Walton v. US Steel

Filing 103

OPINION AND ORDER denying 98 Motion to Have Transcripts Produce at Court Costs. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 3/8/2012. (cc: Walton) (rmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
MARILYN WALTON,

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
U.S. STEEL; UNITED STATES STEEL)
CORPORATION,
)
)
Defendants
)

Case No. 2:07 cv 331

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Motion to Have
Transcripts Produced at Court Costs [DE 98] filed by the plaintiff, Marilyn Walton, on February 2, 2012.

For the reasons set

forth below, the motion is DENIED.
Background
The plaintiff, Marilyn Walton, filed a pro se complaint
against her former employer, U.S. Steel, on September 21, 2007.
She later amended her complaint to include three counts, including: Count I - Racial Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C.
§2000 et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Count
II - Race Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981; and
Count III - Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. §215(a)(3).

U.S. Steel moved for summary judgment

on all of Walton's claims.

The court granted summary judgment in

favor of U.S. Steel on all of Walton's claims except her allega-

tion of retaliatory discharge.

A jury trial was held on December

12-13, 2011, on Walton's surviving claim.

At the close of

Walton's case, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of
law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.

The court deter-

mined that Walton did not meet her burden and that no reasonable
jury could find in her favor.

The court entered judgment in

favor of U.S. Steel and dismissed Walton's claim for retaliation.
On January 11, 2012, Walton filed a notice of appeal.

Her

notice states that she is appealing the judgment entered on
December 13, 2011, and does not state that she is appealing the
additional claims raised in her amended complaint that were
dismissed in the Opinion and Order on U.S. Steel's motion for
summary judgment.

Walton is proceeding on appeal in forma

pauperis and asks the court to waive the fees for the transcripts
of the trial.
Discussion
Title 28 U.S.C. §753 states that "[f]ees for transcripts
furnished in other proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in
forma pauperis shall also be paid by the United States if the
trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not
frivolous (but presents a substantial question)."

The court has

determined that Walton is indigent and unable to afford the costs
of appeal.

However, the court has not considered whether Wal-

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ton's appeal is frivolous.
without merit.

An appeal is frivolous when it is

Shoenrock v. Astrue, 2010 WL 987818, *1 (W.D.

Wis. 2010); Moore ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 23111614, *1
(W.D. Wis. 2003) (citing Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 631-32
(7th Cir. 2000)).

"Substantiality is viewed differently, depend-

ing on whether an IFP appeal is based on evidentiary issues or
purely legal claims.

When the appeal is based on the former, a

'substantial question' is held to be one that is 'reasonably
debatable.'
. . .".

A jury verdict is subject to very limited review

Jones v. Banks, 1995 WL 654008, *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3,

1995) (citations omitted).
Walton's notice of appeal states that she is appealing the
directed verdict entered by the court on December 13, 2011.
Therefore, the sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred by
determining that no reasonable jury could find that Walton was
retaliated against for filing a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC.

To present a prima facie case for discriminatory retalia-

tion, Walton was required to prove that "(1) she engaged in
statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the
protected expression and the adverse action."

Culver v. Gorman &

Company, 416 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2005); Moser v. Indiana
Department of Corrections, 406 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2005).

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The only element disputed at trial was whether there was a causal
connection between Walton filing her EEOC complaint and her
termination seven and a half weeks later.
At trial, U.S. Steel moved for judgment under Rule 50.

The

court found that Walton's case did not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis so that no reasonable jury could find in her
favor.

Walton has not pointed to new evidence or complained that

the court failed to consider a substantial amount of evidence
that would warrant reconsideration and may lead to a more favorable outcome.

There is nothing of record to suggest that Walton

can meet her evidentiary burden and show that she was retaliated
against.

At trial, Walton did not call a single witness who

could show, even circumstantially, that her termination was based
in part on the charge she filed with the EEOC.

Rather, the

evidence established that she was terminated for violating U.S.
Steel corporate policy.

Walton was unable to show that, although

she violated U.S. Steel policy, she was treated different than
other similarly situated employees who committed a similar
violation.

Rather, the evidence unequivocally showed that she

was treated the same as other employees who violated the no
tolerance policy against using racially degrading language.
Because the record is devoid of any indication that Walton's

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claim has merit and will result in a different outcome on appeal,
the court finds that Walton's appeal lacks merit.
__________
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Have Transcripts
Produced at Court Costs [DE 98] filed by the plaintiff, Marilyn
Walton, on February 2, 2012, is DENIED.
ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2012

s/ Andrew P. Rodovich
United States Magistrate Judge

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