Lockhart v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING the decision of the ALJ. Signed by Judge William C Lee on 5/14/2019. (lns)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
EMILY LOCKHART,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 1:18cv111

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant
Commissioner of Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff's application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (DIB), as provided for in the Social Security Act. Section 205(g) of the Act
provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a certified copy of the
transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained
of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the
record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with
or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he findings of the
[Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42
U.S.C. §405(g).
The law provides that an applicant for DIB must establish an "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less than 12 months. . . ."
42 U.S.C. §416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an

impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3). It is not enough for a plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be
shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the plaintiff from engaging in substantial
gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945
(1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill. 1979). It is well established that the
burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v.
Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970).
Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record
as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner’s] findings." Garfield v.
Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786
(7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. §405(g). "Substantial evidence is defined as 'more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.'" Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984) quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1427 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger,
552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed,
42 U.S.C. §405(g), unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, supra at 607; see also
Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).
In the present matter, after consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) made the following findings:
1.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 26,
2015, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

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2.

The claimant has the following severe impairments: post-traumatic stress
disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; major depressive disorder; bipolar
disorder; social anxiety disorder (social phobia); attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), combined; and stimulant use disorder, amphetamine-type
substance (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

3.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

4.

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: she is limited to
performing simple, routine and repetitive tasks, but not at a production-rate pace
(e.g. assembly-line work); simple work-related decisions; occasional interaction
with supervisors and coworkers; tolerating occasional changes in a routine work
setting; and no interaction with the public.

5.

The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

6.

The claimant was born on April 27, 1977 and was 37 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual age 18-40, on the date the application was filed (20 CFR
416.963).

7.

The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in
English (20 CFR 416.964).

8.

Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have past
relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).

9.

Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969(a)).

10.

The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
since February 26, 2015, the date the application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 13- 23 ).
Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability
insurance benefits. The ALJ’s decision became the final agency decision when the Appeals

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Council denied review. This appeal followed.
Plaintiff filed her opening brief on October 30, 2018. On March 7, 2019, the defendant
filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff has declined to file a
reply. Upon full review of the record in this cause, this court is of the view that the ALJ’s
decision should be affirmed.
A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See
Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 229091 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized that test
as follows:
The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant
presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"?
(3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific
impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her
former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other
work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to
the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is
disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops
the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not
disabled.
Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988); Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162
n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). From the nature
of the ALJ's decision to deny benefits, it is clear that Step 5 was the determinative inquiry.
In support of remand, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not incorporating limitations
from all the medically determinable impairments, both severe and nonsevere, into the RFC, and
erred in not considering the combined impact thereof. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
erred in not including a mental limitation which described the quality of the interaction between

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Plaintiff, co-workers, and supervisors. The ALJ found that Plaintiff is limited to occasional
interaction with supervisors and co-workers. However, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in
not finding that Plaintiff was limited to superficial interaction. Plaintiff claims that the RFC did
not account for the opinion of State Agency psychologists that Plaintiff was limited to superficial
interaction. Plaintiff is referring to the opinion of non-examining psychologists Drs. Johnson and
Kladder, who opined that Plaintiff “can relate on at least a superficial basis” (Tr. 94, 105).
Plaintiff argues that the term “occasional” refers to frequency, whereas “superficial” refers to the
quality of the interaction.
The Commissioner correctly responds that the argument fails for several reasons. First, the
opinions of Drs. Johnson and Kladder need to be considered in light of their additional opinions
that Plaintiff had no social interaction limitations (Tr. 94, 104), and mild difficulties in
maintaining social functioning (Tr. 92, 102). Furthermore, both Drs. Johnson and Kladder opined
that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in the ability to work in coordination with or in
proximity to others without being distracted by them (Tr. 94, 104). All of these opinions indicate
that Plaintiff is not limited to merely superficial interaction with supervisors and co-workers. This
would explain why both Drs. Johnson and Kladder opined that Plaintiff “can relate on at least a
superficial basis” (Tr. 94, 105) (emphasis added).
Second, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to jobs that involve simple, routine, and repetitive tasks,
not at a production-rate pace; simple work-related decisions; occasional interaction with
supervisors and co-workers; occasional changes in a routine work setting; and no interaction with
the public. The Commissioner contends that it stretches the imagination that such jobs would
involve more than superficial interaction with supervisors and co-workers (interaction with the
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public is precluded), considering that the jobs are generally performed in a routine manner and
that, even when occasional changes are needed, the jobs would, by their very nature, remain
simple, routine, and repetitive.
Third, although Drs. Johnson and Kladder never examined Plaintiff, Dr. Boen performed a
consultative psychological examination on August 10, 2015 (Tr. 18, 20, 460-63). Among other
things, Dr. Boen opined that Plaintiff can get along with co-workers and a boss (Tr. 20, 463). The
ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Boen’s opinion, but found that subsequent evidence suggested
“slightly greater mental limitations” (Tr. 20). The ALJ accounted for these slightly greater
limitations by limiting Plaintiff to, among other things, occasional interaction with supervisors
and co-workers (Tr. 16).
Significantly, Dr. Johnson had no access to Dr. Boen’s consultative examination, as she
rendered her opinion in April 2015, several months before Dr. Boen examined Plaintiff. Although
Dr. Kladder’s opinion was rendered 8 days after Dr. Boen examined Plaintiff (7 days after the
date on Dr. Boen’s report), it does not appear that Dr. Kladder made any mention of Dr. Boen’s
opinion. Thus, not only did Drs. Johnson and Kladder not have the benefit of examining Plaintiff,
they did not even have the benefit of Dr. Boen’s opinion based on his examination of Plaintiff.
In light of the above evidence, this court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ’s
RFC (and decision) is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the decision will be
affirmed.

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Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is hereby AFFIRMED.

Entered: May 14, 2019.

s/ William C. Lee
William C. Lee, Judge
United States District Court

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