Martin et al v. Noble County Sheriff's Dept et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER: Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the State Defendants' 18 Motion to Dismiss. The federal claims against the State Defendants (Indiana State Police Department, Noble County Prosecutors, R. Cory Culler, and John R. Petro) are DISMISSED. All other claims remain pending. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 9/4/2018. (Copy mailed to pro se party) (tc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
DENICE MARTIN, QUINTON MARTIN,
ANTHONY C. MARTIN, TONY MARTIN, and
AMANDA DELAGRANGE,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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NOBLE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, )
NOBLE COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S
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ALLEN COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, )
FORT WAYNE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
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INDIANA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
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DOUG HARP (NOBLE CO. SHERIFF),
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SGT. HOE HUTSELL (NOBLE CO. SHERIFF), )
SGT. TIM DOLBY (NOBLE CO. SHERIFF),
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DETECTIVE SHAWN DUNAFIN (NOBLE CO.) )
DETECTIVE MICHAEL CARROLL (NOBLE CO.)
LIEUTENANT R. CORY CULLER (ISP),
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SGT. JOHN R. PETRO (ISP), and
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UNKNOWN OFFICERS,
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Defendants.
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CAUSE NO.: 1:18-CV-121-TLS
OPINION AND ORDER
The Plaintiffs, Denice Martin, Quinton Martin, Anthony C. Martin, Tony Martin, and
Amanda Delagrange, proceeding pro se, initiated this litigation against several sheriff’s
departments, the Fort Wayne Police Department, the Indiana State Police, the Noble County
Prosecutors, and individual officers employed by state and municipal law enforcement agencies.
On July 6, 2018, Defendants Indiana State Police Department, Noble County Prosecutors, and R.
Cory Culler and Sergeant John R. Petro from the Indiana State Police Department (the State
Defendants) moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). [State Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18]. The Plaintiffs have not
responded to the Motion.
ANALYSIS
The Complaint sets out events that occurred on August 22, 2017.1 It describes the
conduct of unknown members of law enforcement that would, if true, support Fourth
Amendment claims for excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure. The Plaintiffs do
indeed assert, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that these constitutional violations, among others,
resulted from the events of August 22. The Complaint also identifies the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and state law torts as potential grounds for the recovery of more than
$92.7 million in damages. In addition to monetary damages, the Complaint asks for “a
preliminary injunction for the harassment and retaliation by the mentioned defendants, and or
officers of the mentioned departments.” (Compl. p. 8.)
Section 1983 gives federal courts the jurisdiction to hear lawsuits that allege violations of
constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. However, there are limits to a
court’s ability to adjudicate actions under section 1983. “Section 1983 only permits an individual
to sue a ‘person’ who deprives that individual of his or her federally-guaranteed rights under
color of state law.” Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014). The State Defendants who
are, for legal purposes, the State of Indiana, assert that they are not recognized persons under
§ 1983. The individual officers argue that the Plaintiffs’ Complaint does state a claim for relief
against them under federal pleading requirements, which requires more than a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.
1
The Complaint does not provide the year in which the events occurred, but the State Defendants
assert that it was 2017. The year is not pertinent to the outcome of the Motion.
2
A.
Section 1983 Claims Against the State and its Agencies
Suing the Indiana State Police, the Noble County Prosecutors, and Indiana State Police
officers in their official capacities is the same as suing the State of Indiana. But neither States,
nor state officials acting in their official capacities, are “persons” who can be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“We hold that neither
a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’” liable for damages “under
§ 1983.”). See also Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The Indiana
State Police, as a unit of state government, is not a ‘person’ as § 1983 uses that term and
therefore is not amenable to a suit for damages under that statute.”); Study v. United States, 782
F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (the position of deputy prosecuting attorneys in Indiana
county “is one of state office, even though employed by a specific office”); Bibbs v. Newman,
997 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“A prosecuting attorney in Indiana clearly acts as a
state official when prosecuting criminal cases.”); see also Srivastava v. Newman, 12 F. App’x
369, 371 (7th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with Bibbs and Study because “[t]he office of prosecutor is a
creation of the Indiana Constitution, see Ind. Const. art. 7, § 16, and state statutes govern the
prosecutor’s duties and powers”). Accordingly, any claim for monetary damages being pursued
under § 1983 against the State Defendants (excluding the individual capacity claims) is not a
cognizable claim and will be dismissed.
Section 1983, however, permits official-capacity suits against state officials that seek
only injunctive relief. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. Although the Complaint references preliminary
injunctive relief, the Court does not find that the Complaint’s lone reference to a preliminary
injunction sets forth a plausible claim for equitable relief. The Complaint’s factual narrative does
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not provide a single fact to suggest that the wrongs the Plaintiffs complain of are continuing and
ongoing. Rather, it sets forth, from the perspective of one of the Plaintiffs, the events that took
place on one particular evening in August 2017 when officers entered her home. Thus, there is
no conduct to enjoin. See Daniels v. Southfort, 6 F.3d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
“extraordinary remedy” of enjoining police conduct is only appropriate in a § 1983 action
“where there is a persistent pattern of police misconduct”). Injunctive relief as a remedy for the
claims arising out of the August 2017 events “is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable
injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate
threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again—a ‘likelihood of substantial and immediate
irreparable injury.’” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (quoting O’Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).2
With no valid claim for injunctive relief, the statutory rule that a State is not a person
who can be sued under § 1983 makes it “unnecessary to consider what limits the Eleventh
Amendment would create.” Mercado v. Dart, 604 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Lapides
v. Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617–18 (2002)); see also Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815,
817 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that because § 1983 does not authorize suits against states, the
district court should have dismissed the official-capacity claims against the public university
officials before addressing the Eleventh Amendment defense).
2
The Plaintiffs’ standing to pursue injunctive relief is also questionable. See Lyons, 461 U.S. 95;
Sierakowski v. Ryan, 223 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 2000). “Past exposure to illegal conduct . . . does not in itself
show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” Sierakowski, 223 F.3d at 443 (quoting
O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495).
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B.
Individual Capacity Claims
As to the claims against Sergeant John R. Petro and R. Cory Culler in their individual
capacities, the Complaint does not state a plausible claim. That is, it does not state a claim that
would allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [D]efendant[s] [are] liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A defendant is not liable under § 1983 unless he
“participated directly in the constitutional violation.” Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat’l Res., 347
F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding that “a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution”). The Complaint does not allege any personal involvement by Petro or
Culler in the events of August 22, 2017. Nor are there any factual allegations upon which it
could be inferred that the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred at Petro’s or Culler’s
direction or with their knowledge and consent, such that supervisory liability could apply. See
Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that official satisfies § 1983’s
personal responsibility requirement “if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs
at his direction or with his knowledge and consent”) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). The factual content is far too sparse regarding who did what to “show[] that the pleader
is entitled to relief” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), from these Defendants.
C.
American with Disabilities Act Claim
The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants were not properly trained to handle individuals
with mental health issues—such as her son, Quinton, who is autistic—and thus violated the
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ADA. Section 202 of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “[A] Title II claim under the ADA ‘may be established by evidence
that (1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis of the disability, (2) the defendant refused
to provide a reasonable modification, or (3) the defendant’s rule disproportionally impacts
disabled people.’” Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 753 (7th Cir.
2006) (quoting Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 1999));
see also CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2014).
The pleaded factual content does not describe the particular role of the State Defendants
in the treatment of Quinton on August 22, 2017. The Complaint, which contains only a
conclusory allegation that officer were not properly trained, is insufficient to state a claim. Cf.
McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that “[m]any of the alleged
‘facts,’” such as the claim that the city had “an unwritten custom, practice and policy to afford
lesser protection or none at all to victims of domestic violence” were “actually legal conclusions
or elements of the cause of action, which may be disregarded on a motion to dismiss”). The
ADA claim will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
D.
Federal Claims and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Having reviewed the pro se Complaint more liberally than it would one that was drafted
by a trained attorney, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the Court still cannot find that
it sets forth any plausible federal claims against the State Defendants. With the federal claims
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against them dismissed, the State Defendants urge the Court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claims against them. The federal statute that allows supplemental
jurisdiction of state law claims permits a district court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Although no federal claims remain as to the State Defendants, the Court,
at this juncture, still has original jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims pending against the various
municipal Defendants.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the federal claims against the State Defendants, but
still retains jurisdiction of the case. Moreover, to the extent the Plaintiffs are able to cure any of
the deficiencies identified above, such as the failure to allege facts supporting individual liability
against the Indiana State Police officers, the dismissal will be without prejudice and with leave to
file an amended complaint. See Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (“District
courts routinely do not terminate a case at the same time that they grant a defendant’s motion to
dismiss; rather, they generally dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and give the
plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend her complaint.”); see also Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees
of Univ. of Ill., 747 F.3d 470, 480 (7th Cir. 2014) (“In general, a district court should freely give
leave to amend to cure curable defects, at least where there is no undue delay or undue prejudice
to the opposing party.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANT IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 18]. The federal claims against the State
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Defendants (Indiana State Police Department, Noble County Prosecutors, R. Cory Culler, and
John R. Petro) are dismissed. All other claims remain pending.
SO ORDERED on September 4, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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