Harris v. Community Health Systems et al
Filing
27
OPINION AND ORDER Harris's requests for court-appointed counsel DEs 3 and 20 are DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan L Collins on 7/9/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(kjp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
ROSA ANN HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
) Cause No. 1:18-cv-00101-WCL-SLC
)
)
)
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court in this employment discrimination case is pro se Plaintiff Rosa Ann
Harris’s motion (DE 3) requesting that the Court appoint counsel to represent her, together with
a document titled, “Plaintiff’s Response to Pre-Trial Conference,” which includes a recitation of
Harris’s efforts to retain counsel (DE 20). As Harris explained at the preliminary pretrial
conference on June 20, 2018, she is requesting that the Court recruit an attorney for her because
she cannot afford one.
A. Legal Standard
Civil litigants do not have a right, either constitutional or statutory, to court-appointed
counsel. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Cty. of McLean,
953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)); Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1997);
Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). Rather, district courts are empowered to
appoint an attorney to represent a plaintiff without charge when she is “unable to afford
counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), or “in such circumstances as the court may deem just,” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that the following
factors should be weighed by the district court when determining whether appointment of
counsel is warranted: (1) whether the plaintiff has made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel
or been effectively precluded from doing so; and (2) given the difficulty of the case, whether the
plaintiff appears competent to litigate it herself.1 Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654-58; Sherrill v. Potter,
329 F. App’x 672, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the Pruitt factors in a Title VII case);
Darden v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1986) (instructing the court to
consider “the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff’s diligence in attempting to obtain a
lawyer, and the plaintiff’s financial ability to retain counsel” when considering a motion to
appoint counsel under Title VII (citation omitted)).
The second portion of this inquiry, stated another way, is “whether the difficulty of the
case—factually and legally—exceeds the particular plaintiff’s capacity as a layperson to
coherently present it to the judge and jury [herself].” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 712 (7th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655). In conducting this inquiry, the district court must
ascertain “whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate [her] own claims, given their degree
of difficulty, and this includes the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence gathering,
preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and trial.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655
(emphasis omitted). Normally, determining a plaintiff’s competence will be assessed by
considering “the plaintiff’s literacy, communication skills, educational level, and litigation
experience.” Id. If the record reveals the plaintiff’s intellectual capacity and psychological
history, these too would be relevant. Id. Overall, the decision to recruit counsel “is a practical
one, made in light of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question.” Id.
1
The Court previously granted Harris’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (DE 5). “[P]roceeding in
forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is a prerequisite to appointment of counsel under 1915.” Hairston v.
Blackburn, No. 09-cv-598, 2010 WL 145793, at *10 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2010).
2
B. Analysis
Harris states that she has contacted at least five attorneys, but none have taken her case.
(DE 20 at 1); see, e.g., Jackson v, 953 F.2d at 1073 (“If . . . the indigent has made no reasonable
attempts to secure counsel (unless circumstances prevented him from doing so), the court should
deny any § 1915(d) motions outright.”); Pollard v. Meadows, No. 1:15-cv-00330-RLM-SLC,
2016 WL 128531, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2016) (requiring a pro se plaintiff to contact at least
three attorneys to qualify for court-appointed counsel under § 1915(d)). Thus, although Harris
has satisfied the threshold element of a request for counsel, at least five attorneys have chosen to
pass up the opportunity to represent her. This circumstance speaks rather directly to the merits
of Harris’s case and raises a fair inference that these attorneys did not view her case as
meritorious. See Jackson, 953 F.2d at 1073 (considering plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempts to
retain counsel when denying his motion to appoint counsel).
Moving on to the second portion of the inquiry, this suit is a relatively straightforward
employment discrimination action: Harris alleges that she was employed by Defendants, and
was wrongfully terminated because of her age, and because she has a disability. (DE 1); see,
e.g., Jagla v. LaSalle Bank, No. 05 C 6460, 2006 WL 1005728, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2006)
(denying plaintiff’s request for counsel in a straightforward national origin discrimination case,
observing that the issue did not involve any “nonintuitive procedural requirements applied in a
setting of complex legal doctrine” (quoting Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 429 (7th
Cir. 1991))).
Harris has already adequately articulated her claims in a lengthy complaint (DE 1);
participated in a Rule 16 preliminary pretrial conference (DE 19); filed a document in response
to the preliminary pretrial conference that also explains her efforts to obtain counsel (DE 20; see
3
also DE 3); and she has read the Court’s pamphlet regarding alternative dispute resolution (DE
23). At the same time, Harris claims that she does not understand the Rule 26(f) planning report
(DE 20), and she claimed at the preliminary pretrial conference that she did not understand the
process of discovery (DE 19).
The Seventh Circuit has not articulated “categorical rules regarding the recruitment of
counsel,” but it has “held that a district court abuses its discretion when it does not take note of
certain circumstances [that] demand particular judicial consideration.” McCaa v. Hamilton, No.
16-4209, 2018 WL 3134606, at *3 (7th Cir. June 27, 2018) (alteration in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). Here,
although Harris has encountered difficulty in understanding some pretrial procedures, the
circumstances of her case do not warrant recruitment of counsel. See McCaa, 2018 WL
3134606, at *3; James, 889 F.3d at 327. This case is at the pleading stage, and discovery has
just begun. It is evident from Harris’s filings that she is assertive and possesses adequate
communication skills, certainly at a sufficient level to proceed pro se at this stage of the case.
Cf. McCaa, 2018 WL 3134606, at *3-4 (concluding that the district court had abused its
discretion in failing to appoint counsel where the plaintiff indicated that he had serious mental
illness, a fifth-grade reading level, extremely limited access to research and factual materials as
an inmate who had transferred prisons, and where the complexity of the plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claims had increased as the case advanced to a more sophisticated stage of
litigation); Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing a district court’s
denial of request for counsel pertaining to “a blind and indigent prisoner with a tenth-grade
education and no legal experience” in a case involving complicated medical matters).
Additionally, although Harris alleges that she is disabled due to limited vision and
4
cataract surgery in her right eye (DE 1 at 2), the disability does not appear to have affected her
ability to litigate her case. Furthermore, Harris worked as a patient accounting representative for
over 19 years (see DE 1 at 6), indicating that her literacy and mental capacity levels are
sufficient to proceed pro se at this early phase, cf. McCaa, 2018 WL 3134606, at *4 (concluding
that the district court erred by not appropriately considering that the incarcerated plaintiff’s
mental capacity required him to obtain assistance from another inmate); Henderson v. Ghosh,
755 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing a district court’s denial of request for counsel where
the record reflected plaintiff’s low IQ, functional illiteracy, and poor education). Indeed, at the
preliminary pretrial conference, Harris was able to articulate the events leading up to her filing
this case, the claims that she is advancing, and the relief that she seeks. Also, Harris is not
incarcerated and thus has the freedom and ability to perform her own research.
C. Conclusion
In sum, Harris appears to be competent and fully capable of representing herself in this
suit, at least at this stage of the case. See Zarnes, 64 F.3d at 289. Consequently, Harris’s request
for court-appointed counsel (DE 3; DE 20) is DENIED. See Mungiovi v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No.
94 C 6663, 1994 WL 735413, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1994) (“[The] court’s general practice is
to consider appointment of counsel if and when it appears that the action has sufficient merit to
require complex discovery or an evidentiary hearing.” (citation omitted)).
SO ORDERED. Entered this 9th day of July 2018.
/s/ Susan Collins
Susan Collins
United States Magistrate Judge
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?