairly portray him as a drug addict. Moreover, based on
the record before the Court, it is not clear that the Defendants conducted a meaningful
investigation as it pertained to the Plaintiff. The intake officer’s report attached to the Plaintiff’s
Complaint devotes a single paragraph, out of three pages, to a conversation with the Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 3.) Most of the remainder of the report is devoted to the fitness of the child’s
mother. The Court notes that only the first three pages, out of seven, were attached to the
Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the Court has no way to evaluate any facts contained within the
omitted pages. However, because all facts and inferences have to be construed in the Plaintiff’s
favor at this stage, it is plausible that no meaningful investigation was conducted regarding the
Plaintiff’s fitness as a parent prior to the removal of his daughter.
Thus, the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to allow him to proceed on his Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
D.
Section 1983 Claims
In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
“[I]t is well established that neither a state nor a state agency like [IDCS] is a ‘person’ for
the purposes of § 1983.” Ryan v. Ill. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 758 (7th
Cir. 1999) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (“We hold that neither
a State nor its officials acting their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”)). Because,
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IDCS is a state agency, it is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Therefore, the
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against IDCS must be dismissed.
“In order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the
defendants acted under color of state law.” Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1009 (citing Starnes v. Cap.
Ctys. Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1994)). The Plaintiff’s Complaint does not make
clear whether he is suing Fletcher and Graham in their individual or official capacities. Because
the Court must construe pro se filings liberally, the Court will construe his Complaint as alleging
that Fletcher and Graham violated his rights in their individual capacities. Because the Court
finds that the Plaintiff has stated a claim against all Defendants for violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has stated a claim against Fletcher and
Graham for violation of § 1983.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1)
GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 5];
(2)
WAIVES payment of the filing fee;
(3)
DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims against all Defendants and
DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the Indiana Department of Child
Services;
(4)
DIRECTS, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the United States Marshals Service to effect
service of process on the Defendants.
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SO ORDERED on October 20, 2017.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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