Foster v. US Management of Angola Incorporated

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER The Court TAKES UNDER ADVISEMENT the parties' Stipulation for Entry of a Consent Decree and Order 22 ; and orders that, by May 10, 2019, the parties file either: (1) a stipulated dismissal as of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), dismissing the entire action and signed by all the parties representatives, or (2) a brief for the Court addressing why a consent judgment would be consistent with the law, would not cause harm to the legitimate interest of third parties, and is an appropriate commitment of the courts limited resources, and attaching an amended Consent Decree which complies with Rule 65(d). Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 4/8/19. (kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
LELAND FOSTER,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO.: 1:18-CV-91-TLS

U.S. MANAGEMENT OF ANGOLA
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Stipulation for Entry of a Consent Decree
and Order [ECF No. 22], filed on February 21, 2019. In the proposed Consent Decree, the parties
ask that the Court dismiss the case with prejudice, but retain jurisdiction for the purposes of
enforcing the Consent Decree. (Stip. ¶ G). The parties also direct that the Defendant shall pay an
amount “as has been agreed upon by separate letter agreement.” (Stip. ¶ E).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are at least two kinds of stipulated resolutions of civil actions that parties may
pursue. First, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss a civil action by filing a stipulation of dismissal
signed by all parties who have appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). A stipulation of
dismissal that meets the requirements of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) is as of right, and deprives the
Court of jurisdiction when filed. Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007).
Generally, this kind of dismissal is without prejudice unless the parties specify otherwise. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Stipulations of dismissal thus provide litigants with a flexible tool to
negotiate their disputes and cease litigation whenever they wish, determining for themselves,

without need to consult the court, when the litigation will terminate and whether the plaintiff will
be precluded from renewing his suit at a future time.
Second, the parties may request a consent judgment as a means of concluding the
litigation. While a stipulated dismissal is an agreement by the parties ending the court’s
jurisdiction, a consent judgment is a discretionary exercise by the court of that jurisdiction in the
form of an order that adopts and endorses with the court’s authority the settlement agreement of
private parties. See United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002) (a consent
judgment “is a court order that embodies the terms agreed upon by the parties as a compromise
to litigation”); Schurr v. Austin Galleries of Ill., Inc., 719 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1983)
(describing a consent judgment as “an agreement of the parties entered upon the record with the
sanction and approval of the court”). A consent judgment, if granted, thus involves the court in
continued supervision of the terms of a contract, which any party to the contract may enforce by
returning to the court and initiating contempt proceedings. See Kasper v. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs of the City of Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a consent
judgment is “an exercise of federal power, enforceable by contempt”). As a consent judgment
requires the Court to expend time and resources to supervise a private settlement agreement, in
choosing whether such a judgment should issue, the Court considers: 1) whether the proposed
judgment is consistent with the law, 2) does not harm the legitimate interest of third parties, and
3) “is an appropriate commitment of the court’s limited resources.” Id., at 338. Unlike a
stipulated dismissal, which parties may take as of right, litigants wishing the Court to issue a
consent judgment must argue why the judgment should issue, and cannot expect the Court
unreflectively to endorse their agreement with the full authority of the federal judiciary. See, e.g.,
N.L.R.B. v. Brooke Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (parties were “incorrect to

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contend that [the judge had] no choice but to rubber stamp their proposal” by issuing a consent
judgment).

ANALYSIS
As stated above, consent judgments may be granted by the Court if the judgment is
consistent with the law, does not harm third parties, and is an appropriate use of judicial
resources. See Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338. However, the parties’ Stipulation only provides that the
parties have agreed to the proposed Consent Decree and Order; it does not provide reasons why a
consent judgment is more appropriate in this case than a stipulated dismissal, nor why a consent
judgment would be an “appropriate commitment of the court’s limited resources.” Id. The parties
must also support the conclusion that, if the Defendant makes the identified changes to the
property, the Court may make a finding that the property is in compliance with the ADA and
Indiana law to the extent “readily achievable.” See Stip. ¶ D.
Additionally, as this consent decree functions as an injunction, the parties must include
all the terms explicitly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Am. Express
Co., 467 F.3d 634, 636 (explaining that a court order entering judgment to enforce the parties’
settlement agreement is an injunction and must satisfy Rule 65(d)); see also Dupuy v. Samuels,
465 F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that Rule 65(d) “requires that an injunction be a
self-contained document rather than incorporate by reference materials in other documents”).
The parties have not done so. First, the parties commonly reference the 2010 ADA Standards as
the metric for the Defendant’s alterations to the property to meet; however, the standards must be
included in the document itself before the Consent Decree can be entered. Other references to
external documents will need to be amended as well. See, e.g., Stip. ¶ A.45 (“Site Accessibility

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Evaluation”). Additionally, paragraph E of the stipulation, which dictates that the Defendant pay
an amount “as has been agreed upon by separate letter agreement,” must be changed as well.
Thus, the Court TAKES UNDER ADVISEMENT the parties’ Stipulation for Entry of a
Consent Decree and Order [ECF No. 22]; and orders that, by May 10, 2019, the parties file
either: (1) a stipulated dismissal as of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), dismissing
the entire action and signed by all the parties’ representatives, or (2) a brief for the Court
addressing why a consent judgment would be consistent with the law, would not cause harm to
the legitimate interest of third parties, and is an appropriate commitment of the court’s limited
resources, and attaching an amended Consent Decree which complies with Rule 65(d).
SO ORDERED on April 8, 2019.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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