Goodman et al v. United States of America et al

Filing 227

ORDER re 198 Motion for Summary Judgment: Donald Kalina and Stephanie Holloways motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as it relates to plaintiffs federal § 1983 claims, and DENIED as it relates to plaintiffs state-law claims. Signed by Senior Judge James T Moody on 7/8/13. (mc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
ROY GOODMAN JR., ROY GOODMAN III, )
RENEE GOODMAN, RENIECE GOODMAN,)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
ADAM CLARK, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 2:09 CV 355

OPINION and ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants Donald Kalina and Stephanie
Holloway’s1 motion for summary judgment. (DE # 198.) Plaintiffs have not responded
to this motion, and the time to do so has now passed. For the following reasons, Kalina
and Holloway’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background
In their fourth amended complaint (DE # 151), plaintiffs allege that on or about

December 28, 2007, federal agents and members of the Hammond Police Department
entered plaintiffs’ home, aided by the use of sound grenades and smoke bombs.
Plaintiffs further allege that they were arrested, and that charges were brought against
plaintiff Roy Goodman, Jr. by the Hammond Officers, despite the Hammond Officers

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Defendant Donald Kalina is incorrectly identified in plaintiffs’ fourth amended
complaint as “Officer Donald” and “Officer Kalin.” (DE # 151.) Defendant Stephanie
Holloway is incorrectly identified in plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint as “Officer
Stephanie” and “Officer Holloway.” (Id.) Neither Kalina nor Holloway are police
officers. (See DE # 199-1 at 2; DE # 199-2 at 2.)

lacking probable cause. Defendants Kalina and Holloway are listed as Hammond
Officers in plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. (DE # 151 at 2.) In their fourth
amended complaint, plaintiffs bring the following claims against the Hammond
Officers: Excessive force (Count I), false arrest (Count III), and conspiracy to commit
Constitutional violations (Count V) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law claims of false
arrest (Count IV) and malicious prosecution (Count VII). (Id. at 6-9.)
In their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants
Kalina and Holloway have submitted a statement of material facts (DE # 199 at 2),2
which reveals that defendants Kalina and Holloway are not Hammond Police Officers,
but are in fact civilian employees of the City of Hammond (Id. at 2-3.) Both Kalina and
Holloway are police radio dispatchers. (Id.)
Defendant Holloway was not involved in any law enforcement activities on or
about December 28, 2007 involving any of the plaintiffs. (Id. at 2.) She did not
participate in the execution of the search warrant at plaintiffs’ residence (id.), she was
not involved in the investigation or arrest of the plaintiffs (id.), she was not involved in
plaintiffs’ detention at the Hammond Police Department (id.), and she has never
deployed any flash bang grenades at plaintiffs’ home (id. at 3). Defendant Holloway had
no contact with plaintiffs at plaintiffs’ home or the Hammond Police Department in
regard to any of the allegations plaintiffs have raised in their fourth amended

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Because plaintiffs have not responded to defendant Kalina and Holloways’
motion for summary judgment, these facts are deemed admitted for purposes of
defendants’motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).
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complaint. (Id.) Defendant Holloway has no personal knowledge of any of the events
alleged in plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. (Id.)
Defendant Kalina did not participate in any law enforcement activities involving
plaintiffs on or about December 28, 2007. (Id.) Defendant Kalina did not participate in
the execution of the search warrant at plaintiffs’ house. (Id.) He was not involved in the
investigation, arrest, or detention of any of the plaintiffs. (Id.) On December 28, 2007,
defendant Kalina was simply at work performing his duties as a police radio dispatcher
for the City of Hammond. (Id.) Defendant Kalina has never deployed any flash bang
grenades at plaintiffs’ home. (Id. at 4.) Defendant Kalina did not have any contact with
plaintiffs at plaintiffs’ home or the Hammond Police Department in regard to the events
alleged in plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. (Id.) Defendant Kalina has no personal
knowledge of any of the events alleged in plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. (Id.)
Defendants Kalina and Holloway have now moved for summary judgment on
several of plaintiffs’ claims.
II.

Legal Standard
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery, against a party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
“[S]ummary judgment is appropriate–in fact, is mandated–where there are no disputed

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issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words,
the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”
Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that these
requirements have been met. Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, Ill., 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th
Cir. 2010). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is,
pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has met his
burden, the non-moving party must identify specific facts establishing that there is a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986);
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
In doing so, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must present
fresh proof in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Donovan v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994). In viewing the facts presented on a motion
for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the
non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Chmiel v. JC
Penney Life Ins. Co., 158 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998); Doe, 42 F.3d at 443.
Because plaintiffs failed to file a response to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, defendants are entitled to summary ruling on the motion – that is, a ruling
without the benefit of plaintiffs’ response. Plaintiffs’ failure to respond, however, does

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not automatically result in summary judgment for defendants. Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn
Assoc., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1992). Rather, the court must still “make the
further finding that given the undisputed facts, summary judgment is proper as a
matter of law.” Id. Accordingly, the court’s task is to examine the factual record in this
case to determine whether defendants have met their burden of demonstrating a lack of
genuine issues of material fact warranting summary judgment in its favor.
III.

Analysis
A. § 1983 Claims
As noted above, plaintiffs allege that defendants Kalina and Holloway are liable

for excessive force, false arrest, and conspiracy to commit Constitutional violations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 151.) In their brief, defendants Kalina and Holloway
argue that plaintiffs have failed to identify how they were involved in the deprivation
of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (See DE # 199 at 4-5.) “[I]n order [t]o recover damages
under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for
the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462-63 (7th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Allen v. Wine, 297 F. App’x 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“To hold a person liable under § 1983 . . . the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
was personally involved in the deprivation of a constitutional right.”). Defendants
Kalina and Holloway have submitted evidence which shows that they did not
participate in, or even have knowledge of, the alleged events that provide the basis for
plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaint. Thus, defendants Kalina and Holloway have met

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their initial burden on summary judgment. Because plaintiffs have not filed a response,
they have not shown there is a genuine issue of fact for trial, and defendants Kalina and
Holloway are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
B. State Claims
Plaintiffs also bring state-law claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution
against defendants Kalina and Holloway. (DE # 151.) Defendants Kalina and Holloway
have failed to address or even mention plaintiffs’ state-law claims, and “[i[t is not the
obligation of this court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties,
especially when they are represented by counsel.” Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 703
(7th Cir. 1986). Therefore, defendants Kalina and Holloway’s motion for summary
judgment will be denied as it relates to plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
C. RULE 54(b)
Defendants Kalina and Holloway have also requested that the court issue a final
judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). (DE # 198.) Under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b):
When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Because plaintiffs’ state-law claims against defendants Kalina and
Holloway remain pending, and because plaintiffs’ federal claims remain pending
against other defendants, a certification under RULE 54(b) at this stage of the litigation
would be improper. MOORE’S FED. PRACTICE 3d, § 54.22[2][a] (“Not only must the

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judgment be final under § 1291, but the judgment must also dispose of one or more of
multiple claims, or all of the claims against one or more of multiple parties.”).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Donald Kalina and Stephanie Holloway’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED as it relates to plaintiffs’ federal § 1983 claims, and
DENIED as it relates to plaintiffs’ state-law claims. (DE # 198.)
SO ORDERED.
Date: July 8, 2013
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT