Arseneault v. AC and S Inc, et al

Filing 95

OPINION AND ORDER denying 85 MOTION to Transfer Case to the Northern District of Illinois filed by Clovis Arseneault. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Martin on 7/13/16. (kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
CLOVIS ARSENEAULT,
Plaintiff,
v.
AC AND S INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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CAUSE NO.: 2:99-CV-76-JTM-JEM

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern District of
Illinois [DE 85], filed by Plaintiff Jason Arsenault, special administrator for the estate of Clovis
Aresnault, decedent, on September 15, 2015. Plaintiff requests that the Court transfer the instant
case to the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). On September 28, 2015,
Defendant CBS Corporation, formerly known as Westinghouse Electric Corporation, filed a
response. Plaintiff did not file a reply to Westinghouses’s response within the time allotted to do
so.
I.

Background
Clovis Aresnault filed this action in the Northern District of Indiana in 1999 for injuries he

suffered as a result of asbestos exposure. The case was transferred to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania as part of a multi-district litigation. In an order granting in part Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, the presiding judge found that the decedent was exposed to asbestos at steel
mills in Chicago, Illinois, and Riverdale, Illinois, both in the Northern District of Illinois. There was
also exposure during the decedent’s employment at State Line Generating Plant, which is located

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both in Illinois and the Northern District of Indiana. On March 24, 2015, the case was remanded
back to this Court.
II.

Analysis
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is the provision of the United States Code that governs change of venue

and provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought
or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Therefore,
for a case to be transferred, the movant must demonstrate that (1) venue is proper in the transferor
court; (2) venue is proper in the transferee court; and (3) the transfer serves the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and is in the interests of justice. See Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d
217, 219-20 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Key Electronics, Inc. v. Earth Walk Commc’ns, Inc., No.
4:13-CV-00098-SEB, 2014 WL 2711838, at *8 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2014). The decision to transfer
an action is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the analysis is made on a case-by-case,
fact-intensive inquiry; the statute does not indicate the relative weight to be accorded each factor.
Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219, 220 n. 3.
Plaintiff, deceased, was a resident of the Northern District of Indiana, and the special
administrator for his estate is a resident of Ohio. It appears that Westinghouse is the only defendant
remaining in the case at this time, and it is incorporated in Pennsylvania with its principal place of
business in Connecticut. Accordingly, jurisdiction is appropriate in either the Northern District of
Indiana or the Northern District of Illinois.
For the analysis of the convenience of the parties and the witnesses, the Court considers the
following private interests: “(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the situs of the material events;

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(3) the relative ease and access to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of the witnesses; and (5) the
convenience of the parties of litigating in the respective forums.” Schumacher v. Principal Life Ins.
Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (N.D. Ind. 2009). Although specifically set forth in Section 1404(a),
“these factors are best viewed as placeholders for a broader set of considerations, the contours of
which turn upon the particular facts of each case.” Travel Supreme, Inc. v. NVER Enters., Inc., No.
3:07-CV-194-PPS, 2007 WL 2962641, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2007) (quoting Coffey, 796 F.2d at
219 n.3). As the moving party, Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the Northern District of
Illinois is “clearly more convenient” than the Northern District of Indiana. Coffey, 796 F.2d at 21920.
Plaintiff argues that the Northern District of Illinois is a more convenient forum because
Illinois law governs the claims and because most of the asbestos exposure occurred in Illinois.
Defendant argues that Indiana law should apply to the case, and that the majority of the factors
weigh in favor of keeping the case in Indiana.
“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed,” In re National Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)), and generally a plaintiff’s chosen
forum is entitled to substantial deference, particularly where the chosen forum is the plaintiff’s home
forum. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). In this case, the decedent initially
chose to file suit in Indiana, although his successor, the representative of his estate, now wishes to
move the case to Illinois. Courts also “accord considerable weight to the situs of material events.”
Banks v. Stevens Transp. Inc., No. 2:15-CV-117-TLS-PRC. In this case, the ruling on Defendant’s

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motion for summary judgment concluded that much of the asbestos exposure underlying this case
occurred in Illinois, but that the decedent was also exposed to asbestos in Indiana.
As to the relative ease of the witnesses, this “factor . . . is often considered the most
important of the transfer factors.” Robinson Steel Co. v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 2:10 CV 438, 2011 WL
923415, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 14, 2011). Defendant argues that the majority of non-party witnesses,
including three of the four fact witnesses relied upon by Plaintiff in his motion for summary
judgment, are Indiana residents, and that the fourth is a fact witness motivated to testify for Plaintiff
who could therefore be easily brought to Indiana. Plaintiff does not include any representation or
argument about the convenience of witnesses.
The Court next considers the convenience of the parties. “This factor involves the
consideration of the parties’ respective residences and their abilities to bear the expense of trial in
a particular forum.” Coll. Craft Cos., Ltd. v. Perry, 889 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(quoting Heller Fin., Inc. v. Riverdale Auto Parts, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
Plaintiff does not include any specific argument about the convenience of the parties. Defendant
argues that the decedent was an Indiana resident, and that the special administrator of the estate is
an Ohio resident, such that Indiana is closer to the administrator’s home. Defendant also prefers
Indiana.
The convenience of the parties and the witnesses favors Indiana, and Plaintiff has presented
very little argument to demonstrate otherwise. The Court now turns to the “interest of justice”
analysis, which focuses on the efficient administration of the judicial system rather than on the
private considerations of the litigants. Coll. Craft, 889 F. Supp. at 1056 (citing Coffey, 796 F.2d at
220-21; Espino v. Top Draw Freight Sys., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (N.D. Ill. 1989)). For this

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analysis, courts look at the relative docket congestion and speed to trial, the court’s familiarity with
the relevant law, the respective desirability of resolving controversies in each locale, and the
relationship of each community to the controversy. Research Automation, Inc. v.
Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Coll. Craft, 889 F. Supp.
at 1056 (taking into account considerations including trial speed, trying related cases, and having
a judge who is familiar with the applicable law). The only argument Plaintiff makes as to this factor
is that Illinois law will apply to the conflict. Defendant disputes this assertion, and also points out
that even if Illinois law does apply, courts in the Northern District of Indiana are also capable of
applying it. Plaintiff does not argue that the speed to trial or docket congestion are significantly
different in the two districts or that resolving the controversy in Illinois is more desirable. Defendant
argues that transfer of the case would be a waste of time and resources. The Court notes that there
are significantly more cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois, but that as of December 31,
2015, cases took slightly longer to get to trial in the Northern District of Indiana, and the number
of cases pending before each judge was roughly comparable.
In considering all of the factors and Plaintiff’s insubstantial argument, Plaintiff has not met
his burden of showing that the Northern District of Illinois is a “clearly more convenient” forum
than the Northern District of Indiana.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion to Transfer Venue to the Northern

District of Illinois [DE 85].
SO ORDERED this 13th day of July, 2016.
s/ John E. Martin
MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN E. MARTIN
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
cc:

All counsel of record

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