Wakley et al v. Kammeyer et al

Filing 51

OPINION AND ORDER: GRANTING 11 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State of Claim by Defendant Jennifer L DeGroote; 25 MOTION to Dismiss by Defendants Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan Chase; and 27 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO S TATE A CLAIM W. Randall Kammeyer, Krista K. Motter, and Steve Bremer's Motion to Dismiss, MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction by Defendant W Randall Kammeyer, and DISMISSING the case for LACK OF JURISDICTION. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 9/10/2018. (Copy mailed to pro se parties)(lhc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
VICTOR WAKELY, JULIE WAKLEY,
and DEVON WAKLEY,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
W. RANDALL KAMMEYER,
)
KRISTA KAMMEYER MOTTER,
)
STEVE BREMER, JP MORGAN CHASE, )
JAMIE DIMON, and JENNIFER L.
)
DEGROOTE,
)
)
Defendants.
)

CAUSE NO.: 1:18-CV-10-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
On January 12, 2018, Plaintiffs Victor Wakley, Julie Wakley, and Devon Wakley,
proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against Defendants W. Randall Kammeyer,
Krista Kammeyer Motter, Steve Bremer, JP Morgan Chase, Jamie Dimon, and Jennifer L.
DeGroote. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have engaged in patterns and practices of
committing fraud against the Plaintiffs, and conspired to violate their rights under various
amendments to the Constitution. The Complaint states three causes of action: fraud (Count 1),
conversion (Count 2), and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on a conspiracy to violate the 5th,
8th, and 14th Amendments of the Constitution (Count 3).
The Defendants responded in three groups. First, Defendant Jennifer L. DeGroote, a
magistrate in the Allen Superior Court, filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and
Failure to State a Claim [ECF No. 11]. The Plaintiffs responded [ECF No. 31] in opposition.
Defendant DeGroote filed a timely reply [ECF No. 45]. Second, Defendants JP Morgan Chase

and Jamie Dimon filed a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 25]. On the same day, the third group,
Defendants W. Randall Kammeyer, Krista Kammeyer Motter, and Steve Bremer, filed a
substantially similar Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 27]. The Plaintiffs filed substantially similar
responses [ECF Nos. 48, 49] in opposition to both of these Motions to Dismiss. The Bank
Defendants filed a timely reply. [ECF No. 50]. All the Defendants argue that, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s Complaint because the requested relief would require the Court to
disrupt a final judgment of the state court. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED for LACK OF JURISDICTION.

BACKGROUND
Defendant Steve Bremer appraised property for individuals seeking a mortgage from
Plaintiff Victor Wakley’s company. (See Pls.’ Compl., 3–4, ECF No. 1). On August 21, 2000,
Steve Bremer procured a Default Judgment Order1 [ECF No. 26-2] against Victor Wakley,
signed by Defendant DeGroot. On November 28, 2017, Defendant W. Randall Kammeyer filed a
Verified Motion for Proceedings Supplemental, on behalf of Steve Bremer, against Victor
Wakley and Chase Bank, seeking Summons and Interrogatories to Garnishee Defendant
Depository Financial Institution. Defendant JP Morgan Chase answered the requested
interrogatories, identifying four accounts in Victor Wakley’s name, noting Julie Wakley and
Devon Wakley as joint account holders. On December 12, 2017, Julie Wakley and Devon
Wakley filed separate Exemption Claims and Requests for Hearing, as joint account holders. On

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Because the Defendants are making a factual attack against jurisdiction, the Court may weigh evidence
outside the pleadings. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009).

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the same day, Magistrate Brian D. Cook set an exemption hearing for December 18, 2017. On
December 19, 2017, noting that only the plaintiff had appeared by counsel, Magistrate Thomas
P. Boyer denied the Exemption request. Later that day, Julie Wakley and Devon Wakley again
filed separate, second Exemption Claims and Requests for Hearing [ECF No. 26-8], as joint
account holders. On December 27, 2017, Defendant Magistrate Jennifer DeGroote denied Julie
Wakley’s Second Request for Exemption Hearing, as she “had provided no reasoning to the
Court for good cause in filing a second request for exemption following her failure to appear.”
On January 2, 2018, Magistrate Cook entered a Banking Institution Garnishment Order for
$8,026.05 against Victor Wakley and Chase Bank. [ECF No. 26-10].

DISCUSSION
Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the
decisions of state courts in civil cases. See Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir.
2010) (first citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005);
then citing Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2008)). The doctrine “prevents a statecourt loser from bringing suit in federal court in order effectively to set aside the state-court
judgment,” and applies “even though the state court judgment might be erroneous or even
unconstitutional.” Gilbert, 591 F.3d at 900 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The doctrine
“bars federal claims in two instances. The first involves a plaintiff’s request of a federal district
court to overturn an adverse state court judgment. The second, and more difficult instance,
involves federal claims that were not raised in state court or do not on their face require review
of a state court’s decision.” Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor
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v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2004)). In the second case, “Rooker–
Feldman will act as a jurisdictional bar if those claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state
court judgment.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533). Although the Seventh Circuit has
described the inextricably intertwined inquiry as “a somewhat metaphysical concept,” a district
court must determine whether it “is in essence being called upon to review the state-court
decision.” Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533 (quotation marks omitted). “In order to determine the
applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is
whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or
is distinct from that judgment.” Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996).

A.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars the Plaintiff’s Conversion and Conspiracy
Claims
Because the removal of funds ordered by the state court is the only alleged injury in the

Plaintiffs’ conversion and conspiracy claims, those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.2 The Plaintiffs’ substantive, factual allegations in support of their conversion and
conspiracy claims are that the Defendants “neglected to ‘serve’ either Julie Wakley or Devon
Wakley with the requisite ‘Notice’ and ‘Opportunity’ to be heard regarding the conversion of
their funds,” (Compl. at 10), and that “the Defendants have converted three accounts that were
the exclusive ownership of Julie Wakley and Devon Wakley” (id. at 11). The state court ordered

2

Victor Wakley never articulates how he has standing to raise conversion and conspiracy claims; only
Julie and Devon Wakley allege an injury, namely that their properly-exempt funds were garnished in the
Order against Victor Wakley. However, as the Court does not have jurisdiction over these claims, it need
not address this concern.

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Chase Bank to pay over to the clerk of the court an amount not exceeding the total amount
owing, because “[n]either Defendant nor any other depositor claiming an interest in the aforesaid
account(s) has claimed that any portion of the funds in said account(s) is exempt from
garnishment.” (Banking Institution Garnishment Order, ¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 28-10.) Thus, the only
injuries alleged by the Plaintiffs in Counts 2 and 3 require review of the state court judgment.
The Plaintiffs are asking this Court to overturn the state court’s judgment, “an action [it] ha[s] no
jurisdiction to take.” See Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2017); cf. Iqbal
v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that “[t]he reason a litigant gives for
contesting the state court’s decision cannot endow a federal district court with authority . . .”).
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs additionally cite Trustees of the Teamsters Union, Local
No. 142 v. Brown, No. 2:10 cv 249, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15426 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2012), as
support for their claims. While this case does support the contention that Julie and Devon
Wakley may have had valid exemption claims, that contention is not the issue before this Court.
This Court must determine whether “it is in essence being called upon to review the state-court
decision,” not how valid the Plaintiffs’ claims were in the state court. Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533
(quotation marks omitted).
The Plaintiffs make two arguments that Rooker-Feldman should not apply. First, the
Plaintiffs argue that the notice provided of the exemption hearing was inadequate. (See Mem. in
Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 4, ECF No. 31.) However, when the Plaintiffs learned that the
exemption hearing would take place does not alter the character of the Plaintiffs’ injury. See
Crestview Vill. Apartments v. U.S. Dep’t. of Housing and Urban Dev., 383 F.3d 552, 556 (7th
Cir. 2004) (finding suit barred by Rooker-Feldman when the injury alleged was complete only
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after the state court entered the order) (citing Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1368 (7th Cir.
1996)). “Litigants who believe that a state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional
rights must appeal that decision through their state courts and then to the Supreme Court.” See
Nationscredit Home Equity Servs. Corp. v. City of Chi., 135 F. Supp. 2d 905, 911 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (collecting cases) (citing Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699, 702 (7th
Cir.1998)); see also Iqbal, 780 F.3d at 729 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is concerned not
with why a state court’s judgment might be mistaken . . . but with which federal court is
authorized to intervene.”) (emphasis in original); Ritter v. Ross, 922 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that, when the state court judgment is an essential part of the federal claim,
Rooker-Feldman applies, even if the federal plaintiff complains of notice issues). Because the
Plaintiffs’ injury is the state court judgment itself, the issues of the notice regarding that
judgment do not give this Court jurisdiction.
Second, the Plaintiffs argue that, while the garnishment ordered payment from Victor
Wakley’s funds, the state court lacked jurisdiction over Julie or Devon Wakley, and that
therefore those Plaintiffs had no redress. As part of its analysis under Rooker-Feldman, this
Court must determine “whether the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise the
issue in state court proceedings.” Taylor, 374 F.3d at 533–34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of Rooker-Feldman, claims are not barred if the state court imposed an
insurmountable obstacle to adjudication or if a state law prevented the plaintiff from raising it in
state court. See Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Long v.
Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1999)). Here, the state court determined it
had jurisdiction over the relevant accounts, and the Plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise the issue
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in state court—an opportunity of which they availed themselves by filing Exemption Claims and
Requests for Hearing. (See ECF Nos. 28-5, 28-8.); see also Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] state court is perfectly capable of answering questions of jurisdiction.”).
“The plaintiff has the obligation to establish jurisdiction by competent proof.” Sapperstein v.
Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 855–56 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998)).

B.

This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff Victor Wakley’s Fraud Claim
As the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ conversion and conspiracy claims, the

only remaining claim is the Plaintiffs’ claim of fraud.3 However, this Court has no jurisdiction
over the Plaintiffs’ fraud claim. Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate
claims if (1) the Complaint alleges a violation of a federal statute or of the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, or (2) if the Complaint meets diversity requirements, which require that the
Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states and that the Plaintiff seeks damages in
excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The Plaintiffs’ fraud claim does not allege a
violation of a federal statute nor of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and the Plaintiffs’
Complaint establishes that diversity does not exist. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction, and
dismisses this claim.

3

As with the claims of conversion and conspiracy, the Plaintiffs do not articulate how all three of them
can raise the claim of fraud. However, as the Court has no jurisdiction over this claim, it will not address
this issue.

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CONCLUSION
Because the Plaintiffs’ conversion and conspiracy claims directly challenge the order of
the state court, and are thus barred by Rooker-Feldman, and the Court has no jurisdiction over
the remaining fraud claim, this Court has no jurisdiction and need not reach the parties’
remaining arguments.
For the reasons set forth above, the Motions to Dismiss [ECF No. 11, 25, 27] are
GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED for LACK OF JURISDICTION.
SO ORDERED on September 10, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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