Daniels v. United States Steel et al
Filing
32
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by United States Steel. US Steel termed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew P Rodovich on 10/11/11. cc: pltf (kjp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
JAMES C. DANIELS,
)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES STEEL; LOCAL 1014 )
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA )
District 31,
)
)
Defendants
)
CIVIL NO. 2:10 cv 118
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary
Judgment [DE 19] filed by the defendant, United States Steel
Corporation, on March 31, 2011.
For the reasons set forth below,
the motion is GRANTED.
Background
James C. Daniels was employed by United States Steel Corporation until he was terminated in November 2008, for misrepresenting a medical condition and fraudulently receiving sickness
and accident benefits.
Daniels filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
investigated and denied Daniels' claim.
The EEOC
Daniels was issued a
notice of dismissal and right to sue, advising him that he had 90
days from receiving the notice to file a complaint.
On March 12, 2010, Daniels filed a complaint with this court
alleging that U.S. Steel violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§12101 et seq.
In his complaint, Daniels alleges that he could
not perform the requirements of his position because of a wrist
injury and was not offered another position that would accommodate his condition.
He further alleges that his religious
beliefs were not accommodated because he was required to work on
Sundays, even after he requested Sundays off.
U.S. Steel filed its answer on April 27, 2010, denying that
it had committed any discriminatory acts against Daniels.
Addi-
tionally, U.S. Steel raised two affirmative defenses, arguing
that all employment actions taken against Daniels were performed
in good faith and based upon non-discriminatory business practices.
On December 27, 2010, U.S. Steel served a set of Interrogatories, a Request for Admissions, and a Request for Production of
Documents on Daniels.
Copies of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
33, 34, and 36 accompanied the discovery requests.
Defense
counsel advised Daniels that his responses were due within 30
days and that a failure to respond would result in the Request
for Admissions being deemed admitted as a matter of law.
Dan-
iels' responses were due on or before January 29, 2011, but he
never responded or sought an extension of time.
2
By failing to respond, Daniels admitted the following:
1.
United States Steel Corporation provided
a reasonable accommodation to Daniels'
religious beliefs by allowing Daniels
not to work on Sundays provided Daniels
found another individual to work his
shift.
2.
Daniels' religious beliefs did not preclude him from asking anyone else to
work Sundays.
3.
Daniels never communicated to any representative of United States Steel Corporation that his religious beliefs precluded him from asking anyone else to
work Sundays.
4.
Daniels never filed any complaint or
grievance against United States Steel
Corporation as a result of a) working
any Sunday shift in 2008; and b) requesting that another individual work
his Sunday shift.
5.
United States Steel Corporation did not
discriminate against Daniels based on
his religious beliefs.
6.
Daniels' left wrist condition, in 2008,
was a temporary injury or condition.
7.
Daniels' left wrist condition, in 2008,
did not prevent or severely restrict any
major life activity.
8.
Daniels' left wrist condition, in 2008,
was not a disability.
9.
No representative of United States Steel
Corporation, in 2008, regarded Daniels
as having a disability.
10.
Daniels was terminated from United States
Steel Corporation in November 2008, for mis3
representing a medical condition and for
fraudulently receiving sickness and accident
benefits.
11.
Daniels was terminated for cause from United
States Steel Corporation.
12.
Daniels was not disciplined, discharged, or
suffered any adverse employment action due to
his failure to work on any scheduled Sunday
shift.
13.
Daniels was not terminated due to his religious beliefs.
14.
Daniels was not terminated due to any alleged
disability.
15.
Daniels was not discriminated against due to
his religious beliefs or due to his left
wrist condition.
16.
Daniels has no medical evidence or report
which establishes his left wrist condition
was permanent.
17.
Daniels has no medical evidence or report
which establishes that his left wrist condition prevents or severely restricts any major
life activity.
U.S. Steel filed a motion for summary judgment on March 31,
2011, arguing that Daniels admitted essential elements which
defeated his claim by failing to respond.
U.S. Steel's motion
was accompanied with the Local Rule 56.1(e) Notice, advising
Daniels of the consequences of failing to respond.
filed a response, and the time to do so has passed.
4
Daniels never
Discussion
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary
judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009).
The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material
facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence
of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S.Ct.
1598, 1610, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 155 (1970); Stephens, 569 F.3d at
786.
A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under
applicable law.
There must be evidence on which the jury reason-
ably could find for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d
202, 212 (1986); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786; Wheeler v. Lawson,
539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment is inappropriate for determination of
claims in which issues of intent, good faith, and other subjective feelings play dominant roles.
781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006).
Ashman v. Barrows, 438 F.3d
Upon review, the court does not evalu-
ate the weight of the evidence, judge the credibility of wit-
5
nesses, or determine the ultimate truth of the matter; rather,
the court will determine whether there exists a genuine issue of
triable fact.
Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634 (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
must determine whether the evidence presented by the party
opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury
might find in favor of that party after a trial.
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the
need for a trial--whether, in other words,
there are any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a finder of
fact because they may reasonably be resolved
in favor of either party.
[T]his standard mirrors the standard for a
directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial
judge must direct a verdict if, under the
governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511
See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
149-151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2109, 147 L.Ed.2d 105, 120-122 (2000)
(setting out the standard for a directed verdict); Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786;
Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008)
(stating that a genuine issue is one on which a reasonable fact
finder could find for the nonmoving party); Springer v. Durfling6
er, 518 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2008)(stating that a genuine
issue exists and summary judgment is inappropriate if there is
sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party).
"As a pro se litigant, [a] [p]laintiff is permitted a more
lenient standard with respect to his pleadings than that imposed
on a practicing attorney."
Cintron v. St. Gobain Abbrassives,
Inc., 2004 WL 3142556, *1 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 18, 2004).
Although
the court recognizes that pro se litigants face special challenges that litigants represented by counsel do not, pro se
litigants are not excused from following procedural rules simply
because the "rules of procedure are based on the assumption that
litigation is normally conducted by lawyers."
Lee v. Wal-Mart
Stores, 1994 WL 899240, *1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 12, 1994).
In Lee,
the district court held that
[the Court] ha[s] never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation
should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.
As we have noted before, "in the long run,
experience teaches that strict adherence to
the procedural requirements specified by the
legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law."
Lee, 1994 WL 899240 at *1 (quoting Mohasco
Corp. v. Silver, 477 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct.
2486, 2497, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980))
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A defendant filing a motion for summary judgment must warn a
pro se plaintiff of the consequences of failing to respond to the
motion.
Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992); Local
Rule 56.1(e).
The notice must include a short statement inform-
ing the plaintiff that all factual assertions made by the defendant will be taken as true should the plaintiff fail to respond.
Timms, 953 F.2d at 285; Local Rule 56.1(e).
U.S. Steel served a
proper Timms notice on Daniels, a pro se litigant, on December
27, 2010.
Pursuant to Rule 56.1(a), Daniels had 28 days to
respond.
This period expired on January 24, 2011, without a
response from Daniels.
Daniels is not excused from following
procedural rules and has waived his right to contest U.S. Steel's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Despite Daniels' failure to re-
spond, this court still must determine whether U.S. Steel is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Daniels' complaint alleges a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101.
As set forth
below, these claims are without merit.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that an
employer acts unlawfully if it "fail[s] or refuse[s] to hire or
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
8
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
. . . religion."
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).
This definition
encompasses "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief."
42 U.S.C. §2000e(j).
A plaintiff alleging
religious discrimination under Title VII first must establish a
prima facie case by proving three things: (1) his bona fide
religious practices conflict with an employment requirement; (2)
he brought the practice or observance to the employer's attention; and (3) an adverse employment action based on the religious
practice occurred.
Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274
F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc.,
108 F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1997).
If the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant,
requiring that it present evidence establishing either that it
provided an appropriate accommodation to the employee which the
employee refused, or that the employer would suffer an undue
burden resulting from the proposed accommodation.
Wilburn v.
Y.M.C.A. of Greater Indianapolis (Ransburg Branch), 2007 WL
2752391, *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2007) (citations omitted).
If
the employer can show that it offered a reasonable accommodation,
it has met its burden and summary judgment may be entered in its
favor.
Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1340
(8th Cir. 1995).
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By failing to respond to U.S. Steel's Request for Admissions, Daniels admitted facts defeating essential elements of his
religious discrimination claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
36(a) states that "[a] party may serve on any other party a
written request to admit . . . facts, the application of law to
fact, or opinions about either."
If a fact or set of facts is
requested to be admitted, the party served with the request must
respond to the requesting party with a written answer or objection within 30 days of being served.
The facts are deemed
admitted if the non-requesting party fails to respond.
36(a)(3).
Rule
"[A]dmissions made under Rule 36, even default admis-
sions, can serve as the factual predicate for summary judgment."
United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987).
Daniels has the burden of proving three elements to successfully establish his religious discrimination claim.
Although
Daniels alleges that his work schedule required him to work on
Sundays in conflict with his religion, by failing to respond to
U.S. Steel's request for admissions, he admitted that he was not
discriminated against because of his religion and that he did not
file the appropriate grievance with U.S. Steel apprising them of
the conflict between his work schedule and religious beliefs.
light of these admissions, Daniels cannot establish the second
and third elements of a prima facie religious discrimination
10
In
case.
Furthermore, even if Daniels could make out a prima facie
case, which he cannot, his admissions establish that U.S. Steel
satisfied its burden and provided a reasonable accommodation by
allowing him to take Sundays off, provided he found someone to
cover his shift.
Because Daniels neither can satisfy his burden
and make out a prima facie case nor prove that U.S. Steel did not
satisfy its obligations by providing a reasonable accommodation,
summary judgment must be granted in favor of U.S. Steel.
In addition to his Title VII complaint, Daniels also complained that he was terminated in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act because of his wrist injury.
The ADA prohibits
discrimination against an individual based upon his disability.
An individual claiming protection must show that he is "disabled."
42 U.S.C. §12112(a).
An individual is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA when he suffers a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as
having such an impairment.
29 C.F.R. §1630.2.
Major life
activities include activities that a person generally does on a
daily basis, including but not limited to, "walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
§1630.2(i).
29 C.F.R.
The court must make an individualized analysis to
determine whether an individual's impairments "substantially
11
limit" his "major life activities."
E.E.O.C. v. Lee's Log Cabin,
Inc., 546 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2008).
Through his failure to respond to U.S. Steel's request for
admissions, Daniels admitted that he was not discriminated
against because of a disability, was not regarded as having a
disability, and was not restricted in any major life activity.
Because Daniels bears the burden of establishing that he was
disabled, meaning that he could not perform a major life activity, his admission defeats his claim.
prima facie case under the ADA.
Daniels cannot make out a
Summary judgment must be granted
on this claim.
_______________
Because Daniels admitted facts defeating his claims under
Title VII and the ADA, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
the defendant, United States Steel Corporation, on March 31,
2011, is GRANTED.
ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2011
s/ ANDREW P. RODOVICH
United States Magistrate Judge
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