Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank NA et al

Filing 18

OPINION AND ORDER The Court DENIES the Plaintiff's Motions 16 and 17 for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Theresa L Springmann on 12/3/18. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
JOY JONES,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., and JOHN )
DOE, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Cause No. 1:18-CV-125-TLS

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s, Joy Jones, Motion to Correct Error
[ECF No. 16] and Amended Motion to Correct Error [ECF No. 17]. The Court construes these as
Motions for Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)(1)(3). For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff filed a complaint, pro se, on May 9, 2018 [ECF No. 1], along with a Motion
for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 2], seeking to challenge a mortgage
foreclosure and a pending sheriff’s sale litigated and ruled upon in Indiana state court. On May
14, 2018, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and
dismissed the Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 3]. On August 6, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a second
Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 6]. On September 7, 2018, the
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 10]. On September 10, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a
Motion to Amend the Amended Complaint and attached a Second Amended Complaint [ECF
No. 11 at 1, 11-1]. On September 25, 2018, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

Proceed in Forma Pauperis and dismissed the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction [Op. and Order, ECF No. 12]. On September 25, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a
Motion for an Emergency Stay and requested that the Court grant an injunction staying a state
court’s order of foreclosure [ECF No. 14]. The Court denied the Plaintiff’s motion on September
28 as no basis existed to reopen her case [Op. and Order, ECF No. 15].
On October 29, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Correct Error [ECF No. 16]. On
November 6, 2018, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion to Correct Error [ECF No. 17]. The
Plaintiff claims that the Court erred in dismissing her Second Amended Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. (Pl.’s Mot. to Correct Error at 2.) The Plaintiff alleges that her claims
were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, id., at 2, which states that lower federal courts
lack jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts in civil cases. See Gilbert v. Ill. Bd. of
Educ., 591 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2010) (first citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005); then citing Johnson v. Orr, 551 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir.
2008)). The Plaintiff contends that she suffered damages that were separate and distinct from her
mortgage foreclosure proceedings litigated in state court and the Court erred in its application of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Pl.’s Mot. to Correct Error at 2–3.)
ANALYSIS
“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Plaintiff filed both her First and her Second Motion
to Correct Error, which the Court understands as Motions for Reconsideration, several days past
the 28-day deadline. The Seventh Circuit has established a bright-line rule that “any motion for
reconsideration filed after the deadline must be construed as a motion to vacate.” Williams v.
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Illinois, 737 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). When a motion otherwise
appropriate for consideration under Rule 59(e) is not timely filed, it “automatically becomes a
Rule 60(b) motion.” Kiswani v. Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d 741, 743 (quoting Talano v.
Nw. Med. Faculty Found. Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001). This is the case even for pro se
litigants. See, e.g., 3SM Realty & Dev., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 393 F. App’x 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“In any event, Mehta's status as a pro se litigant does not excuse his failure to meet the
mandatory deadline for filing a Rule 59(e) motion”); Perdue v. Carlos, No. 2:10 CV 35, 2011
WL 2446565, at *1 (N.D. Ind. June 17, 2011) (noting a pro se plaintiff’s filing pursuant to Rule
59(e) that was three days late must be construed as a Rule 60(b) motion). Accordingly, the Court
must consider the Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 governs motions for reconsideration. Pursuant to Rule
60(b):
[T]he [C]ourt may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;

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(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The Plaintiff premises her Motion to Correct Error [ECF No. 16] and Amended Motion
to Correct Error [ECF No. 17] on the theory that the Court committed legal error. Specifically,
the Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in dismissing her Complaint because not all her claims
were subject to dismissal pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Pl.’s Mot. to Correct Error
at 2–3, 6–9.) The Plaintiff’s motions enumerate supposed errors in the Court’s application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. The Court, however,
addressed these same claims in its Opinion and Order dismissing the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction [ECF No. 12]. As the Court explained, the Plaintiff’s claims stem from state
court rulings that were adverse to the Plaintiff (Op. and Order at 9–10, ECF No. 12);the Plaintiff
had an opportunity to raise her claims in state court; and she was thus subject to the RookerFeldman doctrine. (Id., at 11.)
Therefore, a motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle for the Plaintiff’s
arguments as “legal error is not an acceptable basis for such a motion.” Gleash v. Yuswak, 308
F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002). “An appeal, as opposed to a Rule 60(b) motion, is the proper
vehicle to redress claimed legal errors, otherwise a party could circumvent the ordinary time
limitation for filing a notice of appeal.” GHSC Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 29 F.
App'x 382, 385 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d
746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). Further, any of the Plaintiff’s arguments
that could be construed as distinct from her previous claims are untimely. A rule 60(b) motion
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“is not an appropriate place to slip in arguments that should have been made earlier.” Karraker v.
Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2005).
“Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional
circumstances.” Id. (other internal citations omitted). The Plaintiff has not met any of the
requirements of Rule 60 and the Court will not reconsider its Opinion and Order dismissing her
Second Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration [ECF No. 17] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED on December 3, 2018.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
CHIEF JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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