Schorey v. Greer et al

Filing 15

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING Curtis A. Schorey until 1/2/2025, to file an amended complaint and CAUTIONING him that if he does not respond by the deadline, this case will be dismissed as outlined. Signed by Chief Judge Holly A Brady on 11/26/2024. (Copy mailed to pro se party)(mrm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
CURTIS A. SCHOREY,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAUSE NO. 1:24-CV-494-HAB-SLC

QUINTON GREER, JOHN DOE, and
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Curtis A. Schorey, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the
merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
Schorey sues Detective Quinton Greer of the Wells County Sheriff’s Department
and unknown officers with the Indiana State Police and the Bluffton City Police,
alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures when they arrested him and searched his house in Bluffton,
Indiana. He alleges that on August 16, 2022, he was woken up by law enforcement

beating his door with a battering ram. Then Schorey heard someone over a bullhorn
identifying himself as law enforcement. The officer advised Schorey and the other
occupants of the house that they were surrounded and needed to come out with their
hands up. Schorey alleges he did not exit right away; he first got dressed and secured
his dogs in the bathroom. He left through the back door because the front door had
been destroyed. When Schorey exited the home, he alleges he was immediately manhandled by at least a dozen officers with tactical weapons. He says he was searched,
cuffed, and thrown into an SUV to be taken to the Wells County Jail.
Schorey alleges that after he left, officers illegally entered his home without his
consent or a search warrant. They took weapons and other items of personal property.
He says his house was damaged to such an extent that it was deemed uninhabitable by
the county. Once he posted bond, he had to rent a motel room until a contractor could
repair the damage.
Public records show that Schorey was arrested pursuant to a warrant, which he
doesn’t challenge here. See State v. Schoney, No. 90C01-2208-F2-000004 (Wells Cir. Ct.
filed Aug. 16, 2022), available at mycase.in.gov. An arrest pursuant to a valid warrant is
presumptively constitutional, see Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010), but
can nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it was carried out in an unreasonable
manner. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995). The “method of an officer’s entry
into a dwelling [is] among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness
of a search or seizure.” Id.

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A valid arrest warrant carries with it the authority to enter the home of the
person named in the warrant to execute it, so long as the police have a reasonable belief
that the person resides there and is present. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603
(1980). Police may conduct a warrantless search of a place incident to arrest, limited to
the “area ‘within [the arrestee’s] immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). And in conducting an otherwise
appropriate entry into a home, the police can conduct a limited “sweep” of the
premises, limited to “a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be
found” when “the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and
articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those
on the arrest scene.” United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 268 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-37 (1990)). A warrantless search beyond that scope
may violate the Fourth Amendment.
Schorey’s complaint, however, may not proceed because he does not identify a
proper defendant. Individual liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. See Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492,
498 (7th Cir. 2018). As to Detective Greer, Schorey does not mention him in the body of
the complaint. He does not explain how the detective was personally involved in the
arrest or search or even allege that the detective was present that night. There is no
plausible basis in the complaint to infer that Detective Greer was involved in the events
at issue here.
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The unknown police officers who took part in the arrest and search would have
the personal involvement needed to be held liable for any constitutional violations. But
Schorey cannot proceed against unknown John Doe defendants; they must be identified
in order to be served. Normally, when a prisoner is not “in a position to identify the
proper defendants . . . it is the duty of the district court to assist him, within reason, to
make the necessary investigation.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
822 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “[T]he court may assist the plaintiff . . . by
allowing the case to proceed to discovery against high-level administrators with the
expectation that they will identify the officials personally responsible . . ..” Donald v.
Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, however, it is too late to
do that because the statute of limitations has already expired.
“Indiana’s two-year statute of limitations . . . is applicable to all causes of action
brought in Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task
Force, 239 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2001). The date on which the claim accrues, and the
limitations period starts running, is the date when a plaintiff knows the fact and the
cause of an injury. O’Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015). The
statute of limitations for a claim that a search or seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment accrues at the time of the incident. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
Schorey alleges the search occurred on August 16, 2022. He attests that he submitted
this complaint for filing on August 1, 2024, just two weeks before the statute of
limitations would expire.

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It is unclear why Schorey waited until nearly the end of the limitations period to
file this lawsuit, but it is clear he left himself no meaningful time to conduct discovery
and identify proper defendants. He also further delayed the case by filing it initially in
in the Southern District of Indiana without a copy of his inmate trust fund ledger. ECF
1, ECF 2, ECF 6. Not until Schorey paid the initial partial filing fee on October 8, 2024,
was this case ripe for screening because “the statutory formula . . . required him to
prepay part of the filing fee before the district court considered the merits of the case in
any fashion.” Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000), and Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d
626 (7th Cir. 2000). By then, the statute of limitations had expired.
In order for a defendant to be added after the statute of limitations has ended, a
plaintiff must satisfy the “relation back” requirements in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15. Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “permit[s] an amendment to relate back to the original
complaint only where there has been an error made concerning the identity of the
proper party and where that party is chargeable with knowledge of the mistake.” King
v. One Unknown Federal Correctional Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000). Suing an
“unknown” defendant is not a “mistake.” Id. at 914-15; see Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688,
696 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Not knowing a defendant’s name is not a mistake under Rule 15.”);
Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is pointless to include lists of
anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door
to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.”
(citations omitted)). Ultimately, “[i]t is the plaintiff’s responsibility to determine the
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proper party to sue and to do so before the statute of limitations expires. A plaintiff’s
ignorance or misunderstanding about who is liable for his injury is not a ‘mistake’ as to
the defendant’s ‘identity.’” Hall v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir.
2006). Therefore, the case cannot proceed against the unknown John Doe officers.
This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Schorey
believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this
complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil
cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least
where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738
(7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a
Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law
library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title
“Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Curtis A. Schorey until January 2, 2025, to file an amended
complaint; and
(2) CAUTIONS Curtis A. Schorey if he does not respond by the deadline, this
case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the
current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.
SO ORDERED on November 26, 2024.
s/ Holly A. Brady
CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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