Marshall v. GE Marshall Inc et al

Filing 124

OPINION AND ORDER, denying 96 MOTION for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of June 20, 2012 Opinion and Order filed by Karen Marshall. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 10/10/12. (kjp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
CASA M. MARSHALL,

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
GE MARSHALL, INC.; M5, INC.;
)
MBIP LLC; TOWER ROAD LLC; JOLIET)
ROAD PROPERTIES LLC; CRCFR
)
PROPERTIES LLC; FRANK A.
)
MARSHALL; CLINTON E. MARSHALL; )
ROGER W. MARSHALL; ROSS J.
)
MARSHALL, individually and in
)
their official capacities as an )
officer director and/or
)
shareholder of GE Marshall Inc, )
M5 Inc., MBIP LLC, Tower Road
)
LLC, Joliet Road Properties LLC,)
CRCFR Properties LLC, and as a )
beneficiary of the Glen E.
)
Marshall Marital Trust; MARIE
)
MARSHALL, as Trustee of the Glen)
E. Marshall Marital Trust; KAREN)
MARSHALL, as beneficiary of the )
Glen E. Marshall Marital Trust, )
)
Defendants
)

CIVIL NO. 2:09 cv 198

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of June 20, 2012 Opinion and Order
[DE 96] filed by the defendant, Karen Marshall, on June 29, 2012.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
Background
On February 28, 2011, the plaintiff, Casa M. Marshall, filed
a seven-count amended complaint against the defendants.

All of

the defendants were named individually with the exception of
Karen Marshall, who was named solely as the beneficiary of the
Glen E. Marshall Marital Trust.

The parties engaged in discov-

ery, and on February 3, 2012, the plaintiff served the defendants
with two subpoenas – one directed to Commercial Advantage, Inc.
and the other directed to BKD, LLP, both of which held personal
financial documents belonging to the defendants.

The subpoenas

sought production of any and all files concerning the named
defendants, which included Karen Marshall.

The defendants

collectively objected to the subpoenas as overly broad and
irrelevant and moved to quash them.
The court denied the defendants’ motion to quash on June 20,
2012.

In the opinion, the court found that the individual

defendants’ personal financial information was irrelevant to the
plaintiff’s discrimination claim but that the information was
relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for breach of the individual
defendants’ fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing.

The

court explained that the individual defendants’ personal financial information would show whether they received payments from
the corporate entities that the plaintiff did not receive, and
the amounts and frequency of any such payments.

The court also

determined that the individual defendants’ personal information
was relevant to determine whether payments were made to a Grantor

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Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT), which would affect the amount of
money the plaintiff sought to recover and the plaintiff’s request
for punitive damages.
The defendant, Karen Marshall, now asks the court to reconsider its opinion and order.

Karen argues that she only was

named as a defendant in her capacity as a beneficiary to the Glen
E. Marshall Marital Trust, not individually, and because of this
her personal financial information is irrelevant.

Although she

owned shares of G.E. Marshall, Inc., she could not vote on her
shares and did not participate in any decisions affecting the
company.

For these reasons, she argues that she could not have

participated in making any decisions that are the basis of the
plaintiff’s claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties, rendering her personal financial information irrelevant.
The plaintiff opposes Karen’s motion, arguing that this argument
was waived and cannot be raised for the first time on a motion to
reconsider.
Discussion
Although they are frequently filed, the Court of Appeals has
described a motion for reconsideration as "a motion that, strictly speaking, does not exist under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."

Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1142 n.2 (7th

Cir. 1994).

See also Talano v. Northwestern Medical Faculty

Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 760 n.1 (7th Cir. 2001). This
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type of motion "is a request that the [Court] reexamine its
decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law,
or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked." Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted).

See also United States v. Ligas,

549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2008)("A district court may reconsider a prior decision when there has been a significant change
in the law or facts since the parties presented the issue to the
court, when the court misunderstands a party’s arguments, or when
the court overreaches by deciding an issue not properly before
it.").

In Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995),

the Court of Appeals did not question the availability of a
motion to reconsider but stated:
It is not the purpose of allowing motions for
reconsideration to enable a party to complete
presenting his case after the court has ruled
against him. Were such a procedure to be
countenanced, some lawsuits really might
never end, rather than just seeming endless.
56 F.3d at 828

See also Oto v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 224 F.3d
601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)("A party may not use a motion for reconsideration to introduce new evidence that could have been presented earlier."); Divane v. Krull Electric Company, 194 F.3d
845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999); LB Credit Corporation v. Resolution

Trust Corporation, 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995).

Ulti-

mately, a motion for reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy
to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conser-

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vation of scarce judicial resources."

Global View Ltd. Venture

Capital v. Great Central Basin Exploration, 288 F.Supp.2d 482,
483 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(internal quotation omitted).
Karen argues that the motion should be reconsidered because
the court disregarded her "unique party status" when rendering
its decision.

The plaintiff sued Karen only in her capacity as a

beneficiary to the trust, and not as an individual.

The court

first found that the defendants’ personal financial data was
relevant because it may reveal that the defendants received
payments that the plaintiff did not, which may be circumstantial
evidence of a breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duties.

Karen

argues that she should be treated differently than the other
named defendants because, although she held stock, she was not
entitled to vote or participate in the management decisions, and
therefore, did not owe or breach any fiduciary duties.

Because

the court determined that the information sought was relevant to
this claim, and Karen could not have participated, she asks the
court to reconsider whether the subpoena should be quashed as it
relates to her personal financial information.
Similarly, Karen argues that because of her "unique party
status", the plaintiff could not attack her personal finances to
recover punitive damages.

The plaintiff’s ability to recover

punitive damages would be limited to the capacity in which she
sued the defendants.

Therefore, the amount of punitive damages

would be limited to her interest in the trust.

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Karen did not raise these arguments in her motion to quash
or reply memorandum and raises them for the first time in her
motion for reconsideration.

The plaintiff argues that Karen’s

motion must be denied because the moving party cannot raise new
arguments in a motion to reconsider, and instead, must point to
errors of law or fact made by the court.
828.

Frietsch, 56 F.3d at

Karen has not pointed to any information that was unavail-

able at the time she filed her motion or her reply to the motion
to quash, nor has she shown any changes to the law that would
warrant a change in the outcome.

Karen argues that her failure

to raise these arguments in the motion to quash or reply brief is
irrelevant because "courts have recognized the importance of
examining closely the capacity in which a party has been sued in
evaluating the appropriateness of discovery requests".

(Deft.

Br. p. 5) However, she cites no Seventh Circuit cases in support
of her argument.
Karen joined the individual defendants in opposing the
motion to quash.

At no time did she argue that she should be

treated differently.

Karen was aware of the arguments the

plaintiff raised in her response brief and chose not to respond
individually or to ask the court to treat her differently from
the other defendants.
waived it.

By failing to raise this argument, Karen

See Hernandez v. Cook County, 634 F.3d 906, 913 (7th

Cir. 2011) (explaining that skeletal arguments may be treated as
waived); Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 597-98 (7th Cir.
2003) (explaining that arguments not raised in initial motion or
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response are waived).

"Motions for reconsideration serve a

limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.

Such motions cannot in any

case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence . . . Nor
should a motion for reconsideration serve as the occasion to
tender new legal theories for the first time."

Publishers

Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557,
561 (7th Cir. 1985).

Motions to reconsider that exceed the

limited function of a motion to reconsider can waste judicial
resources and obstruct the efficient administration of justice.

U.S. Government ex rel. Houck v. Folding Carton Administration
Committee, 121 F.R.D. 69, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

This precisely is

what Karen’s motion to reconsider has done.
Karen had two opportunities to raise her argument – in her
motion to quash and reply brief.

Unhappy with the result, she

now presents new arguments that could have been raised in the
initial motion or reply.

She has provided no explanation why she

did not or could not have raised these arguments with the original motion.

Instead, she asks the court to consider the motion a

second time and to address arguments that could have been raised
in the initial motion.
reconsider.

This is not the purpose of a motion to

Karen has not pointed to manifest errors in the law

or fact, nor has she presented new evidence.

A motion for

reconsideration is not the appropriate platform on which to raise
new arguments that previously were not before the court.

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Moreover, Karen has not demonstrated how the information
sought by the subpoena is irrelevant to the plaintiff’s claim.
The court first determined that the defendants’ personal financial information was relevant to show whether they received
payments that the plaintiff did not.

Karen has not argued that,

if any such payments were made, they would not be reflected in
her personal financial information.

Karen may have received

payments regardless of whether she participated in the decision
to distribute payment or not.
Because Karen both failed to show how the information sought
is irrelevant and waived this argument by failing to raise it in
the motion to quash or reply memorandum, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of June 20, 2012 Opinion and Order
[DE 96] filed by the defendant, Karen Marshall, on June 29, 2012,
is DENIED.
ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2012

s/ ANDREW P. RODOVICH
United States Magistrate Judge

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