Campbell v. Crown Point Police Department et al
Filing
28
OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Rudy Lozano on 9/28/11. (mc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
DONALD CAMPBELL,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER RYAN OLSON,
individually and in his
official capacity,
Defendant.
NO. 2:10-CV-146
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and Designation of Evidence, filed by Defendants,
Officer Ryan Olson and City of Crown Point Police Department1, on
February 17, 2011. For the reasons set forth below, this motion is
GRANTED.
The clerk is ORDERED to close this case.
BACKGROUND
On February, 12, 2010, Plaintiff, Donald Campbell, initiated
this case against Defendants, City of Crown Point Police Department
and Officer Ryan Olson, arising out of Campbell’s April 21, 2008,
arrest.
Plaintiff alleges false imprisonment and false arrest
claims under both Indiana state and federal law.
1
Plaintiff also
The City of Crown Point Police Department has since been voluntarily
dismissed from this case. (DE# 24).
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alleged a failure to train claim against the Crown Point Police
Department.
In April of 2010, this case was removed here.
Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
While this motion was being briefed, the Plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed the Crown Point Police Department.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment Standard
The standards that generally govern summary judgment motions
are familiar. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
In other words, the record
must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th
Cir. 1991); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court
must view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Nucor Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas De
Occidente, 28 F.3d 572, 583 (7th Cir. 1994).
The burden is upon the movant to identify those portions of
"the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
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to
interrogatories,
and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits," if any, that the
movant believes demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Once the movant has met
this burden, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but
"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill
Assocs., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990); Schroeder v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 1989).
"Whether
a
fact
is
material
depends
on
the
substantive
law
underlying a particular claim and 'only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'"
Walter v.
Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248).
"[A] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue
may not rest on its pleading, but must affirmatively demonstrate,
by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of
material fact which requires trial." Beard v. Whitley County REMC,
840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original); see also
Hickey v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 995 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir. 1993).
Therefore, if a party fails to establish the existence of an
essential element on which the party bears the burden of proof at
trial, summary judgment will be appropriate.
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Facts
The largely undisputed facts are as follows.
On April 13,
2008, Officer Olsen was dispatched to the home of Plaintiff’s
daughter, Carly Campbell.
(Aff. Olsen ¶ 3).
After arriving,
Officer Olsen spoke with Carly and her step-father, Carl Loomis.
(Aff. Olsen ¶ 4).
Carly informed Officer Olsen that she was
fearful of her father, Donald Campbell, and presented Olsen with a
court order dated October 28, 2003, requiring any communication
between Carly and her father to be only at the direction of a
therapist.
(Aff. Olsen ¶ 5; Aff. Carly Campbell ¶ 5).
Carly and
her father were not engaged in therapy at that time.
(Aff. C.
Campbell ¶ 6).
The court order Officer Olsen was presented with was dated
October 28, 2003, under Cause No. 45D05-0201-DR-10, which stated:
The Court Orders that if Father wishes to establish
communication or visitation with his youngest daughter
Carly, he will proceed as follows:
a.
Arrange for a licensed family therapist
who is convenient to Carly in location;
b.
Be solely responsible for any
associated with the therapy; and
c.
Strictly follow all instructions of the
therapist.
costs
***
All communication and/or contact between
Father and Carly shall be strictly directed by
the therapist.
(Ex. F, ¶ 8).
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There is no expiration date identified on the face of the
order.
(Ex. F).
It states that “[t]his Order is enforceable by
all remedies provided by law including contempt and that it remains
in effect until modified or dissolved by the Court.”
(Ex. F).
Carly informed Officer Olsen that between noon and 2:30 p.m.
her father called her cell phone and left a voice message stating
he would be outside of her building waiting to see her.
Olsen ¶ 6; Aff. Carly Campbell ¶ 7).
(Aff.
On that day, Officer Olsen
filed a Probable Cause Affidavit with the Lake County Prosecutor’s
office stating that Donald Campbell violated a protective order
with the Cause Number 45D05-0201-DR-10.
(Aff. Olsen ¶ 8).
upon
Prosecutor
that
affidavit
the
Lake
County
Based
approved
an
Information, alleging that Donald Campbell committed the Class A
Misdemeanor of Invasion of Privacy.
City of Crown Point Judge,
Kent Jeffirs, issued an Arrest Warrant for Donald Campbell on the
charge of Invasion of Privacy.
(Aff. Olsen ¶ 9; Ex E).
In the morning of April 21, 2008, Officer Olsen observed a
white dodge van belonging to Donald Campbell in the parking lot of
Citizen’s Financial Bank.
(Olsen Aff. ¶ 10).
A computer check
revealed that Campbell was wanted on an arrest warrant through
Crown Point City Court for invasion of privacy. (Olsen Aff. ¶ 11).
Officer Olsen went inside the bank with Officer Sprague and they
observed Donald Campbell standing near a desk.
(Olsen Aff. ¶ 12).
The officers approached Donald Campbell and asked him to identify
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himself.
(Olsen Aff. ¶ 13).
Donald Campbell identified himself
and provided his driver’s license.
(Olsen Aff. ¶ 14).
Officer
Olsen provided Donald Campbell with a copy of the arrest warrant
and advised him that he was under arrest.
(Olsen Aff. ¶ 15).
Donald Campbell was handcuffed and taken to the Lake County Jail.
(Olsen Aff. ¶ 15).
Donald Campbell argues that the October 23, 2003, order was
expired as a matter of law and Officer Olsen would have realized
that fact if he exercised reasonable diligence and made the
necessary investigation.
Donald Campbell contends that, as a
result, he was arrested without probable cause.
Thus, Donald
Campbell asserts he suffered a false arrest and false imprisonment
under both Indiana law and the United States Constitution.
DISCUSSION
Federal Law Claims of Wrongful Arrest
and Detention Against Olsen in his Individual Capacity
Title 42, Section 1983 authorizes a federal cause of action
for any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives
another of rights secured by federal law or the United States
Constitution.
Donald Campbell alleges that Officer Olson violated
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because Officer Olson
lacked probable cause to effectuate his arrest on April 21, 2008.
Donald Campbell’s arrest came pursuant to a valid arrest
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warrant.
An
arrest
made
pursuant
to
a
valid
warrant
is
presumptively constitutional unless the officer seeking the warrant
intentionally or recklessly misstated or omitted material facts to
obtain the warrant, and there would not have been probable cause
had the testimony been accurate. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171-72 (1978); United States v. Hoffman, 519 F.3d 672, 675 (7th
Cir. 2008).
Moreover, Officer Olson enjoys qualified immunity for
his conduct in applying for an arrest warrant.
992 F.2d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1993).
Hinnen v. Kelly,
Thus, Officer Olson will be
liable under section 1983 “only if a reasonably well-trained
officer in Olson’s position should have known that the testimony or
affidavit he provided in support of the warrant would have failed
to establish probable cause.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345
(1986)(adopting the qualified immunity standard from the standards
established for the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
To demonstrate this, Campbell must “identify evidence in the
record showing that [Officer Olson] , knowingly or intentionally or
with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to
the judicial officer, and that the false statements were necessary
to
the
judicial
officers’
existed for the arrest[].”
determinations
that
probable
cause
Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320
F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2003)(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56)).
“A ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ is demonstrated by showing
that the officers entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
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their statements, had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
information reported, or failed to inform the judicial officer of
facts they knew would negate probable cause.”
Id.(citing United
States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614, 620-21 (7th Cir. 2001)).
In this case, Donald Campbell was arrested for Invasion of
Privacy, based on violating the 2003 protective order, in violation
of Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1.
The crux of Plaintiff’s
argument is that the protective order issued in 2003, which Officer
Olsen relied on to create the probable cause affidavit, was expired
as a matter of law.
This belief is based on Indiana Code section
34-26-5-9(e), which provides:
An order for protection issued ex parte or upon notice
and a hearing, or a modification of an order for
protection issued ex parte or upon notice and a hearing
is effective for two years after the date of issuance
unless another date is ordered by the court.
Plaintiff argues that Officer Olsen is presumed to know that orders
of protection only last two years, but he recklessly disregarded
that and nevertheless relied on the 2003 order in an effort to
create probable cause.
As a result, Donald Campbell suggests that
Olsen’s arrest lacked probable cause and is thus actionable under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments via section 1983.
As
Donald
Campbell
recognizes,
typically
these
types
of
section 1983 cases center around the probable cause affidavit
“being attacked on the basis that it contained evidence that the
officers knew or should have known was false, or omitted material
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information that would have led to the issuing magistrate to find
probable cause lacking.” (Resp. p. 13). That did not happen here.
Officer
Olsen
information.
provided
all
of
the
correct
relevant
factual
He identified the protective order at issue arising
in cause number 45D05-0201-DR-10.
He stated that the protective
order required Donald Campbell not to establish any communication
with his daughter Carly unless accompanied by a licensed family
therapist. Officer Olsen further stated that Donald Olson violated
that order by calling Carly on her cell phone leaving a voice
message on April 13, 2008, between the hours of 12:30 p.m. and 2:30
p.m.
What Donald Campbell complains about is that Officer Olsen
should have known that a 2003 court order could not provide
probable cause for a 2008 arrest.
Simply put, Donald Campbell
asserts that Officer Olsen is presumed to know that the 2003 Order
was too old to be enforceable and thus had obvious reasons to doubt
the presence of probable cause.
Clearly, Officer Olsen’s legal
conclusion based on the facts is what is being assailed.
It is true that the Indiana Code states that protective orders
are valid for two years unless another date is ordered by the
court.
In this case, there was another date ordered by the judge,
and that date was “until modified or dissolved by the Court.”
Donald Campbell argues that the general language in the court order
cannot be used to extend the protective order beyond two years.
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While Campbell makes this argument, he fails to cite to any
supporting authority that would disallow a judge from extending the
duration of a protective order’s validity indefinitely.
Notably,
Judge Pete ordered that the protection would last until the order
was modified or dissolved.
That order was never modified or
dissolved. Thus, on its face, the order appears to still be valid,
giving rise to probable cause for the arrest of Donald Campbell.
Nevertheless, whether or not probable cause existed to arrest
Donald Campbell is not determinative.
Before liability can be
imposed upon Officer Olson, this Court must determine if Officer
Olson is entitled to qualified immunity.
This Court is to decide
whether Officer Olson could have reasonably believed that the 2003
protective order was still valid at the time of the arrest.
Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998).
In making
this decision, this Court looks to whether “a reasonable police
officer in the same circumstances and with the same knowledge . .
. as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that
probable cause existed in light of the well-established law.”
Id.
(citation omitted).
Donald Campbell can demonstrate that Officer Olson could not
have reasonably believed that the 2003 protective order was valid
by either presenting a closely analogous case or by presenting
evidence that Officer Olson’s conduct was so patently violative of
the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know
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without guidance from the court.
Siebert v. Severino, 256 648,
654-55 (7th Cir. 2001)(identifying two ways for proving that a
right is clearly established: (1) a closely analogous case; or (2)
obvious violation).
Donald Campbell does not demonstrate this in
either way.
To start, Donald Campbell has failed to cite to a closely
analogous case. The only case Donald Campbell cites to demonstrate
that Judge Pete’s “until modified or dissolved by the Court”
language is insufficient to overcome the two year provision in
Indiana Code 34-26-5-9(e) is City of Wabash v. Wabash County
Sheriff’s Department, 562 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
While
Wabash discusses statutory and rule construction generally, it is
not closely analogous to the instant case.
Wabash did not concern
any of the statutes involved in this case nor did it have any
analogous facts.
As a result, Wabash is insufficient to put a
reasonable officer on notice that the 2003 protective order was
expired2.
Donald Campbell also fails to demonstrate that a reasonable
officer would know that the 2003 protective order was expired and
could not provide the basis for probable cause without guidance
from a court.
The face of the 2003 order states that it is valid
until it is dissolved or modified.
2
It had neither been dissolved
Assuming for the sake of argument that the order was expired pursuant
to Indiana Code section 34-26-5-9(e).
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nor modified.
In addition, both the prosecutor and presiding
magistrate signed off on the arrest warrant, which would further
tell a reasonable officer that the 2003 protective order was valid.
Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 624 (7th Cir. 1999)(noting that an
officer could reasonably believe that a judicial officer’s arrest
warrant is presumptively valid).
Ultimately, whether or not there was probable cause to arrest
Donald Campbell, it is undisputed that a reasonable officer in
Officer
Olson’s
position
could
have
believed
that
the
2003
protective order was still valid at the time of the arrest, and
thus had a good faith belief that there was probable cause.
Accordingly, Officer Olson is afforded qualified immunity from
Donald Campbell’s constitutional claims.
State Law Claims of False Imprisonment
and False Arrest Against Olsen in his Official Capacity
Similar to the qualified immunity afforded to Officer Olson
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Officer Olson is entitled to a “good
faith” immunity from state law claims of false imprisonment and
false arrest.
Garrett v. City of Bloomington, 478 N.E.2d 89, 94
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
“A police officer cannot be held liable . .
. if ‘the officer believed in good faith that the arrest was made
with probable cause and that such belief was reasonable.’” Id.
This Court has already determined that Donald Campbell has
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failed to show that Officer Olson acted with bad faith or with an
unreasonable belief in the constitutionality of his actions.
at 95.
Id.
Because Officer Olson acted in good faith that the arrest
of Donald Campbell was made with probable cause and because Officer
Olson’s belief was reasonable, he is afforded good faith immunity
from Campbell’s state law false arrest and false imprisonment
claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
DATED:
The clerk is ORDERED to close this case.
September 28, 2011
/s/RUDY LOZANO, Judge
United States District Court
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